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FIELD-MARSHAL

COUNT MOLTKE

1800—1878

FIELD-MARSHAL
COUNT MOLTKE


1800—1878

BY
PROFESSOR W. MÜLLER
OF TÜBINGEN

TRANSLATED WITH THE AUTHOR'S SANCTION

BY
PERCY E. PINKERTON

AND EDITED BY
CAPTAIN H. M. HOZIER



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EDITOR'S NOTE.



THE history of the life of such a strategist as Count Moltke needs no introduction to the public. For the convenience of English readers the work of Herr Müller has been translated into our tongue. Both translator and editor have done their best to render their task worthy of the subject, but success to the undertaking must be expected rather from the universal interest taken in any account of the great General than from their own labours.

H. M. H.

AUTHOR S PREFACE.

THE life of Field-Marshal Count Moltke forms a page in history. A man who has done so great things in the cause of Germany's unity and strength must not shrink from the grateful curiosity of the entire German nation, in their sympathetic desire to know as much as may be of the personal details of his life. Accordingly, at the request of many, the author has undertaken to produce the following sketch, with materials for the most part derived from works either written by Moltke himself, or more or less inspired by him. To the former category belong his Letters from the East, his description of the Russo-Turkish war in 1828-29, and his Letters from Russia and from Paris; to the latter, the official accounts of the Prussian campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71. The author has also made use of Count Waldersee's work on the Danish war of 1864, and those of Count Wartensleben and Baron von der Goltz on the operations of the armies under Prince Frederick Charles and General Manteuffel, besides the volumes of Generals Wimpffen and Ducrot, and the official work on the cam-

paign of 1859. Yet, despite this wealth of material, the task of constructing a biographical sketch therefrom was not altogether an easy one ; for, apart from the fact that in times of peace the life of a Chief of the Staff calls for no comment, his abilities in war-time must of necessity lack that prominence which, as a commander-in-chief, they would possess. And so, while careful to keep Moltke as much as possible in the foreground, the author, in treating of the two great wars which Moltke conducted, has thought fit to dwell more especially upon the plans of his campaign and his orders to his generals, rather than upon the minutiae of the battles themselves. For in these plans we may trace at once the preparations made for each battle, as well as the conditions on which victory was possible. In the present monograph both Moltke's sojourn in the East, as also his speeches in the German Reichstag, have met with the attention which they deserve.

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FIELD-MARSHAL
COUNT MOLTKE.

1800—78.

THE BOHEMIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1866.

It was the 2nd of July, 1866. The King of Prussia had arrived at Gitschin, where he assumed the supreme command of the troops. With him were Count Bismarck, General Von Moltke and General Von Roon. Prince Frederick Charles, whose head-quarters were at Kamenitz, had also come to Gitschin, on a visit to his royal uncle. He brought accurate details of the engagement of June 29th, and was also present at a council of war. At his suggestion, it was decided that the troops should halt for a couple of days to recover from their recent fatigue. The Prince left for Kamenitz that afternoon at three o'clock. Moltke and other members of the Staff remained with the King. The table was strewn with maps, in which, here and there, coloured pins were stuck. It was to Moltke that all listened. Later on the council broke up, and the Staff officers retired. The King, however, transacted business until past ten o'clock. At half-past, as he was retiring for the night, a Staff officer of the army of Prince Frederick Charles was announced. It was General Voigt-Rhetz, with news of import for the King.

The Prince, on his return to Kamenitz, had been at once acquainted with the results of the reconnaissances made during the day. From the Cerekwitz-Schloss, Colonel Zychlinski reported that the Austrians were encamped near Lipa. Major Unger, in the course of a daring ride along the Sadowa high-road, as far as Dub, had found the heights there in the possession of the enemy. Great bivouacs had been noticed by Lieutenant Heister on both sides of Benatek; and it was evident that the neighbourhood of Sadowa was occupied by the Austrians. From prisoners it had been ascertained that about four corps d'armée were stationed by the river Bistritz; that the Saxons were in position near Probus; and that, near Lipa, ten cavalry regiments with a considerable body of artillery were assembled. From all this there could be no doubt that Austria intended to take the offensive. And it was this that the Prince was anxious to prevent, so he at once decided to attack the enemy with his whole army upon the following morning. Accordingly, at 9 P.M., the necessary orders were issued to the generals of his army. General Herwarth received instructions to proceed as soon as possible with the army of the Elbe to Nechanitz, on the Bistritz. To Lieutenant Normann, of the Hussars, was entrusted a despatch addressed to the Crown Prince at Königinhof, requesting him to advance with the Guards and any other troops in the direction of Josephstadt, a town situate on the right bank of the Elbe. This would serve to protect the left wing. The Prince's order reached General Herwarth at 12.30 the same night; that of the Crown Prince some half-hour later. But as it was the King who now held the chief command, it was necessary that he should know of the Prince's plan. It was a move which must receive the sanction and approval of the Commander-in-chief; hence the arrival of General Voigt-Rhetz. It

seemed scarcely credible to the King that Benedek should have thus arranged his whole army upon the banks of the Bistritz. For whether a defensive movement or a direct attack upon Prince Frederick Charles' army were intended, in either case the Austrians would have the Elbe in their rear ; and, in the event of a repulse, this could not but prove extremely embarrassing to them. The King, therefore, sent the general to Moltke, bidding him state the whole matter to him. "If," said he, "General Moltke is of opinion that such a step ought to be taken, you can apply to me to-night for the necessary orders. You will find me ready at any hour."

The two generals conferred together for some time. To Moltke the reports of the reconnoitring parties seemed perfectly reliable ; he quite approved of the Prince's plan of operations ; and even in the absence of information as to whether it were the whole or only a considerable part of the Austrian army which was encamped on the Bistritz, he yet held that the opportunity of an immediate engagement with the enemy on this side of the Elbe should not be lost. He did not doubt of victory in the event of being able to attack with the three Prussian armies. Even if only a portion of the Austrian army were stationed on the Bistritz and no decisive battle took place, still such a victory would greatly facilitate a later necessary attack upon the enemy's position on the Elbe.

During this discussion, the King, thinking that Moltke had rejected the plan without so much as submitting it to his sovereign, had thrown himself upon his camp-bed. But before long Moltke and Voigt-Rhetz were announced. The King at once rose ; Generals Roon, Alvensleben, and Treschow were sent for ; and a council of war was held. The matter had to be looked at from its various points of view. The troops, exhausted as they were by continuous marches

and repeated skirmishing since June 26th, were in absolute need of some rest before engaging in any decisive battle. The army of the Crown Prince lay so far from the probable scene of action, that it was doubtful if it could be brought up in time to take part in the fight, especially as the state of the ground, owing to the rains, made marching extremely difficult. Some of the troops would have to march five or six hours in order to reach the right flank of the Austrians. If Benedek's eight corps d'armée were in position on the Bistritz, which was probable, though not certain, the Prussian army, not counting the Crown Prince's troops, would consist of only four and a half corps d'armée, and would have hard work to make a stand. Again, there was something extremely enticing in the possibility that presented itself of delivering so severe a blow, that, even if it did not completely end the war, would yet give matters a decisive turn. Should all go well, should Herwarth attack at Nechanitz, the Crown Prince at Ratschitz, thus engaging the enemy's flanks and possibly his rear, while Prince Frederick Charles held his centre, a great result might be achieved. It was difficult to decide. It all depended upon whether Benedek had the whole or only a part of his army in position between the Bistritz and the Elbe, and whether the Crown Prince could come up in time or not. To be sure of the Crown Prince was to be sure of success ; even though the enemy should have eight corps behind the Bistritz. By postponing the attack for a day, till the 4th of July, no doubt would remain as to the Crown Prince's arriving in time. A postponement at all events insured greater certainty. On the other hand, an immediate attack would prove a greater surprise : it would prevent the Prussians from being attacked themselves in an unfavourable position. Upon this subject Moltke writes : " On the morning of the 3rd of July our front was extended over sixteen

miles, a position in which we dare not allow ourselves to be attacked. By assuming the offensive, however, we could concentrate all the corps upon the battle-field, thus changing the strategical disadvantage of our extension into the tactical advantage of a complete surrounding of the enemy. This will be plain to any one who remarks our line of advance. Our three corps d'armée widely separated from each other, were at the beginning of the campaign in anything but an advantageous position; but each day, as it passed without our advance being checked, brought us according to human calculations nearer to success."

Whichever way one looked at it, one could not but feel that the risk lay in the uncertainty of the arrival of the army of the Crown Prince. But this risk would have to be run, or else the plan must be abandoned in favour of some fresh one which the movements of the enemy might dictate. In the interests not only of her military but also of her foreign relations an immediate decision on the part of Prussia was imperative. To quote accomplished facts seemed the only effectual way in which France's various attempts at mediation could be met. Moltke, true to his own motto, "Erst wägen, dann wagen" ("first weigh, then wage"), was determined after his midnight council to run the risk. With him, as the King's chief adviser, all responsibility lay. It was a responsibility which he could well bear. He felt that he could count upon his Prussians. He knew full well that, were instructions given to the Crown Prince for an immediate advance of his whole army, that that army, at any hour of the day or night, whether fresh or weary, would instantaneously resume its march, and that to

- a man it would stake its last breath in the cause of king and country. Cautious though he was, in critical moments Moltke showed the utmost daring. This arose mainly from
- his knowledge of what his men could do, from his confi-

dence in their capacities on occasion. He completely echoed the speech of Gneisenau, who said "the boldest way is the safest way." The entire council thought with Moltke; he had the King's sanction withal. Accordingly, a despatch was immediately sent to the Crown Prince. It was as follows: "In accordance with reports just received from the First Army, the enemy with a force of about three corps d'armée (which may possibly be reinforced) has advanced over the valley of the Bistritz near Sadowa, and an encounter with our First Army may shortly be looked for. To-morrow morning, July 3rd, at two o'clock two divisions of the First Army will be stationed at Horitz; one will be at Milowitz, one at Cerekwitz; two at Psanek and Bristan; and the cavalry corps at Gutwasser. Your Royal Highness will at once take the necessary measures to advance with all available forces in support of the First Army against the right flank of the enemy's anticipated line of advance, attacking at the same time without delay. The orders of this afternoon, given under other circumstances, are hereby cancelled." In this very pregnant message we may trace the peculiar qualities of the man. In his orders to those in command we shall find no minor hint, no supplementary suggestion as to ways and means. To the discretion of the commander all that is left. Moltke himself is content with just the plain, straightforward command. At Königgrätz, at Gravelotte, at Sedan, in the campaign with Bourbaki, on all these occasions we have the same far-seeing, curt directions. When Moltke sent off his despatch to the Crown Prince, he was perfectly ignorant as to whether it was three or eight corps d'armée which Benedek had concentrated. Neither could he tell if the Austrians would commence the fight; nor if the scene of action would lie upon the east or west of the Bistritz. Therefore he names no village to the Crown Prince to

serve as a guide. He says simply, "the enemy's right flank." As to the precise point to attack on this tolerably indefinite right flank, he felt that both time and place, and subsequent events would determine. The cannon's roar would doubtless prove the surest guide.

This despatch was made out in duplicate ; with one copy General Voigt-Rhetz returned to Kamenitz, whence it would be sent on to Königinhof. The other copy was given to an aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Count Finckenstein, who was to ride with it to Königinhof by the shortest road, through Miletin. As his route lay through the outposts of the First Corps, he was further charged with a letter to Bonin, the general in command. Herein he was informed of the impending combat, and was requested to hold his corps in readiness for any orders that might reach him from the Crown Prince. Failing such orders, and should circumstances render it necessary, he was to attack on his own account. Count Finckenstein, attended by a dragoon, rode off between twelve and one o'clock. The distance from Gitschin to Königinhof was about twenty miles. His way lay through a hostile country ; it was one of which the rider knew nothing. Hence fresh dangers arose. Supposing the Count were waylaid and shot, and that a like fate were in store for the officer who should take on the despatch from Kamenitz to the Crown Prince? What then? But Moltke, in his plan of procedure, had to include all such possibilities. In advising the King to sanction Prince Frederick Charles's scheme, the responsibility became solely his. And from whatever the cause, had those despatches failed to reach the Crown Prince, there would have been no reason for Antonelli's exclamation at the news of Königgratz, "The world has come to an end." At first it would appear most rash at early dawn to throw such a hazard in the game of war, to thus lightly place Prussia's

destiny in the scale, balancing as it were the future of Germany upon a horse's hoof. Was this not a tremendous risk? Yet Moltke ran it. He felt convinced that officers of such rank and such mettle would successfully battle with any danger, however grave. Nor was he wrong. General Bonin got his despatch, and that for the Crown Prince was delivered by Count Finckenstein at four o'clock. The duplicate sent from Kamenitz came safely to hand as well. An hour later Blumenthal, the chief of the Crown Prince's staff, had issued his orders to the different commanders of the four Army Corps, and had made arrangements for an immediate break-up of the camp.

Moltke remained with the King, transacting business till close upon two o'clock. The head-quarters would not break up for another three hours. For a short time both king and councillor retired to rest. At that same hour Prince Frederick Charles's army was on the move. Moltke's success in bringing the three armies (marching separately) into hostile territory had been so far complete; it was now necessary to lead them simultaneously into action. The spoils of victory would be included in the last act. Certainly the performances of the staff in the earlier period of the campaign had been little short of amazing, for nearly everything had been a question of possibilities, in some cases but a matter of guesswork. Moltke had to consider the fact that it was three different portions of the enemy which he would have to meet and in three different places withal. Hanover and Kurhesse formed the first group, South Germany the second, Austria and Saxony the third. He estimated the force of the first at 36,000, that of the second at 100,000 and that of the third at 264,000. If left unnoticed in the rear, the Hanoverians and Kurhessians might prove decidedly unpleasant on account of their ability to intercept all communication with the Rhine and

the duchies of the Elbe. Yet, were they to undertake actual hostilities, Moltke believed he would be able to prevent their concentration. Despite her various warlike preparations, he was content to look upon South Germany as an embryo foe. He well knew the scanty arrangements which prevailed in that quarter in times of peace. Lacking as they did the elements of an uniform organisation, much could not be looked for from these otherwise excellent troops, and it was but reasonable to suppose that it would be a considerable time before they could even singly prove of service in the field. The safest plan with them would be to attack on the offensive, which would serve to keep them employed within their own territory. The third portion alone had a strong, well-organized army ready for action.

The defeat of the Austrian army must of necessity prove weakening to all other opponents; but in order to accomplish this, the seven Army Corps in the east of the monarchy were not sufficient. Should even the two western corps be withdrawn in order to assist in a decisive battle, the Rhine provinces would be left apparently defenceless, and could offer but a feeble resistance to the attacks of South Germany. Nevertheless the King arrived at this weighty and momentous decision by which alone it would be possible, after the engagement with the main army, to appear in sufficient strength before the enemy's capital. It is true that the Rhine fortresses, occupied as they were in force by the Landwehr could not prevent invasion, but they would certainly arrest the progress of an invader; and in the event of success in the east, the recovery of any losses sustained in the west would be comparatively easy. But to prevent any such invasion, a special Army Corps was formed, consisting of part of the Schleswig-Holstein troops, with others destined for the defence of the fortresses, the nucleus of which was the thirteenth infantry

division. The last could be drawn from the cantonments about Minden, and in a very short time could be assembled in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital of Hanover. This corps might fairly be reckoned upon to disarm both Hanover and Kurhesse, and could then advance against Bavaria. This improvised force would have three objects in view, and would be compelled to make up by energy and speed what it lacked in strength.

It will thus be seen that the military strength of the smaller German states did not give any great concern to the Prussian strategist; and although annually large sums of money were spent for military purposes on their Federal contingents, to the dissatisfaction of both their chambers and the public, considerable doubt had been expressed even before the war as to their being able to render any great service, if called upon to act independently. The circumscribed scale upon which everything in these small states was worked, could not produce any great strategic results. Even were it allowed that the material was of the best, the staff of the contingents could hardly be considered their strong point. Moltke believed that he would be able with a small improvised army successively to defeat any forces which the enemy might concentrate on the Leine, the Darm, or the Iser. Prussia's full strength must be directed against Austria. Many important questions here presented themselves. Could an invasion of Prussia be prevented or not? Should the several Prussian Army Corps be concentrated and pushed forward in the Napoleonic manner *en masse*? Was a division into several independent corps, which should advance separately towards one given point, preferable? Should such advance be made on Bohemia, on Moravia, or on both? Yet even on these points Moltke was not in doubt, although it to a certain extent depended upon the disposition of the Austrian troops.

The lines of march which Frederick the Great took during the two Silesian wars and the Seven Years' war, were of course well known to the Prussian general. But a commander in 1866 had a far larger army to handle than in Frederick's time. It was a new task for the strategist skilfully to divide, lead forward, and reunite the same. "It was most desirable to find one position for the *whole* of the troops which would cover Berlin and Breslau, even though no protection were ensured for the country to the left of the Elbe, and near the upper Oder. The point which would combine all these advantages was Görlitz. The difficulties of massing and providing for a quarter of a million of men could be overcome if an early advance were contemplated, but would be insurmountable if such an advance were indefinitely postponed. To concentrate such an army either at Görlitz or in Upper Silesia would require considerable time, as the transport would have to be effected chiefly by means of only one line of railway which would thus delay the advance for several weeks. The Mark Provinces and Silesia stood, however, in need of immediate protection, so two separate armies must be employed by Prussia. Austria would thus clearly have a chance of directing her whole strength against one of these two armies. Besides all this, no disposition of the troops could overcome the geographical conformation of the ground, nor prevent an enemy in Bohemia being placed between Lusatia and Silesia. There was but one way of meeting the difficulty; namely, to move into Bohemia. In any case the army corps must be advanced by railway as soon as possible."

* In order to be able to move two or three army corps from Prussia to the Bohemian frontier and to carry out the Prussian rule of "marching separately and striking together," it was absolutely necessary to become master of

Saxony. It was impossible to believe that Saxony would join Prussia against Austria. The well-known ambition of the ministerial President Count Beust, and the long course of years in which the Saxon Government had made antagonism to Prussia its chief political aim, prevented such an idea from being entertained. The King of Prussia could not bring himself to act as an enemy towards Saxony, before the latter had taken any hostile steps, albeit that his ancestor Frederick the Great had done so in 1756 with great success. But, in sending an ultimatum to his adversaries, King William was anxious that they should first put themselves in the wrong, before he drew the sword. These feelings were in no wise shared by the staff. "Had there been no need to respect the Saxon territory, it would have been easy by means of the several lines of rail from the Rhine Provinces, Westphalia, Pomerania and the Mark Provinces, to concentrate a considerable body of men in the vicinity of Dresden. But practically the lines available for Prussian transport went no further than Zeitz, Halle, Herzberg, Görlitz, Schweidnitz and Neisse. From these points, which formed a circle of two hundred and forty miles in circumference, they would have to continue their march to the front on foot. This was obviously no part of the general scheme for the concentration of the army; it could but be looked upon as an unavoidable first stage." The vote of the majority of the Germanic Confederation on June 14th, in favour of a mobilisation of the allied troops against Prussia rendered all further regard for Saxon interests unnecessary. From that moment the King was resolved to act on the offensive. "It was now no longer a question of defensive flank-marches; it was upon their own ground that the foe must be met." An ultimatum had been issued to Hanover, Kurhessen and Nassau. Saxony in her turn received one on the 15th of

June; and, in consequence of her indefinite answer, the Prussians crossed her frontier on the 16th of June. This movement became necessary not only on political grounds, but also because it helped the strategical advance of the army of the Elbe as well as that of the First Army Corps on the Dresden-Bautzen lines. In other words, it would allow their junction in but few marches by various converging routes. The Prussian forces would then consist of only two armies. To guide these in such a manner as to effect a decisive result was the difficult, though not impossible, task of the staff. Armies of over 100,000 men naturally possess a great amount of independence; and Austria would not be able with her whole force to develop an attack upon the one without protecting herself from the second. To advance was thus the shortest way both to effect a junction and to overthrow the enemy's resistance.

The Prussian main-force was at this time composed of three armies. That of the Elbe under General Herwarth v. Bittenfeld lay at Torgau; the first army under Prince Frederick Charles at Görlitz; and the second under the Crown Prince at Neisse. Besides these a reserve corps of 24,000 men was stationed at Berlin; and there was also the contemplated army of the Maine, which (under General Vogel v. Falckenstein) was destined to disarm Hanover and Kurhesse, and advance later on against the two South-German army corps in Franconia and at Frankfort. After the advance into Saxony the three armies, on June the 20th, were at Dresden, Görlitz and Neisse. By the 23rd of that month, the two first had crossed the Bohemian frontier. Benedek, who on the 17th of June was encamped at Olmütz with the apparent intention of invading Upper Silesia, on this day advanced into Bohemia, in order to concentrate his main force on the right bank of the Upper



Elbe, near Josephstadt and Königshof. This enabled the Crown Prince to quit his position at Neisse, and to march with the view of joining the other two armies through the passes of the Riesengebirge. Moltke, ever in possession of good information, had got wind of this movement on the part of Benedek. On the 19th of June therefore he directed that the Crown Prince should leave only one corps at Neisse, and that with the others he should take up his position at those points where an immediate passage of the defiles could be effected. As in the next few days there was no sign of an attack on the part of Austria on Upper Silesia, the order was telegraphed from Berlin on the 22nd of June to Prince Frederick Charles and to the Crown Prince for the two armies to enter Bohemia and seek to effect a junction near Gitschin. In one of this day's despatches to the two Princes, Moltke included the following explanation :—

“To-day's telegram has specified Gitschin as a desirable point of juncture for the two armies. But where so much will depend upon the course of events, it is not thereby intended that this point should be reached at all hazards. From all accounts it seems quite unlikely that the Austrians should be able within the next few days to concentrate their chief force in the north of Bohemia. It is quite possible from the initiative which we have taken that an opportunity may occur for attacking the enemy with superior numbers when in a divided condition, and of following up the advantage in a different direction. At the same time it must be remembered that it is by a combination of our forces alone that any great decisive results can be expected. From the moment of feeling the enemy, the generals in command are empowered to act entirely according to discretion and to the exigencies of circumstances, a due regard being maintained for the relative

condition of either army. Such continuous understanding will help much towards a mutual support." As it fell to the lot of the Second Army to perform the difficult task of debouching from the mountains, Prince Frederick Charles was further specially charged "to hasten the crisis by a rapid advance." This advance of the three armies on the Upper Elbe should according to Moltke's calculations have been accomplished by June 28.

The most effective way in which Benedek could have defeated this plan, would have been to engage with his whole force one of the two advancing Prussian divisions and effectually crush the same before the other could come to its aid. But instead of this, the opposition offered was in each case insufficient. The Prussians gained ground daily; so that at last Benedek found himself in the awkward position of being between two fires. His action is thus criticized by Moltke: "With a comparatively small force the Austrian army could have held their strong intrenchments on the Iser or on the Elbe, if either the Crown Prince's army or that of Prince Frederick Charles had been met by superior numbers. To a plan, in itself a correct one, the Feldzeugmeister would appear to have clung with that tenacity of purpose which is so admirable a quality in a commander. It is open to doubt, however, whether in this instance he did right, seeing that the Prussian troops were already rapidly advancing. Were the Prussians allowed to press forward to the Elbe and the Iser, and should some of the passages of these rivers fall into their hands, thus to be wedged in between both armies was manifestly extremely hazardous." And so it came about that the Austrian commander's policy was thwarted in the way that Moltke has here shown. The Austro-Saxon troops under General Clam-Gallas met with daily repulses from the 26th to the 29th of June at Hünner-

wasser, Liebenau, Podel, Münchengrätz and Gitschin. They retreated before the First Army and the Army of the Elbe over the Iser towards the Upper Elbe. Prince Frederick Charles occupied Gitschin, awaiting there a junction with the Silesian army. This latter, in its passage through the Riesengebirge had been unsuccessful in the combat at Trautenau ; but at the subsequent engagements of Nachod, Skalitz, Bürgersdorf, Soor and Schweinsschädel it had, between the 27th and 29th of June, completely repulsed the Austrian corps by which it had been met. After storming Königinhof, it seized the bridge there and communication was established with the First Army.

At the news of this success the King, with Moltke and other members of the staff, left Berlin on June 30 for the seat of war. Moltke could look back upon the first act of his military drama with complete satisfaction. The difficult task of a twofold entry into a hostile country and in the face of a powerful army had been accomplished. His plan for the junction of the armies had been carried out almost to the very day. Of the preparations for the second act we know already. On July 3 at 5 A.M. the headquarters of the king broke up. The sovereign and his staff drove along the road which leads from Gitschin to Königgrätz by way of Horitz and Sadowa reaching Dub shortly before eight o'clock. It was between these two last-mentioned towns that they took horse. The battle had begun. Moltke felt hourly more certain that it was not a part but actually the whole of his army which Benedek had posted on the rising ground on the further side of the Bistritz. But Moltke had quite calculated for this when ordering the Crown Prince's army into the field. The latter was absolutely indispensable ; for Benedek, besides having eight corps d'armée and more than five hundred cannon at his command, had converted his position by

judiciously throwing up batteries and entrenchments into a most redoubtable fortress. The artillery on the Lipa heights could command the valley of the Bistritz to the north-west of the battle-field. That on the heights of Chlum ranged over the north of the field where were the villages Maslowed, Horeniowes and Benatek, and served to hinder any hostile advance from the east. An advance on Nechanitz and the lower Bistritz was opposed by the batteries upon the Prim and the Problus heights. In contending against such numbers occupying such fortified positions, Prince Frederick Charles's army would find it hard to hold its own. If it could manage to remain in the field until the Crown Prince's army came up, it was all that could be hoped for, and if this were long delayed, it would have to be prepared for the worst. The battle had its critical moments, but Moltke's coolness never forsook him. He remained in the saddle, stopping near the King and riding forward now and again to some commanding point from which to watch the issue of some deadlier struggle, regardless of the shells which burst on every side. Not for one moment did he doubt of victory. Prince Frederick Charles's attack was directed upon the enemy's centre to the right and left of the Sadowa-Königgrätz road. To the right the passage across the Bistritz must be forced, the villages Sadowa, Dohalitz, Dohalitzka and Mekrowans taken, and an advance made against the Lipa position. Not till ten o'clock could the infantry cross the Bistritz and capture the villages, but they were unable to push forward to the steep heights beyond. Higher up, to the north-west front of these, lay the wood of Sadowa. Into this the Prussians forced an entry, and were soon in possession of half of it. The Austrian artillery now played into the trees and their infantry redoubled their attacks. About one o'clock Prince Frederick Charles sent his two

reserve divisions into action. These fought their way to the skirts of the wood, but could get no further. The Prussians suffered terribly. Their artillery was so badly placed that it could do little against the heavy fire of the Lipa batteries. In and around this wood the fighting lasted till nearly two o'clock. To carry the heights from this point seemed impossible. Nothing was known of the Crown Prince. The right wing at Nechanitz was still unsupported. A rupture of the First Army's centre seemed imminent. Anyway, it became necessary to mass the cavalry in order to cover a possible retreat of the infantry. With the left wing matters were scarcely any better. Fransecky's division had seized the village of Benatek and was pushing on to the wood between Sadowa and Maslowed. This brought them exactly within reach of the Chlum batteries, while three divisions of the enemy contested every inch of ground. The Prussians were in this wood for two hours, but at eleven o'clock they were forced to retire, as their left flank was in danger. Fransecky now brought up his last battalions of reserves, and with a reinforcement which he received of two more and five batteries of artillery he renewed the attack, and they thus fought on till close upon one o'clock. The Prussians could make no advance. A fourth of their men lay dead or wounded. It had been the task of the army of the Elbe, as forming the right wing, to cross the Bistritz at Nechanitz, and by advancing upon the enemy's left flank and rear to threaten their line of retreat. Though less unfortunate, they had been very long in doing this. After a five hours' march the advance-guard reached Nechanitz by eight o'clock. They crossed the bridge and drove the Saxon troops out of the village. The heights of Probus and Prim now lay before them; to their left were masses of Austrian infantry with the Lipa batteries. The bridge at Nechanitz was the only one with the troops

could use; it was thus a long while before they could attack in any force. Not till two o'clock was an advance made, against Prim by one division, against Probus by the other. Later on, the third division essayed to turn the left of the Austrian position. Upper and Lower Prim were seized by the Prussians; and, despite the enemy's superiority, Probus was carried about three o'clock. The Saxons withdrew to the centre. Herwarth's left wing now felt the First Army, while his right had gained the high road to Königgrätz. These were but minor advantages, however, and would not determine the fate of the day; it was upon the Crown Prince's arrival that the issue of the battle depended.

Matters looked gravest between one and two o'clock. The Austrians had pressed forward to Upper Dohalitz, only to be driven back to the heights. Shortly after, the report was brought by Colonel Sandrart of the approach of the foremost portion of the army of the Crown Prince.

On the left wing of Prince Frederick Charles, Fransecky, with his fourteen battalions and four-and-twenty guns, had hard work to make a stand against an Austrian force of fifty-one battalions and over one hundred guns. Here the combat lasted till half-past two. Between one and two o'clock there was a decided falling off in the frequency of the enemy's attack. The Crown Prince's approach put a stop to the Austrian onslaught upon Fransecky, as it made it necessary further to protect their own army. The Prussians, however, though exhausted by hard fighting, took courage at the news of help. Of the Crown Prince's troops, the first to come upon the field were the first division of the Guards and the 6th Army Corps. These had by two o'clock carried the heights of Horeniowes, and Zastrow's division took Ratschitz, while Prondzynsky's division threw itself into Trotina, a hamlet near the Elbe. The Guards, leaving Maslowed on their right, advanced on Chlum. At a quarter to three Chlum

fell, and Rosberitz was seized not long after. They were now in the rear of the enemy's centre, for Rosberitz is close to the road leading from Lipa to Königgrätz. The battle was lost if Benedek could not recapture Rosberitz. The Austrians made every effort to do so; and for a time succeeded in repulsing the few battalions of the Prussians in possession. The troops now became reinforced, and the advance guard of the First Army Corps joined the first division of the Guards in its march on Chlum, and, supported by the artillery, beat back the Austrians and re-took Rosberitz. The day was won. Benedek gave his centre the signal for retreat. The Prussian batteries from the Chlum heights made havoc among their retreating ranks. Prince Frederick Charles's forces now moved forward *en masse*, and his cavalry hotly pursued the stragglers. Zastrow's division, which had captured Sendraschitz and Nedelist, now turned towards Swintj and Wschestar, which they seized; and, crossing the Königgrätz road, south of Rosberitz, compelled the Austrian rear to go round towards the south-west. The enemy's retreat, covered by their numerous artillery, lasted until nightfall. Some crossed the Elbe by the pontoon bridges which had been made before the battle. Others took the direction of Königgrätz, while some made for the bridge at Pardubitz. The trophies of the day were considerable: 19,800 prisoners, 161 guns, five standards, several thousand muskets and some hundred waggons. The number of the Austrian dead and wounded was 24,400. The Prussian loss amounted to 359 officers and 8,794 men. The losses of the First Army were nearly double those of the two other armies together.

The Prussians have often been blamed for neglecting to make their victory doubly sure by a close pursuit of the foe, thus following the example of Gneisenau on the night of Waterloo, who said, "We have shown them how to

conquer, now we'll show them how to pursue;" and this he did the whole night through, reaching Frasné at sunrise, fairly worn out. Moltke replies to this:

"As the natural result of a concentric attack, our forces found themselves at the close of the battle in a position of extreme disorder; and though their attack had insured victory, it by no means justified pursuit. Were they to push forward, they would be confronted by the Elbe. After the enemy had crossed the river by the pontoon bridges at Königgrätz, the line of pursuit would be towards Pardubitz. The troops, a part of which had commenced their march on the previous night, had reached the limit of their powers. For them their day of rest had become a day of battle. The ground some had covered in their advance was from twelve to sixteen miles. Others, after marching for nineteen hours at a stretch, had fought for ten more. The commissariat and other arrangements had necessarily suffered in no small degree. In order satisfactorily to re-form the larger bodies of the troops, a further march was needed, which would serve to bring each army to its separate bearings. This could not be done until the following day. Under the circumstances, it was agreed to halt on the 4th of July, and that only marches of an absolutely necessary nature should be attempted, and that the duties of pursuit, where practicable, should devolve upon General Herwarth."

Thus, too, the second act of the drama had been a complete success. The plan of "marching apart and striking together" had answered admirably. The victory of Königgrätz showed the thorough practicability of the main idea. It bore witness likewise to the complete reliance which could be placed in the capacities of the three armies and their officers. The trust shewn them by Moltke had had its abundant reward. "Our Northern Army

no longer exists," wrote the Austrian journals. Taken literally, this was hardly the fact; yet this much was certain, that that army, after its successive defeats since the 26th of June, could do little more towards arresting the Prussians for any length of time. We come to the third act, in which Moltke leaving Königgrätz leads the way to "the beautiful blue Danube." Benedek had still some 180,000 men. These would need concentrating if they were to be of any service, and it was considered that the fortress of Olmütz would serve this end admirably. The Austrians resting here unmolested could divert the attention of the enemy from the capital, and so allow of fresh troops being got together in its defence. It was hardly to be expected that, with Benedek at Olmütz, the Prussians would march on Vienna. But Benedek had his misgivings. He sent Gablentz's corps and most of the cavalry to Vienna. With the other seven corps he marched to Olmütz, and thence, on July 11, he sent the third corps with the Saxons by rail to the capital. With five corps and a brigade of horse he remained in the fortress to watch the course of events. But no sooner did Moltke know that the chief force of the Austrians had taken the direction of Olmütz, than his plans were formed. As in the former month Gitschin had been the objective-point of the Prussian operations, it was now Vienna. Redoubled energy and caution showed itself at the Prussian head-quarters. For every reason despatch was necessary; it was to deeds that Prussia must point. On the night of July 4, when the head-quarters lay at Horitz north of Sadowa, there had come a telegram from the Emperor Napoleon. This was the result of Austria's move respecting Venetia. Though made over to France by the secret treaty of the 9th of June, it was now first that the news of its cession had become public. Napoleon, in great anxiety at the success of Sadowa, was not slow to accept the gift. In his new rôle

of mediator, he hastily telegraphs to King William : " The great and speedy results which have attended the Prussian arms render a strictly neutral position on the part of France no longer possible. The Emperor is too well aware of the magnanimous disposition of the King of Prussia to doubt that after so triumphant a vindication of the Prussian honour, he would be inclined to help France in her efforts towards an armistice which might eventually lead to peace."

Neither to accept nor to reject this offer would tax the powers of Prussian diplomacy with Bismarck at its head. On the 5th an answer was telegraphed back to the Emperor, acquiescing in principle with his proposal. Two days later Prince Reuss left Pardubitz for Paris with a letter from the King. This specially pointed out that the present military complications did not admit of an armistice being concluded, in the absence of a guarantee of future peace. Meanwhile, the military operations were continued with increased activity. Luckily, the disturbed state of the telegraph-wires prevented any very brisk diplomatic communication from being carried on. Ere matters were settled the Prussians might be on the Danube. Moltke's plan was to keep Prince Frederick Charles in the centre, with Herwarth and the Crown Prince on either wing. The last, with four corps, was to pursue the Austrians towards Olmütz, while the bulk of the troops advanced at once upon Vienna "in order speedily to end the campaign." As it was clearly impossible to besiege or completely invest so large a fortress as Olmütz, it was enough if the Crown Prince could secure a north-west position, near Mährisch-Trübau, from which to watch matters. His chief task would be to cover the march on Vienna. In the case of an advance or of an attack on the part of Benedek, he must take the marching Austrians in flank and rear, and endeavour to push them back across the March to the Car-

pathians. It was not impossible that Benedek might attack the Crown Prince with vastly superior numbers, in which case the latter was to move round towards Silesia, drawing the enemy after him. Of the three roads leading to Vienna, the first through Iglan-Znaim was to be taken by the army of the Elbe, the First Army was to march by the second through Brünn and Nicolsburg, and the Second Army, in case it followed, was to take the one *viâ* Kremsier, Göding and Lundenburg. Many possibilities presented themselves for consideration. After the victory of Custoza and the official cession of Venetia, it was not very likely that Austria would keep her Italian army on the Mincio. It was more in her interests to leave but few troops there, bringing up the others with all haste to Vienna. Prussia's aim was to prevent Benedek from joining the Southern Army—in other words, to arrest his march on the capital. We have already seen how it was impossible for Moltke to hinder the advance of three of Benedek's corps d'armée. This plan was submitted to the King, by whom it was sanctioned on July 6th. The selfish terms of General Gablentz's proposed armistice were rejected. Moltke's written refusal stated that while Prussia would gladly accord such an armistice as might lead to a lasting peace, she was certainly in no position to assent to such proposals as had been made by Austria through General Gablentz.

The armies advanced. On the 12th of July Brünn was taken by the First Army, which on the day following became the royal head-quarters. Meanwhile Herwarth's advance-guard entered Znaim. But the Austrians had moved forwards as well. Vienna must be saved at all hazards. Archduke Albrecht, now the first in command, left Italy on the 12th of July for Vienna with General John, the chief of his staff. He had left orders for two corps d'armée to march thither at once. The same day Benedek

was instructed to send his five corps d'armée to Vienna without delay. This was accordingly done ; and on the 14th of July and following days they were sent forward by the road on the right bank of the March through Kremsier and Göding, which, going southwards across the Lesser Carpathians, reaches Tyrnau and Preszburg. Moltke tried to prevent this.

Before he knew that they were on the march, he had already given orders to Prince Frederick Charles to send a detachment on to Lundenburg to destroy the line of rail between Göding and Olmütz, taking care to preserve that of Brünn, Lundenburg and Gänserndorf, for the entire use of the Prussians. It was not until the night of the 15th July that it was known at the head-quarters in Brünn that a considerable body of troops had been moved from Olmütz southwards ; and even then it was not certain whether it were all or only a part of Benedek's force. Prince Frederick Charles' instructions were at once forwarded to him ; the Crown Prince was ordered to leave part of his army before Olmütz, and with the other half to pursue the retreating foe and effect a junction with the First Army. The Crown Prince, however, on the 14th had detected signs of this movement from Olmütz, and on the 15th Hartmann's cavalry division and a brigade under Bonin had been sent on in the direction of the March. In the engagements at Tobitschau and Rokeinitz two of the Austrian corps had been much harassed and were in great disorder. The Austrians had, however, had a long start, and the Crown Prince was too far behind to catch up with them. Benedek thus pushed on to Kremsier and Hradisch. But south of this lay an effectual bar to progress. In accordance with his instructions, Prince Frederick Charles had posted Horn and Fransecky's divisions in the valley of the March. On July 16th the



one had taken Göding, while the other held Lundenburg, somewhat lower down. Benedek thus found himself forced to quit the March valley, and he now strove to form a junction of his army with the southern forces at Vienna by a *détour* across the Lesser Carpathians. The time thus lost he hoped to regain by forced marches. In order to save Vienna, Preszburg would have to be reached before the Prussians could get there, as otherwise he would have to cross the Danube at Komorn, which was some distance off. But Moltke, too, had thought of Preszburg. His orders of the 17th of July to the three armies were to the effect that the First Army should move forward on both banks of the March and secure the different fords of this river, and cut off the enemy's retreat from Olmütz to Vienna and Preszburg. "The First Army will bear in mind that one division may be required to advance from Malaczka (between March and Tyrnau) by rapid marches on Preszburg, to secure the passage of the Danube there, and possibly even Hainburg and Kitsee." As many men of the Second Army as could be spared from Olmütz were to be concentrated along the line from Nicolsburg to Lundenberg, and were to follow the movements of the other two armies. The First Army Corps alone remained before Olmütz, and after July 23rd only one single division was there. The other corps had marched southwards, and by the 19th were already close to Nicolsburg, to which town the head-quarters had been transferred.

Prussian strategy was at a disadvantage, in that the force of their opponents on the right bank of the Danube at Vienna was not known. The question was just as to how many corps d'armée Benedek had been able to assemble there in the early part of July—how many troops had been brought from Italy—the strength of the reserve army, formed as it was to be from the fourth and fifth battalions

—whether the fortifications at Florisdorf would admit of being used also as a point from which sorties could be made. In the face of these various possibilities, the Prussian staff was recommended to keep a very strict look-out in every quarter, to have all forces in readiness, and to communicate the intentions of the head-quarters to the several officers in command. In his order of July 19th Moltke says, “It is intended to concentrate the army in a position behind the Russbach which runs through the March field from the north-west to the south-east. The Army of the Elbe will be posted at Wolkersdorf, the First Army in rear of Deutsch-Wagram, and the Second Army, as a reserve, at Schönkirchen. So placed, it would be possible to sustain an attack which the enemy with about 150,000 men might make at Florisdorf, and from there the fort at Florisdorf could be reconnoitred and attacked; or, leaving one corps before Vienna, a rapid flank march could be made on Preszburg.” Further directions for an attack on the Florisdorf lines, as also for crossing the Danube, and for a general extension of the whole scene of action, were as follows: A park of artillery with fifty 12-pounders to be held in readiness at Dresden; the pontoon columns to be moved forwards; Rosenberg’s division in Moravia to be relieved; the re-construction of the railway between Tyrnau, Prague and Pardubitz; the garrisoning of Teschen by Stolberg’s detachment, as that town might form the basis of a subsequent attack upon Hungary. The leading files of the advanced guard of the Army of the Elbe and the First Army had reached Stockeran and Wagram, and by the 22nd had pushed on to Gross-Enzendorf. But from this quarter no attack was to be made until the Second Army was upon the spot; though any offer of battle on the part of the enemy would of course be accepted. No such offer was made, however. The arrangements for the attack on Flor-

isdorf, and for arresting the progress of the southern forces, had not been completed at head-quarters by 22nd of July ; nor was the Second Army in the required position. All eyes were, therefore, turned towards Preszburg. The Austrian columns reached the Waag valley on the 18th, and on the same day Thun's corps (the farthest in advance) was at Neustadt, forty-eight miles from Preszburg. Horn's division lay at St. Johann, which is only twenty-four miles from it. On the 17th this latter had crossed the March at Göding, and had moved down the left bank of the river, as Fransecky had done on the right from Lundenburg. In consequence of a despatch from Moltke it had neared Stampffen. Fransecky, crossing at Anger, got here by the 21st and assumed the command of both divisions, and an advance was made on Preszburg with all available strength. At that time only two Austrian brigades were there. Thun's corps by the 20th had only got to Tyrnau, and, in order to reach Preszburg, it would take them twice as long as Horn's division at Stampffen. At Tyrnau some thousand conveyances were in readiness to take them on. By dint of these and other appliances, it was possible to get the entire corps into Preszburg by noon on July 22nd, and though the Austrians had got there first, Fransecky believed that he would be able to repulse Thun's exhausted brigade as well as that of Mondl, and eventually capture the town. On the 22nd he assailed the enemy's position at Blumenau, Rose's brigade turning their left flank. General Rose, who in this movement had had many difficulties to encounter, was stationed at eleven o'clock by the mill between Blumenau and Preszburg. He was preparing to take the enemy in the rear at Blumenau, from which place after the engagement he could be quicker than the remaining Austrian battalions on their march to Preszburg. Such a proceeding must inevitably result in the rout of the enemy and the

fall of the town. It was twelve o'clock ; but one hour more, and victory was theirs. That hour never came. The five-days' armistice arranged for at Nicolsburg was to begin at noon on the 22nd. As they heard of this from headquarters, the Austrians hastened to arrest the advancing Prussian troops with the news. Fransecky, though he knew of it at half-past seven, yet continued hostilities in the hope that before twelve o'clock Preszburg would have fallen. It was a vain hope, however—Preszburg remained in the Austrians' possession.

On the night of the 11th of July Count Benedetti arrived at the Prussian head-quarters, having been commissioned to arrange for an armistice with all possible speed. His instructions, however, could hardly keep pace with the movements of the Prussian army : the basis of his mission was as yet wanting. Prussia was expecting a reply to her memorandum of July 7. A telegram containing the proposed basis of peace reached the head-quarters at Brünn on the 16th. In the newly formed Germany, Austria was to have no place. North Germany was to be united under Prussian rule ; but of any enlargement of Prussian territory there was no mention whatever. The answer telegraphed back on the 18th, ran thus :—"The outline of the peace-programme can hardly be regarded by Prussia as a satisfactory one. The consequences of war and popular sentiment will render a territorial concession on the part of the hostile states of North Germany a necessity. Yet to pave the way to future peace, an armistice on such terms was in every way sufficient—provided Austria would accept it." Benedetti had gone to Vienna, whence he returned to Paris with the news that Austria approved in theory of the French proposals, and that she was anxious for an armistice as a preliminary to the conclusion of the war. A five days' armistice was accordingly granted by

Prussia. At ten o'clock on the morning of July 22 the Generals Podbielski and John met at Eibesbrunn to settle the line of demarcation to be observed by the troops. At noon the treaty was signed; and a suspension of hostilities was agreed upon, to date from noon of the 22nd until the 27th inst. at the same hour. On the evening of the 21st, the Austrian Plenipotentiaries arrived at Nicolsburg to discuss the terms of peace. These were the Feldzeugmeister Count Degenfeld, Count Carolyi and Baron Brenner. The discussions commenced on the 22nd. The political side of the question was left to Bismarck, while matters pertaining to the armistice were in Moltke's hands. The latter, however, had not neglected to make the requisite arrangements in the event of no agreement being come to before the armistice were ended. The preparations for crossing the Danube and for the attack on Florisdorf were carried on just as usual, and though the progress of some of the reinforcements was for a time arrested, the orders had been completed at head-quarters for the line of action which the several armies should pursue if peace were made impossible. The orders were ready at Nicolsburg in case hostilities were resumed, for the Army of the Elbe with the First Army, to concentrate in the lines of Wolkersdorf and Stampfen on the 27th, and the Second Army to take up a position at Gaunersdorf. The forces at command for carrying on the campaign were estimated at 243,600 men—194,000 for immediate warfare, and 49,600 as reserves. With such a force Moltke quite believed that all the eventualities of a second campaign could be met. But to this it never came. No orders for a re-concentration of the troops were ever issued. The proceedings, which had lasted from the 23rd to the 26th of July, came to an end with the Napoleonic peace-proposals as their basis. The preservation of Austria's integrity (Venetia excepted), her exclusion from

the North-German Convention—the separate arrangement and the maintenance of a national connection between north and south—all these were points which had been taken for granted in agreeing to the basis. It became more difficult to settle the alterations of territory which the King of Prussia desired. Austria's rights respecting Schleswig-Holstein were forfeited without a murmur; but upon the freedom of Saxony both France and she set great store. Acquiescence was at once given to any alterations which Prussia might require to make in North Germany. 16

Viewed as a whole, this outline of a general peace brought with it considerable advantages to both nations; yet, if looked at singly, it was not without its grave considerations. The independent attitude of the southern states, upon which Napoleon had so insisted, was undoubtedly damaging to a natural development of entire Germany, while in her non-occupation of Saxony Prussia would be the loser for many reasons. It was thus a very momentous question, whether the peace preliminaries could be signed or not, and the matter needed to be thoroughly weighed. Respecting this Moltke writes: "Was the war to be carried on in the hope of yet greater results? Our army stood before Vienna; and Preszburg was all but in our grasp. The outcome of a second battle gave us but small concern, and an entry into Vienna might have been made without any serious loss. With so much in our favour from a military point of view, it was only natural that we should wish to follow up our triumph to its farthest limit, and give full scope to the energies of our forces. A goal which the First Napoleon had never omitted to reach, the enemy's capital, lay temptingly at hand with its spires already in sight. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Austria, even after the loss of Vienna, would not be compelled to make peace. She could move her army into

Hungary, and there await further European complications. Again, if no peace arrangements on the Napoleonic basis were come to, the interests no less than the honour of France would suffer. One great end had now been reached; and for a yet greater one were fresh sacrifices, fresh efforts, to be asked of the Prussian nation, jeopardizing anew the results already obtained? A wise policy measures its aims by its needs rather than by its wishes. By this contemplated peace the national development of Germany under the guidance of Prussia was now secured, and further schemes of conquest formed no part of the plan of her government. Both King and people could say that they had to the full discharged the duties laid upon them by the State; and they were bound to acknowledge that to the security and development of the national existence of both Prussia and Germany there was absolutely nothing wanting. What Prussia now expected to gain in territory and power might subsequently be hers by a later peaceful development. The conditions offered by Austria did not preclude the possibility of a future reconciliation between herself and her former confederates. Her honour and might had not suffered to such an extent as to make such enmity irreconcilable. To demand more, if a successful continuation of hostilities admitted of it, would leave a thorn behind that no time would be able to remove, and to perpetuate such a rupture would hardly be in the interests of either Germany or Prussia."

The King, who with his political and military advisers had discussed the *pros* and *cons* of the whole question, decided in favour of peace. On July 26, at his command, Bismarck signed the peace-preliminaries, and Moltke the military convention. In the latter, the boundary-lines which the Prussian troops were to observe during the subsequent armistice, were very distinctly laid down, and treaties

of peace were specially concluded with Saxony and the South German states. Moltke's directions to General Falckenstein at the beginning of the war stated: "As Austria's army was the main difficulty to be overcome during the war, so too Bavaria must now form the centre of the South German coalition. In assuming the offensive on Frankfort direct, you must take care that the 8th Corps is thrown upon Mayence, which will prevent your meeting with any immediate opposition. It will therefore be more advisable to march over Fulda to Schweinfurt. You may rely upon coming in contact with the Bavarian troops if they are sought for on their own ground, and this route will presumably prevent any junction of the 7th and 8th Corps."

General Falckenstein acted according to these instructions. On the capitulation of Hanover, he routed the Bavarians and a part of the 8th Corps, and entered Frankfort. His successor in command, General Manteuffel, pushed back the two South German corps from the Tauber to the Maine at Würzburg, while the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg advanced from Saxony as far as Nürnberg. The news of the treaty of Nicolsburg aroused a general wish for peace among the South German contingents. A premature telegram of the Bavarian Minister, Von den Pfordten, gave rise to this false rumour, as though there had been no fighting on the Maine from the 27th of July until the signing of the armistice. On the 28th and 29th General Manteuffel received telegrams from Moltke, telling him that an armistice of three weeks (from August 2) could be granted to Bavaria, and authorizing him to allow the same, if asked for, to Baden, Würtemberg and Darmstadt, though not to the North-German states. At the same time, pending territorial arrangements, he was to occupy the country, avoiding any fighting of a serious

nature. This was specially emphasized in a later telegram, which stated that Würtemberg must also be taken possession of. Before the 2nd of August no mention whatever was made of an armistice. To make certain, Manteuffel telegraphed to head-quarters, receiving the reply, "Complete liberty of action up to the 2nd of August." The immediate result of this laconic telegram was the garrisoning of Würzburg on the 2nd. The armistice began on that day, and was shortly followed by peace. Moltke thus characterizes the campaign on the Maine :—

"In the western theatre of war, our point was gained by mere combats and without any decisive battle, so that at the conclusion of the war Prussia was practically in possession of all, or at any rate the more important portion of, the territory of her opponents; and to one and all of them she could dictate her own terms of peace. Through a single guidance, coupled with an unflagging energy of action, she was enabled to overcome the numerical advantages of her adversaries."

On August 1st the head-quarters were removed from Nicolsburg to Brünn. On the 3rd, the victors of Königgrätz were conveyed to Prague by special train, reaching Berlin the following night. On the 23rd, the peace of Prague had been signed, confirming the Nicolsburg preliminaries. On that date the retreat of the troops began. Their return-march through the Fatherland was for them one perpetual gala-day. Each village was decked in its gayest colours to greet the passing columns. Brilliant indeed was the entry into Berlin of the King at the head of his men, which took place on the 20th and 21st. Bismarck, Moltke and Roon, with Voigt-Rhetz and Blumenthal, rode in front of His Majesty; behind them came Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince. The conquerors were cheered by enthusiastic crowds.

"Many, alas!" writes Moltke, "were never to come back; for our loss had been a grievous one. Four thousand four hundred and fifty sons of the Fatherland had bought this victory with their blood; six thousand four hundred and twenty-seven had perished by cholera or other disease; while over sixteen thousand had been honourably wounded." These numbers are yet vastly inferior to those of other wars, and Prussia had never yet experienced so short and eventful a campaign. Even the acquisition in land and in subjects exceeded 1,300 square miles (German), and more than four million souls. Greater, however, was the gain which Prussia in her newly-tested self-confidence had made. But before all things, the situation furnished an opportunity for a fulfilment of the King's wish, when the war broke out. "If God gives us the victory we shall be strong enough to cement the loose bond which now holds all lands together in name more than in truth." In the course of a speech upon this campaign, Moltke observes—"It is to be hoped the late war, unparalleled in the swiftness of its success, will bring with it a blessed future to Germany and the coming generation. The trial has been a severe one for both King and people. What a feeling to-day to be a Prussian—from the King down to the least of his subjects! The youths whom Prussia would expect to fight her battles in the future—both these and the older citizens had given good evidence of their worth, and indeed there had been abundant proof of the ready self-sacrifice of the whole nation. Prussia knows herself now; and that is the greatest result of the war. Germany can now call herself Germany, and can confidently face the future." Referring to his share in the general glory, Moltke says, "I have a hatred of all fulsome praise. It completely upsets me for the whole day. Aye, the Bohemian campaign is a great and deathless page in the

world's history, an event the importance of which it is impossible now to fathom. In this campaign I but did my duty ; my comrades did theirs, too. God's omnipotence led on our banner to victory. He alone lent strength to our army, vigilance to our generals, success to my plans. And when I listen to all the exaggerated flattery which the public sees fit to bestow upon me, I can only think how it would have been if this victory, this triumph, had not been ours ! Would not this self-same praise have changed to indiscriminate censure, to senseless blame ?" Pursuing the subject, Moltke says of Benedek, "A vanquished commander ! Oh ! if outsiders had but the faintest notion what that may mean ! The Austrian head-quarters on the night of Königgrätz—I cannot bear to think of it ! A general, too, so deserving, so brave and so cautious !"

Moltke's remark on his return from the seat of war was indeed a just one—"I have but done my duty." It was done though with the instinctive genius of the born strategist. In the drawing-up of his plans he saw at a glance where the decision lay, the distribution of the troops, their several divisions and their point of juncture. He says himself of this, "Two points only were decisive in the attainment of our object, together with God's help and the bravery of our men. These were : the primary distribution of our forces upon the different theatres of war, and their concentration upon the field of battle. Austria, fully prepared as she was, was manifestly our most formidable opponent. If she were crushed, the bond which held Prussia's other enemies together would be burst asunder ; for though banded together by their enmity to us, they were without any natural unity between themselves. The only course to success was a bold one, namely, to move our whole nine corps simultaneously towards the centre of the Austrian monarchy. Political events allowed us to

trust to an improvised army the defence of the Rhine Provinces, and, later, to form that army into the nucleus of our Army of the Maine."

On the 22nd of June the three armies still lay at Dresden, Görlitz and Frankenstein; that same day they began their march into Bohemia; the afternoon of July 3rd found them fighting side by side on the hilly ground between the Bistritz and the Elbe; and on the 22nd they were before Preszburg and Vienna. In the one week in which all the principal battles had been fought two hundred guns, eleven standards and 39,800 prisoners had been captured. How proud, then, to feel conscious of having taken so great a part in the matter, and thus excellently to have served Both King and People! Moltke might well feel thus. For though it was much to be able to rely completely upon the zeal and bravery of all his subordinates, Moltke yet held a position in which the slightest omission would have had an influence upon the entire Prussian army. We have seen repeatedly during this campaign how he foresaw the plans of the enemy, himself striking before he could be struck, developing such energy in his method of attack as to rob his opponent of any clear notion of his design. Be the answer what it may as to how matters would have stood if there had been no Moltke there, this much is certain, that with such means and in so short a time no greater result could possibly have been obtained. Small wonder, then, if from that time forward the name of Moltke was on every lip, of friend and foe alike. Till now Moltke had been known only in Prussian military circles; and even there his merits scarcely met with proper recognition. In Prussia the public knew little of him; outside it, nothing whatever. But henceforth every one in Germany knew Moltke as the hero of Königgrätz; and in their supreme trust in the superiority of his

strategy, they recked little of any later darkening of the political horizon. The Prussian Landtag awarded to Moltke at the instigation of the Government a gratuity of 200,000 thalers (£30,000). With this sum Moltke bought the estate of Kreisau situated near Schweidnitz in Silesia, which he converted into a modern Tusculum.



1800-56.

MOLTKE, like Blücher the hero of Leipzig and Waterloo, was born in Mecklenburg. Both in Denmark and in North Germany some branches of his family (an old Mecklenburg one) exist. The family-estate at Ribnitz, near Rostock, had passed for centuries from father to son. Moltke's grandfather was the first to sell it. His two sons, Helmuth and Fritz, both entered the army, the one in the Mecklenburg, the other in the Prussian service. The latter became captain in the Müllendorf regiment, and in 1797 married Henrietta Paschen, a daughter of a Prussian privy-councillor living in Hamburg. At the request of his father-in-law Freiherr Fritz von Moltke left the service and bought an estate in the Priegnitz district. He sold this property at the end of two years, and at the request of his brother, a captain in the Mecklenburg army stationed at Parchim, went to reside with him there from the summer of 1799 until the year 1801. He had two boys, and on the 26th October 1800, a third son was born to him, who was christened (after his uncle) Helmuth Karl Bernhard, known to the world since Königgrätz and Sedan as Moltke. His birth occurred in troublous times. Napoleon was First Consul and had that same year vanquished the Austrians at Marengo, and had re-conquered the whole of Northern Italy. By Moreau's victory at Hohenlinden Vienna was threatened, and her Emperor forced into a disadvantageous peace. The first stage of Napoleon's iron rule over Europe had here been reached. Our hero was

destined to make an early experience of it. In 1801 his parents left Parchim for the Gnevitz estate in Mecklenburg, which they sold after two years, retiring to the old Hanseatic town of Lübeck, where they remained till the year 1807. During this period Napoleon had become Emperor of the French, and had beaten the Austrians and the Russians at Austerlitz, distributing crowns and sceptres *ad libitum*. By the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, he had dissolved the ties which held the German nation together; and to Prussia, which, as Queen Louisa said, had fallen asleep upon the laurels of Frederick the Great, he had already dealt a deadly blow. Blücher, pursued by 60,000 French troops, had retreated with a force of 20,000 to the Baltic, establishing himself at Lübeck. On the 6th November 1806, the French stormed this town, treating the inhabitants with the utmost barbarity. Moltke's house was not exempted, being mercilessly plundered with the rest. Young Moltke's first acquaintance with the French was, therefore, hardly of a friendly nature. A few months later his father purchased the estate of Augustenhof, near Kiel, and in the autumn of 1811 he placed his two sons under the care of a Pastor Knickbein, at Hohenfelde, at that time a tutor of some repute. They passed two years here, and how pleasant the recollection of this period may be gathered from the fact that, thirty years later, when Moltke published his volume of Letters on Turkey, he sent a copy to his old tutor with the inscription, "To my dear master and friend, to whom I owe so much, I send this, my first work, as a slight token of my esteem."

The period immediately following this stay at Hohenfelde was scarcely encouraging to young Helmuth's sensitive nature. In the autumn of 1811 the father took his two sons to Copenhagen, where they were sent to a military

academy. At first they boarded here with an old general named Lorenz, who paid them but scant attention, and whose sullen housekeeper was wont to vent her ill-humour upon the boys. Later on two vacancies occurred and they entered the academy, receiving board and lodging with a salary of fifty thalers each. The perpetual bickering at General Lorenz's was now exchanged for the monotony of barrack life. In later years Moltke had always the most disagreeable recollections of his life in Copenhagen. Writing of this in 1866 he says : "Without friends or acquaintances, we passed a thoroughly joyless childhood. We were treated with rigour, nay, even with harshness, and to this day it is my true belief that our regulations were in every way too severe. The only good which I ever got from such treatment was that I became well-used to every sort of deprivation. It may be that this treatment had its brighter side, even if only in making me lastingly grateful to a Copenhagen family, who showed to both of us the greatest kindness. Outside the town lay the charming estate of General Hegermann-Lindenkrone, which formed our weekly play-ground in common with his three sons, who all afterwards became distinguished in the Danish service. My intercourse with the accomplished members of this family exercised a very marked influence upon my whole character." Moltke had to go through a six-years' course of instruction ; and, despite the difficulty of having to learn everything in a foreign language, his diligence and natural abilities secured him the first place on the list of candidates at the officers' examination in 1818. Before getting his lieutenancy, however, he had, in common with all who owed their education to the State, to fill the post of court-page for one year. It was not, therefore, until 1819 that he joined an infantry-regiment stationed at Rendsburg. "He was a graceful young man," writes one of his friends,

"with fair hair and good-humoured blue eyes, with a quiet courtesy of manner and a sincere and open countenance, clouded at times by a pensive melancholy. There was no difficulty, however great, which he did not by his indomitable industry and energy of purpose overcome. His comrades had a great respect for him, and this he knew, though he forbore to turn such knowledge to the slightest account. While in social intercourse chatty and communicative, he maintained in his official capacity a stern reserve, and was notably imbued with an unflinching devotion to duty, coupled with a rare spirit of conscientiousness."

With qualifications such as these, Moltke entered upon his military career. In the meantime political affairs had assumed a different aspect. Napoleon's day was over, and a long peace followed upon the many years of fighting. Moltke's uncle, in whose house at Parchim he was born, had perished at Beresina, fighting under the Russian standard. His parents became reduced in circumstances, and in 1808 their country house, Augustenhof in Holstein, was completely burnt to the ground. "Soon after this," writes Moltke, "my grandfather, the owner of considerable property, died. The legacies under his will were many and large. To my mother, as residuary legatee, fell the entire share of those losses which the estates had sustained through the war. The property had to be sold." In order to support his numerous family, Moltke's father entered the Danish army, where he attained the rank of lieutenant-general. Henceforth young Moltke became entirely dependent upon his pay, and at that time the prospects of a Danish officer were far from brilliant. Denmark, who for long past had been Napoleon's ally, had suffered heavily, and, in ceding Norway to Sweden, had greatly reduced the strength of her army. She retained however her officers, so that there were many supernumeraries in:

each regiment, the younger of whom could hardly hope for promotion. Many officers, therefore, sent in their papers, and among them Moltke. His brother Fritz remained in the Danish service, but Helmuth was impatient to quit a sphere which only served to hamper the impetuous aspirations of his genius. He was a German by birth, and to Germany therefore he wished to go ; to Germany, who in the wars of emancipation had pre-eminently distinguished herself by the intrepidity of her commanders, and where there was a possibility of a great future. The knowledge that his four years of service as page and as lieutenant would count nothing in his favour, but that he would have to pass a fresh examination, might well have deterred him from his resolution, but he was willing to make this sacrifice for the advantages of his new future ; and, as regarded the examination, he had little cause for alarm. On the 5th January 1822, he left the regiment with high testimonials from his commanding officer, the Duke of Holstein-Beck, and went to Berlin. Here, after passing a brilliant examination, he was at once gazetted as second lieutenant to the 8th Infantry regiment, then garrisoned at Frankfort on the Oder. The next few years were passed in a quiet way in close application to study. In 1823 we find Moltke still in Berlin at the Army School, attending the lectures of Major von Kanitz on the History of War, of Professor Ritter on Geography, and of Professor Erman on Physics. His life in this gay town with its manifold attractions made him fully realize what living upon his mere pay involved. He had to avoid all unnecessary expenses, but was yet able to satisfy his literary tastes and his desire to acquire the various languages of the continent. The integrity of his character and his quick powers of comprehension soon attracted the attention of his superiors. In 1827 he rejoined his regiment at Frank-

fort. He was here appointed to the control of the somewhat disorderly military school, and, having completely satisfied his superiors in this capacity, he became the following year attached to the topographical department of the General Staff, then engaged upon a survey of Silesia and Posen. General Von Müffling superintended the undertaking; he was one of those officers for whom it is impossible not to feel the deepest respect. In 1832 Moltke was placed on the General Staff, and on March 30, 1833, he became First Lieutenant. Being at the same time, through the influence of General von Krauseneck, formally enrolled upon the Staff, he received his captaincy two years later.

About this time he had a great wish to go forth into the world and widen his experience by observing foreign men and manners. As study and not pleasure was his object, his path did not lie in the direction of Paris or London, but towards the East. He had a great desire to see Constantinople, and to become personally acquainted with the nature of Turkish affairs, which, in their romantic horror, were then attracting the attention of all Europe. At the same time the antiquities of Greece lay open to his research. He accordingly applied for a royal leave of absence, sufficiently long, as he thought, to allow of a three-weeks' stay in Constantinople, whence, after having visited the most interesting parts of Greece, he could return in the course of a few months' time by way of Naples and Rome. Circumstances, however, arose which did not permit of this. In the autumn of 1835 he left Berlin, and he returned at the close of the year 1839, without having visited either Italy or Greece. He remained in Turkey exactly four years, traversing Asia Minor to the Euphrates and the Tigris, and taking part in the Turkish campaign of 1839 against Mehemed Ali. We are enabled to follow his Eastern tour

closely in all its details from the letters he addressed, partly to his friends and partly to his sister, in which he has narrated all his experiences. In the year 1841, his work entitled "*Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835-39*," made its appearance, reaching a second edition in 1876. In his preface to this unpretentious but meritorious volume, Carl Ritter, the greatest of modern geographers, says: "The letters before us were certainly never intended for publication, addressed as they are to various intimate friends, and describing in heartfelt language the succession of extraordinary events which befell the writer from time to time; to us, however, the value of the book is enhanced by its eminently vivid and truthful qualities, which claim for the author our unreserved praise."

In the October of 1835, Moltke and his travelling companion, a Baron von B——, arrived at the Turkish Island Fortress of New Orsowa, on the Danube; and there made his first acquaintance with the Pachas. He continued his journey on to Bucharest in a country-cart drawn by eight horses, to which, in difficult parts, was added a couple of buffaloes. Thence he proceeded by sleigh to Giurgevo, crossing the Danube to Rustchuk. The remainder of the road to Constantinople was performed on horseback, a Tartar having undertaken to convey the small party to their journey's end, for the sum of a hundred thalers. "Our small caravan consisted of five riders and seven horses; our guide, an Arab, took the lead with a spare horse. His dark face seemed out of place in the white wintry landscape. This son of the desert often sank up to his horse's girths in the snow. After him came the servant with a pack-horse, we bringing up the rear in company with a Tartar." The whole party was well armed, and each carried a 'Kamtschick,' i.e., a short-handled whip

with a long thong. The road lay through Shumla, across the Balkans into the Tundsha valley, and on to Adrianople, a town which favourably impressed them, but where they could make only a short stay. "Our Tartar pressed forward, and on the tenth morning after our departure from Rustchuk we saw the sun rise behind a distant mountain, at the base of which lay a silver streak. This was Asia, the Cradle of Nations; there was snow-capped Olympus, and clear Propontis, with its deep blue surface studded with swan-like sails. Then arose, as it were from the sea, a forest of minarets, masts and cypress trees. It was Constantinople." The splendid *coup d'œil* presented to the view at Constantinople on the shores of the Bosphorus, the Propontis and the Dardanelles, made a deep impression upon the landscape-loving mind of Moltke. In a letter of his, dated December 3, 1835, he describes his first trip on the Bosphorus to Buyukdere thus:—"After resting one night at Pera, we seated ourselves in an elegant caique, hundreds of which are to be seen on the waters of the Golden Horn. A few strokes of the oar served to free us from the crowd of surrounding boats. And now how shall I describe the magic scene around? From the cold of winter we were transported into the genial warmth of summer, from the solitude of a desert into the busy throng. Only a slight transparent mist shrouded the fairy scene, as it lay in the warm sunshine. On our right was Constantinople, with its gaily-tinted blocks of houses. From the midst rose numberless cupolas, the bold arches of an aqueduct, imposing stone buildings with their lead-covered roofs, and, above all, the tall minarets which surround the seven giant mosques. Stretching far out to sea was the old Seraglio with its fantastic kiosques, its cupolas and dark cypress-trees and waving palms. The Bosphorus at this point breaks its flow in foaming billows against the walls. Far away the

Propontis was spread out, with its groups of islands and rocky shores. From the misty distance the eye wanders to the beautiful mosques of Scutari, to the Maiden Tower, rising sheer from out the billowy depths which divide Europe from Asia, to heights still covered with fresh green, and grave-yards buried in the dark cypress-woods. We glided along amongst stately merchantmen and huge ships of war from the Golden Horn into the Bosphorus. It was delightful to mark the individual quaintness of the summer-residences on its margin, with windows closely shut in by cane-blinds, and their gardens shaded by laurels, and gay with countless flower-beds. Roses smile on the passers-by from the windows. Both shores are lined with these country-houses, and villages succeed each other so closely, that the whole three miles from Constantinople to Buyukdere form, as it were, one continuous town, consisting of handsome houses and stately palaces, fishermen's huts and mosques, cafés, old castles and kiosques. At Buyukdere we landed, and presented ourselves to our ambassador." Moltke never tired of this lovely scene, and daily discovered new beauties therein. "Regularly after breakfast, be the weather what it may, I go out; generally through the main street of Pera, to the great cemetery. Tall aged cypress-trees bend their snow-laden branches earthwards, and the numberless tombstones stand cold and erect, curiously encrusted with ice. Where the road leaves the cypress wood a splendid view is obtained of the Bosphorus and the snow-capped mountains of Asia. On descending to the shore, I see the foaming breakers dashing against the stone quay and splashing over the gilded railings of the Sultan's kiosque. Greeks are collecting oysters on the shore. Passing on the right a magnificent marble fountain, I find myself between long rows of shops, the roofs of which often nearly meet. Here my

chief attention is arrested by the show of eatables and fruits, dates, figs, lemons and pomegranates, interspersed with vegetables, artichokes and huge melons. Close to these are the monsters of the deep, the gigantic tunny-fish, the turbot, with oysters, lobsters and crabs." Delighted as Moltke was with the winter in Constantinople, spring pleased him more with its magic change of colouring. "It appears wonderful to me how slowly vegetation comes on here. Plants seem to know they need not hurry themselves as with us, where winter comes suddenly upon them. Here one is sure of fine weather up to Christmas. On the whole, however, I must confess that spring does not please me here so well as at home; it lacks that quick magic transformation, and, above all, the varied beauties of our own forests. At the time of the Greek Emperors both shores of the Bosphorus were covered with woods; now they are bare uncultivated heights. In the valleys, however, where here and there a single tree has been left, it stands like a grand mountain of leaves and branches. Altogether one cannot help thinking what Constantinople is, and what it might be, with a good government and an industrious population." The Asiatic shore had great attractions for Moltke. In April 1836, he made an excursion to the coast of Troas, and brought back with him an olive-branch from the supposititious grave of Patroclus. A few weeks later we find him riding through the district of Broussa, and making a partial ascent of Olympus. In August he made a voyage to Smyrna by steamboat, and thence had a most interesting ride into the interior. After he had been at Constantinople some three weeks, he plainly saw that he could not reckon on an early return home. To his great regret, he was obliged to allow his travelling companion, Baron von B——, to go back alone. The Prussian ambassador had presented his countryman to the all-powerful Seraskier

Mehemed Chosref Pacha, who conversed with Moltke through a dragoman. He put several questions to him on the subject of Prussia's system of defence, in which he showed his own knowledge of the subject, and he also bestowed great praise on the Prussian military organization. Moltke's answers gave the Seraskier so much satisfaction, that he addressed a formal request through the Embassy begging him to delay his departure. In order to please the Porte, the Prussian Government extended Captain von Moltke's leave, and he now became Chosref's confidential military adviser. The Seraskier, who was nearly eighty years old, had been able through his talents to occupy for thirty-five years the highest offices in the State. His chief energies, however, were confined to an endeavour to shut out all competitors for the Sultan's favour. As head of the police of the capital, and supporter of the reforms instituted by the Sultan, he seemed to the latter indispensable. Notwithstanding, however, he was not over-earnest in his advocacy of the said reforms. To Moltke it seemed as if he had a profound contempt for them, yet they were a means of obtaining power; and power was the old man's ruling passion. Chosref entrusted Moltke with the carrying-out of several matters, to which he applied himself with his wonted zeal. In the first place, he was to draw up a scheme for the re-organization of the Turkish army, and for the introduction of the Prussian system into the same. By the desire of the Seraskier, Moltke took up his quarters in February 1836, in the house of the Armenian Mar-diraki (little Martin), Chosref's chief interpreter, a well-to-do man of good standing, who was to translate Moltke's work into Turkish. He was, however, sorely tried by the little man's Oriental lethargy. "If I ask little Martin to smoke a pipe with me, or play a game at tric-trac, he is always ready, but the moment I mention the translation

he finds he has got a pressing engagement." His house was beautifully situated in the small village of Arnaut-Kjöi, on one of the narrows of the Bosphorus. "The landing-place, which is immediately under my window, is a continual scene of bustle and din; for the Greeks, who form the majority of the inhabitants, are still a garrulous race. The largest ships pass so close to the shore, that in rough weather their yard-arms often break the windows." There was much to strike Moltke in the Armenian domestic arrangements and mode of living. "To be waited on by the daughters of the house produces a curious impression upon a European. They bring you your pipe, hand you your coffee, and remain standing with their arms crossed, till you ask them to be seated. They in no wise consider themselves demeaned by this; after all, it is only in accordance with the ancient Biblical custom. And, in truth we must confess that with us, when a girl from being a bride becomes a wife, she goes one step lower; for it would be impossible to maintain through a lifetime the worship with which she has been wooed. In the East it is just the reverse; for, although by marriage she remains in subjection to her husband, she rules over her sons and daughters, her men-servants and maids. By this I only mean to say, that if we possibly go too far in the one direction, the Turks (not the Armenians) go a great deal farther in the other."

Besides the scheme for military reform Moltke had many other matters to carry out for the Sultan. He prepared for him a plan of the Straits of the Dardanelles and its shores, of both sides of the Bosphorus, and of Constantinople. He inspected the fortifications of the Dardanelles and tested their guns in company with Halil Pacha, a son-in-law of the Sultan and the head of the artillery. He also examined the newly-constructed defences of Varna, and had, further, to give his opinion and advice as to the con-



struction of bridges, palaces, waterworks and reservoirs, besides preparing plans for the same. He had often to work ten hours a day. In order to aid him in his topographical studies and in his plans for fortifications, he was granted unrestricted admission to all the fortresses along the shores. "I have a free pass in Turkish, empowering me, accompanied by as many soldiers as I may require, to enter all forts and batteries." Under such circumstances he was unable to carry out his intention of returning home on the 10th May 1836; and although he shortly afterwards expressed the hope of being able to pass the winter in Berlin, in this also he was doomed to disappointment. In the autumn of 1836, he left "little Martin's" quarters, and moved to Buyukdere, where his stay was most agreeable. "The long-continued northerly winds keep the temperature low, and it is very little warmer than in Berlin, while we have lovely weather and blue skies." From Buyukdere he visited his old friend Chosref Pacha, who, through the intrigues of his former slave Halil (whom he had raised to be a son-in-law of the Sultan), had been removed from power and banished from Constantinople. Chosref was exiled at Emirgjon, a lovely seat on the Bosphorus, where he lived forsaken by all the world. His banishment had robbed him of all his friends. Moltke, thinking that a visit to the old man under such circumstances could not but prove a pleasure to him, regardless of whether the new Seraskier approved of it or not, went to see him several times. He soon perceived that Chosref's love of reform had not taken any very deep root, for it seemed that the old man had gone back to his old-fashioned Turkish mode of living. In order, however, to render it possible in the future to enjoy once more the Sultan's favour, he had built alongside his palace a magnificent mosque, and had also founded a school.

On the 19th January, 1837, Moltke was desired to attend a private audience with the Sultan, who, having been greatly pleased with the different works of his which had been submitted to him, wished to make his personal acquaintance. He was received in a Kiosque which commanded a lovely view of the sea. "The curtain was drawn from a side-door, and we beheld His Majesty reclining in an arm-chair. According to custom I bowed low to him three times, and then retreated to the door. His Imperial Majesty wore a red fez, and a large violet-coloured cloth cloak, or rather cape, covering his whole person, and which was fastened by a diamond clasp. He was smoking a long jasmine-stemmed pipe, with an amber mouth-piece set in jewels. His chair stood alongside a long divan, which in the East is always placed before the window. From it, by glancing to his left, he could gaze on the most beautiful portion of his realm, the capital, the fleet, the sea and the mountains of Asia. His Highness began by acknowledging with thanks the many proofs of friendship he had received from our King, and spoke in high terms of the Prussian Army. Hereupon all eyes were turned towards me in wonder and approval, and my dragoman translated his words to me, but not having anything to say in reply, I contented myself merely with bowing my acknowledgments. The Sultan then conversed with me on the subject of the work which I had done, and after entering into many of the details, he concluded by saying, that, 'so God will,' I should render him further services. While expressing his satisfaction, his private secretary Wassaff Effendi handed me at the request of the Sultan the order of the Nischan. Having, as is customary, raised it to my breast and brow, without opening the case which held it, His Highness said, 'Show it to him, and ask him if he likes it,'

whereupon the Nischan was fastened round my neck. An order of a lower class was also given to my dragoman, for having assisted me in my labours. We then retired. The most vivid impression which remains to me of the whole of this scene is caused by the expressions of good-will and kindness contained in every word His Majesty uttered."

The Sultan, desiring Moltke to accompany him on a journey he was about to make through Bulgaria and Roumelia, sent him a red fez and a Turkish dress, in order to avoid attracting attention by having a Frank among his suite. Thus clad, Moltke found himself on the 24th of April 1837 on board the man-of-war, which was to convey the Sultan and suite to Varna. His Highness paid Moltke the compliment of telling him that the fez suited him admirably. From Varna they proceeded to Shumla, Silistria, Rustchuk, and Tirnova. Thence they crossed the Balkans through the Shipka pass to Kesanlik, and so on to Adrianople, returning to Constantinople on the 6th of June. This journey, during which he had to prepare plans of the fortifications of Varna, Shumla, Silistria and Rustchuk, gave Moltke many opportunities of exercising his powers of description. He was much surprised that the Sultan on his entry into Shumla changed his blue overcoat for a scarlet hussar's uniform. "On whose account this change of toilet was made I know not. With us, a monarch's splendour is enhanced by the brilliancy of the high and mighty ones by whom he is surrounded. Here, as there is only one master and all others are servants, I cannot see why that one should take the trouble of wearing anything more than a dressing-gown." The streets were lined by the notables of the town: on the right hand the Musselmans, on the left the Rajahs. Amongst the latter the Greeks paraded with laurel branches, then the

Armenians with wax tapers, and finally the poor despised and ill-used Jews, who rank here just above a dog, but quite below the horse. The Muslims stood erect with their arms crossed before them; the Rajahs, however, and even the bishop and the priests with the church ornaments threw themselves on the ground with their brows touching the earth until the Sultan had passed. They were not permitted to behold the face of the Padisha." This slavish oppression of the Christians roused Moltke's ire. "Such a state of things may foster the national self-conceit of the Turks, but cannot possibly last much longer. Even the Sultan's two tributary Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, Stourdza and Ghika, who waited on their suzerain at Silistria, threw themselves on their knees before him and kissed the hem of his garment, whereupon he graciously handed them 10,000 ducats. The private secretary Wassaff Effendi also draws largely on this servile feeling. The Vizier remains standing before him until he receives a sign to be seated. I give myself the sign, and believe I am not in particularly good odour with him." The manœuvring of a battalion of militia at Shumla does not seem to have greatly impressed Moltke. "Other climes, other customs. A field-day at Shumla seems very different from what it does at Potsdam." As a peculiarly pleasing trait, Moltke mentions that "the Sultan, who took a sum equal to two and a half millions of florins in cash with him on this journey, never passed a poor man or a cripple without bestowing a gold coin upon him. The Sultan's expenses were very considerable, the whole retinue consisting of eight hundred horses. It is really incredible with what cumbersome accessories the Sultan travels. Besides secretaries and pages, he has special officers; one to carry his pipe, another his umbrella, his peacock-feather fan, his campstool, his golden basin, and his writing materials. Each of

these is mounted, and each horse requires a groom." Moltke himself had on this journey his own followers, viz., a dragoman, a colonel of engineers with three young Turks from the Polytechnic School, and three servants. For these he required two four-horsed carriages, seven led horses, two mules, four coachmen, and several grooms. The district of Tirnova, the Shipka Pass and Kesanlik, "the Town of Roses," which forty years later obtained a warlike notoriety in consequence of the bloody struggle between Gourko, Radetzki and Suleiman, captivated Moltke, and formed the subject of a charming description. Writing from Tirnova, on May 19, 1837, he says :—"What a lovely country this Bulgaria is; verdure everywhere; the slopes of the valleys planted with limes and wild pears; rivulets meandering through broad meadows, and rich corn-fields covering the plains; even the long stretches of uncultivated land are decked with green. Long before entering Tirnova the inhabitants lined the sides of the road, the soldiers were mustering on parade, and Greek women stood on the flat roofs and terraces to witness the entry of their 'Basileus.' I never beheld so romantically situated a town. Picture to yourself a narrow mountain-valley through which the Jantra has formed for itself a deep rocky channel, between the upright sandstone walls of which it courses. One side of the valley is covered with woods, and on the other stands the town. In the centre rises a conical-shaped hill, whose steep sides make it a natural fortress, and being surrounded by the river it forms an island, connected with the town by a natural causeway of rock 200 feet long and 40 feet high, only sufficiently wide for a path and a water-conduit." The little town of Kesanlik he found buried among enormous nut-trees, many of whose branches spread themselves more than a hundred feet in diameter, and in which countless doves and nighten-

gales had built their nests. "Kesanlik is the Cashmir of Europe, the Gulistan of Turkey, the land of the rose. It is not cultivated here in pots and gardens, but in the fields and in furrows like potatoes. Millions and millions of blossoms are spread over the pale green carpet of the rose-fields, although not one-fourth of the buds are yet open. Not only do you see and smell roses, but you eat them also; for preserved rose-leaves as a sweetmeat are thought a great deal of in Turkey. One takes them in the morning with a glass of fresh water, before coffee, a custom which I can highly recommend. In Kesanlik the costly Attar of roses is also produced, but it is difficult even in Constantinople to obtain the genuine oil. I had provided myself with a supply, and being compelled on one occasion, while riding, to carry the bottle in my pocket, for a week I smelt like a rose-tree." The Sultan during the journey often took occasion to address a friendly word or two to Moltke, a mark of no small distinction towards a stranger. Shortly after his return to Constantinople he was received a second time in audience by the Sultan, who spoke with him about their journey, approving of the several plans that Moltke had sketched. He also presented him with a valuable snuff-box, which he desired might be kept in his family as a memento. Despite the beauties of the Bosphorus, Moltke by degrees began to grow dissatisfied. Neither the lovely scenery nor the dreamy enjoyment of smoking the chibouque could compensate him for the want of intellectual intercourse. He was too far off to be able to mix much in diplomatic circles. He was therefore overjoyed at the news of the speedy arrival of several Prussian officers, who, at the request of the Sultan, were being sent to Constantinople by the King of Prussia. Up to this period French and English officers had alone been employed as army instructors, and having, as it were, been

pressed by their respective governments into the Sultan's service, they did not hold a very enviable position, and their performances did not come up to his expectations. It was evident that in the thoroughness of his work, in his sense of duty and general capabilities, Moltke had left them all behind. Old Chosref had at once seen this ; and the friendliness shown to him by the Sultan was due to his having obtained such a first-rate man for his service. What more natural than that he should desire to have more Prussian officers in his army ? " And the very fact that the Prussian government allowed only officers to proceed to Turkey after repeated applications from the Porte was the means of obtaining for them a distinguished reception, to which their abilities entitled them. On the 28th of August 1837, two captains from the staff at head-quarters, Von Vincke-Olbendorf and Fischer, with Capt. von Mühlbach of the Engineers (who later on were joined by Capt. Laue), arrived. Moltke, who from time to time during the day had ascended the round tower at Galata, which commands a good view over the Propontis, saw with delight a small black cloud of smoke, which as it drew nearer and nearer gradually changed into a steamboat, and shortly afterwards cast anchor in the harbour. " I took my companions at once to Buyukdere, where they were comfortably lodged, and I had the great pleasure of being their cicerone both on horseback and by water through this lovely country, with which, from my previous explorations, I was thoroughly acquainted." Soon after this the new comers and Moltke were presented to the Sultan. They received orders for a journey to the Danube, on which they would have principally to explore the Dobrutscha. The four officers with their attendants formed a small caravan of some forty horse. In front rode a Tartar, who had to get their quarters ready and take on the horses to the nearest

post-town, while the rear was brought up by two more, who were to keep their eye upon stragglers. Three *Kavasses* or gendarmes acted as escort, and in the suite were three other Turkish officers, two Armenian interpreters, two Greek slaves, four or five grooms and fourteen pack-horses, besides some spare horses. The route lay across the Balkans to Varna, Shumla and Silistria, places well-known to Moltke. The Dobrutscha failed to impress the travellers. "The place is as dreary a wilderness as it is possible to imagine, with not a tree nor a shrub to be seen. You may ride for hours along these monotonous wastes before you light upon some miserable village without vegetation or water." More inviting was the Danube delta, with its many tributaries. The relics of the old Roman past were specially interesting, such as the double wall of Trajan, between Czernawoda and Kustenje, with the castrum and the walled town of Constantiana. The main object of this journey would seem to have been to discover if it were possible, actually, or by means of a canal carried along the wall of Trajan, to divert the course of the Danube into the Black Sea. Though from their observation of the ground the officers did not deny the possibility of such a scheme, it was yet one which its enormous expense rendered valueless. Soon after his return in the November of 1837 Moltke visited Ilium and its surroundings. Here he lived again in the by-gones of Homeric story; scenes from the *Iliad* crowded to his mind; and, by his keen knowledge of locality, he was enabled to judge between their fact and fiction. "Whether all those princes of whom Homer tells really fought beneath the walls of Pergamos may be as doubtful as the genealogies of his demigods themselves; yet certain it is that Homer was fully acquainted with the scenery which he chose for the action of his poem. All that he permits the devastating Poseidon to behold we

may ourselves see in reality from the mid-summit of the gorgeous rocky isle of Samothrace. The local details of the picture are all so truthful, that we can construct an entire Ilium for ourselves in imagination—not perhaps as it really was, but at any rate as Homer conceived it.”

In detailing the past and present beauties of Constantinople Moltke is led into a description of the desperate struggles made by Greece in the year 1204 against the Latins, and later, in 1453, against the invading Turks. Passing over the later conquests of the Sultan, Moltke refers to the task of the two Eastern Powers, Austria and Russia, in guarding Europe from the encroaching Musselman. He pithily observes: “Russia did it with greater results; Austria with greater renown. One can never forget in recalling those conquests that the German emperors fought with Turkey in her day of might; the Czars, on the other hand, when she was falling to decay. Austria’s extended line of operations lay through a waste and semi-barbarous country, through provinces entirely destitute of water, inhabited by Bosnians, Serbs and Arnauts, who to this day give evidence of their warlike capacities. In the affinity of their beliefs Russia possessed a great advantage, as well as in her connection with the Turkish seaboard. But Russia, too, having become so terrible an enemy could be at once the friend and guardian of her weaker foe. If then it is come to this, that all her European neighbours constitute themselves the defenders of the once-dreaded Turkish realm, at the same time that they dread its fall, it is not hard to comprehend how the final solution to this great problem may well take place beneath the time-honoured walls of Byzantium.” In this sentence we are reminded of the recent state of affairs after the treaty of San Stefano, and how a collision between England and Russia seemed well-nigh inevitable. With the Berlin

Congress fresh in our minds, Moltke's utterance seems little short of prophetic. And, as in these days when the Koran has been quoted as an authority for the collapse of Mohammedanism, Moltke, too, believes it to teach the doctrine of the unity of one Supreme Spirit, which nevertheless is so warped, that its laws and decrees must of necessity oppose all social progress. "Its arrogance in victory, the indolence fostered by a glorious climate and a rich vegetation, but its religion above all is what keeps the East stationary." Moltke attributes further causes of decay to the proverbially-defective administration of Turkish bureaucracy, and to the neglect of agriculture; the government having been compelled thereby to purchase its corn at Odessa. "Acres upon acres of fertile soil lie uncultivated without the gates of a town having 800,000 inhabitants." The balance which Moltke strikes in Turkish debit and credit is given in a letter dated 12th Feb. 1836. "The lesser members of the body politic are destroyed; the heart alone remains. It only wants a rebellion in the capital to give the finishing stroke to the collapse of the Turkish monarchy. The future will show us if it be possible for a state to stop midway in its downfall and to re-organize itself; or whether, like the Christian-Byzantine Empire, the Mohammedan-Byzantine Kingdom is doomed to perish at the hands of fiscal administration. But the peace of Europe seems less likely to be threatened by the conquest of Turkey at the hands of a foreign Power, than by that Kingdom's own internal rottenness."

In the year 1838 Moltke left the shores of the smiling Bosphorus for those of the Euphrates and the Tigris. He had been over two years now in Turkey, and at present his return home was out of the question; he seemed more and more magnetized by Eastern complications. The Sultan, Mahmoud II., was just on the point of a fresh conflict

with Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt. He had been defeated in his encounter with Ibrahim Pacha, and he could not forget the fact that, in a rash moment by the peace of Kutajah he had conceded to Mehemet Ali the whole of Syria and the territory of Adana. Mahmoud had been grievously humiliated. The insubordination of his Pacha had not simply confined itself to mutiny and rebellion; but, from conquering his own master, he went on to assume the footing of an independent monarch, finally extorting from Mahmoud a cession of territory. Nor did he stop here. He held sway over the Gulf of Arabia; its shores to the east and west were already in his possession. He now seized upon the Bahrain islands in the Persian Gulf; and threatening the Sultan of Muskat with dethronement, he was preparing to conquer Busra, a town at the mouth of the Euphrates. If this came about, and he became master of Egypt, Syria and Arabia, he would hold the key of the Arabian and Persian seaboard, and his special talents for commercial enterprise would make him not only far more powerful than his suzerain at Constantinople, but he would also do much to injure England's Eastern commerce. The position which this latter Power had taken up with regard to the conflict between the Sultan and his vassals had attracted some attention. In 1833 England had hoped to bring about a rupture of the bond of alliance between Turkey and Russia by counselling the Sultan to make peace, thus procuring Syria for Mehemet Ali. She now advised the Sultan to punish his arrogant Pacha, and in 1838 she concluded a treaty of commerce with Turkey. By this treaty England secured an abolition of all monopoly, and also the right of free export from all parts of the Turkish kingdom, including Egypt and Syria. It remained to be seen whether Mehemet Ali would submit to so important a

reduction in his revenues. To agree to the treaty meant a delay in the declaration of war: to reject it was to have war immediately. Meanwhile Mahmoud thought it as well to place a body of troops on the frontier of Asia Minor under the command of Hafiz Pacha. The official reason given for this was that this army was intended to quell the revolts of the Kurds on the borders of Asia. But Mehemet Ali was not to be deceived thereby, and despatched reinforcements to Syria. The Sultan was naturally not unwilling that his general should profit by the superior military knowledge of the Prussian officers, and Moltke and Capt. von Mühlbach were selected for this purpose. They had a farewell audience of Mahmoud, who gave to each of them a sabre, exquisitely damascened.

In the early days of March 1838, the two officers left Constantinople by steamer, and on the following day reached the harbour of Samsun. It was the eastern portion of Asia Minor which was to form the present scene of Moltke's activity. A line drawn from north to south leads from Samsun on the Black Sea to Amasia, Tokat and Sivas, and from there over the Anti-Taurus into the valley of the Upper Euphrates, to Karput, Walatia, Ufra Biradschik and Nisib. These last-named towns were the most southern points in Moltke's plan of operations. Going east of this line, the Tigris skirts the eastern border of the Armenian highlands where lie the towns Diarbekir and Mossul. Mossul was Moltke's eastern point. To the west of the first-named line is Marasch and across Taurus and Anti-Taurus, Kaisarijeh and Konija. Konija formed Moltke's extreme westerly point. His sojourn in these parts lasted from March 1838, until the beginning of August 1839. During the whole time Moltke showed unflagging zeal and enterprise, an iron power of endurance, and a devotion to his duty which no bodily fear could

shake. It was through Moltke's topographical survey that the Turkish Pachas got their first knowledge of the country there. Leaving Samsun, Moltke and his countryman Von Mühlbach journeyed forwards on horseback, a caravan of some thirty horse, to Sivas. Here they crossed the swollen river Kisil-Irmak, whence, after an ascent of three hours in the deep snow, they reached the highest summit of Anti-Taurus, and then the way led downwards across a table-land. The ride was a toilsome one, and but little progress could be made. In the whole twenty hours they had come to only two small villages. With the Euphrates at hand, Moltke grew impatient, and he found travelling by caravan very tedious work. On March 16th they came to a deep ravine. "The country around grew more and more wild; the mountains seemed like the storm-waves of a sea. No trace of vegetation is here; neither grass nor shrubs nor mossy slopes. Yet the colouring is exquisitely varied by the red and brown and black precipices, with scarps of blue and greenish loam, while above dazzling snowpeaks tower against the clear sky. We now saw far below us the Frat, a river which the Roman emperors were wont to consider the natural limits of their measureless empire. The whole region is woefully barren here; the banks devoid of dwellings; the mountains without road or path; one might almost imagine that one had reached the uttermost end of the earth." At this point they crossed the Euphrates by the ferry, and reached the little town of Kieben-Maaden. Not far from here two tributaries of the Euphrates join the main river. These are the Murad from Ararat, and the Frat from Erzeroum. The river now grows wider, some twenty feet in breadth, and its current is very rapid. On the day following Moltke approached Karput, which lies further eastwards. He stopped at Mesra, a village hard by, which formed

the head-quarters of the Turkish army of the Taurus. Moltke and Von Mühlbach presented themselves to Hafiz, who gave them each a couple of splendid arabs, and rode with them into Karpuz, where he took them over the soldiers' barracks. When the officers returned to their head-quarters they found awaiting them large boxes of pistachios, dried peaches from Malatia and mountain honey, all marks of the Sultan's consideration.

On March 23rd, at the request of the Pacha, Moltke started on a reconnoitring expedition to the borders of Syria. His suite consisted of a Tartar officer, and servants, a groom and a couple of horses. At first the route lay westwards. After fording the Euphrates at Isoglu, they soon came to Malatia, a town of some 5,000 houses, all built of limestone. From there riding on across the snow-swept Taurus mountains, they reached the exquisite valley of Marasch, where almond-trees bloomed amidst the verdant meadows. Here Moltke made a halt after his long ride of sixty-five hours; and, with the Pacha, he inspected the militia battalions stationed there. Marasch is not far from the Syrian frontier. Leaving here on the 29th, Moltke went east again in the direction of the Euphrates across the table-land to Adiaman, and from thence, by dangerous mountain passes and over swollen streams, they came to the ancient castle of Gerger, upon a cliff overlooking the Euphrates. Moltke, in the course of his journey, found here and there, amid the wilds and on the sides of the rocks, cuneiform and Greek inscriptions. From Gerger, Moltke travelled by the side of the river in a south-westerly direction, to Samsat (the former Samosata), and through a desert to Rumkaleh, a town "cut out of the rock" with a really splendid fortress, formerly the old Roman castle Zeugma. "The Euphrates here reaches its extreme western point, and, in former times, it was crossed by a

bridge, which was perhaps the reason why the Romans founded a colony in so impassable a neighbourhood." From this place he wrote to his friend Captain Fischer, who had remained with Vincke at Constantinople. "One starlight night I stood amid the ruins of the old Roman castle of Zeugma. Below, in the rocky defile, the Euphrates glistened, only the noise of its ripple breaking the silence of the night. Before me, in the moonlight, passed wraiths of Cyrus, of Alexander, Xenophon, Cæsar, and of Julian, they who all once from this selfsame stony spot looked down across the stream upon the land of the Chosroer—a spot which time and nature cannot change. Then I resolved to offer a libation to the memory of the mighty Roman race in the form of the golden grape. I flung a bottle from the heights into the river below, whence, dancing and bobbing, it was carried seawards. Of course, *it was an empty one*. There I stood, like the old toper in Goethe's ballad; and, like him, 'I drank not a drop again!' And for a very good reason. The bottle was my last one."

From Rumkaleh Moltke proceeded further south to Biradschik on the left bank of the Euphrates, where the river first becomes navigable. He at once recognized the strategical importance of this town with its rocky fortress. From thence, by an almost impassable road, he went to the north-east, to Urfa, the old Edessa, and to Diarbekir. The sheriff of Urfa received him with every hospitality, and a sham fight was held in his honour. The way from Urfa to Diarbekir led through a dreary wilderness, and for the whole way there are only four villages and very few wells. When crossing the Karadscha-Dagh, the ridge of which he reached before daybreak, Moltke saw the sun rise and the Tigris "glittering in the first rays of dawn." He reached Diarbekir in thunder and hail about noon, where he stopped for a few days. The question whether there

would be war or no, was harder to answer here than on the Bosphorus. But Moltke's activity remained the same. "It is to be hoped that the mediators of the European Powers will not allow it to come to a sort of military *allopathy*, but that they will undertake the cure of Syria's disease by a diplomatic *homœopathy*. Meanwhile, it is our business to whet the somewhat rusty sabre in case it should be needed." The manner in which Moltke went down the Tigris, from Diarbekir to Mossul, is highly interesting. "On the 15th Von Mühlbach and I, with two well-armed Agas of the Pacha, and our servants and dragomans, got into a boat, which, like those in Cyrus' time, was made of a raft of inflated sheep-skins. The Turks hold hunting a sin, and look with horror upon all beef and game. On the other hand, they consume quantities of sheep and goats, the skins of which they carefully take off and sew together, tying the extremities tight. When the skin has been inflated, which can be done without having to hold the mouth tight to the opening, it has great capacity for carrying, and it is almost impossible for it to sink. From forty to sixty of such skins are bound together in rows under a frail super-structure of branches so that the raft has a breadth of eight skins in front, and eighteen behind, and over this some leaves are spread, then carpets and a mat; and so you float comfortably down the stream. The current is so strong that oars are not needed for rowing purposes, but only to steer a straight course with, and to keep clear of the dangerous eddies. And although on account of these latter we were obliged to moor the raft at night until the moon was up, we accomplished our long journey of eighty-eight hours in four days and a half. The rate at which the current runs is, on an average, about one mile (i.e., four English miles) an hour. In some parts it is far stronger; in others not so strong."

The scenery, as far as Dschesireh, was weirdly beautiful. Steep rocks rose to the right and to the left, with ruined castles and towns and pretentious-looking bridges. In places were found Latin, Greek and Persian inscriptions. The river leaves the Dschüdid mountains at this point, "from whose glittering snowpeaks," as the popular saying is, "Noah and his somewhat-mixed society embarked." And now the country round grew very monotonous and uninhabited. Moltke humorously relates a little adventure which befell him in these parts. "Nobody could travel more comfortably than we did. We had provisions and wine and tea, and a brazier of coals, and lying back on our soft cushions, we glided easily along at the rate of post-horses. The element, however, which helped us on had followed us in another form. After we left Diabekir the rain poured incessantly, and, in spite of our umbrellas, our wraps and clothes and carpets were drenched through. On Easter Sunday, as we were leaving Dschesireh, the sun came out, warming our numbed limbs. Some way below the town there is the wreck of another bridge across the Tigris, and one of its piers at high water produces a powerful eddy. Despite the efforts of the oarsmen our little ark was irresistibly drawn into this Charybdis. Like an arrow it shot down into the deep abyss, and a heavy wave swept clean over us. The water was like ice, and, as the craft danced on without capsizing, it was impossible to repress a melancholy smile at the pitiable plight in which each of us was. The brazier had been washed overboard, beside us floated a boot, and everybody was fishing for this and that trifle. We landed on an island, and, as our portmanteaus were as wet as we were, there was nothing to do but to take off every single thing and dry them, as well as we could, in the sun. Hard by on a sand-bank sat a swarm of pelicans, sunning their white raiment, as if in mockery. Suddenly we noticed

that our raft had broken from its moorings, and was drifting down stream. One of the agas jumped in at once after it, and just managed to reach it, or else we should have been left in nature's garb on that desolate island. After drying ourselves somewhat we went on again, but fresh torrents made rowing impossible. The night was so dark that we were forced to put ashore for fear of fresh eddies. Though we nearly perished with cold and were soaked to the skin, we were afraid to light a fire for fear of attracting the Arabs; and so, mooring our raft as noiselessly as possible to a willow, we anxiously waited for the sun to rise behind the Persian hills when we should get warm again."

On the fourth day this "comfortable" trip on sheepskins came to an end, and the travellers landed at Mossul. The Pacha gave the Prussian officers a most distinguished reception, and quartered them at the house of an Armenian. They gave him a rough sketch of Mossul, and a hastily-finished plan of some new barracks, with one of a water-wheel, all of which greatly surprised him. He gave them a supply of horses and mules for their return-journey across the desert. The neighbourhood of Mossul had become dangerous on account of the brigandage of the Arabs, and Moltke determined to attach his party to a caravan just starting, and to accompany this across the desert of northern Mesopotamia. The caravan consisted of 600 camels and some 400 mules, and the Pacha had given them an escort of four men of his irregular horse. With this caravan Moltke travelled in a north-westerly direction, and after a five days' journey he came to the village of Tillaja. Here he learnt that that morning Mehemet Pacha had marched northwards in pursuit of the chief of a rebellious Kurdish horde. Moltke instantly left the caravan and hastened after Mehemet, reaching his camp at nightfall. The latter, with 3,000 men and a force of artillery, which had been

brought by raft from Diarbekir, was moving up the left bank of the river, where the Kurdish chieftain, Sayd-Bey, had entrenched himself in an inaccessible haunt among the rocks. The cortége went far too slowly for Moltke, who rode on a couple of marches further accompanied by an aga to Sayd-Bey's castle, and thoroughly reconnoitred the same. He found it was built on the summit of a rock some thousand feet high, joined by a narrow impassable ridge to the range of hills, and connected with the valley by a single path, strongly protected by outworks. The rocks to the right and to the left were nearly on a level with the castle itself. They were so steep that guns could not have been got up thither ; and, even if they had, the distance was too great for them to do damage. Yet Moltke wished to try the experiment, whether by bombardment from these heights the castle would not be forced to capitulate. As soon as Mehemet came up, the guns were brought up the rocks with immense labour, half a battalion towing each gun, and the others clearing the way by felling trees and hurling the blocks of stone into the precipices. For two days the castle was bombarded without effect. Moltke, therefore, looked about for a likely point from which to spring a mine, and in the night, with two or three Kurds, he climbed up to the foot of the castle-wall. But as they were not under cover at all they had to come back, not, however, before having been seen by the enemy, who fired several shots after them. Moltke then proposed to renew the attack on the following night, hoping that a strong roofing of planks would be sufficient to protect them until a hole had been made in the wall and a powder barrel inserted. But the enemy had witnessed the first attempt, and, not caring to wait to see if the second one should be successful, capitulated. Sayd-Bey came down to the Pacha's tent ; and with the air of a conqueror kissed hands in token of

friendship. He then sat down between the Pacha and Moltke, drank coffee and smoked, conversing in Kurdish just as though nothing had happened. The castle was then set on fire. But this was not the last of the Kurdish disturbances, for to the north of this castle, lying between Musch and Hasu, were the highlands of Karsan, with many flourishing villages, the inhabitants of which were not under the Turkish rule, paying no taxes and refusing to serve in the army. The taxation and the levying of troops formed the two causes of discontent among both Kurds and Turks. It was not so much the burden of the taxation itself to which they objected as the arbitrary way in which it was levied without the least regard to their individual means. The result of this was, Moltke thought, the extraordinary poverty of an otherwise extremely rich country. "As long as taxation consists in nothing else but the pitiless extortion exercised by every Moslem official upon his subordinates without driving them to open rebellion, so long will it be impossible for agriculture to flourish, and much more for trade industries to take root." Compulsory military service, which alone affected the Moslem and not the Rajah, was for that very reason a sore burden to the former. "The fault lies in the unequal division and the long term of service, fifteen years being only another way of saying for life." Consequently before a conscription the whole of the male population in the mountain-district fled. Those drawn were obliged to be surrounded in camp by a strong line of outposts to prevent their escaping; and, although a deserter's punishment was 200 stripes, desertions were numerous. The remedy for this great evil would be to induce more men to enlist for a shorter term of service. It is but of little use to decree in Constantinople a term of five years' service if the villagers do not see with their own eyes the soldiers return home from such

service ; and, since Nizams and troops exist, no soldier has as yet ever been known to have received his discharge.

The campaign against the inhabitants of Karsan was undertaken by a considerable force. Hafiz Pacha himself had advanced. Moltke, being ordered on a reconnaissance, had pushed forward with a couple of dozen Kurdish horsemen, who at the first shots refused to go any further, and he was compelled to carry out his orders accompanied by a solitary Kurd. The inhabitants of the village of Papur made preparations to defend themselves from the flat roofs of their houses, and commenced firing from a distance. As Hafiz Pacha had been driven back from here a few days previously with considerable loss, Mahmoud Bey asked Moltke how he proposed to conduct the attack. The village was situated on a steep rocky slope. Moltke proposed, therefore, to outflank it with skirmishers on the left, and, by scaling the heights in the rear, to storm it from above, thus cutting off all retreat from the defenders. This advice was acted upon ; and the soldiers, having driven the inhabitants from their roofs by a rain of bullets from above, threw themselves into the village, slaying all but a few with the bayonet. At an attack later on of a height defended by men and women Moltke was not present. "The Pacha did not wish us to take part in this affair, and I can assure you I was not sorry. You need not envy us this war : it is full of horrors. Besides many thousand head of cattle, about six hundred prisoners arrived, half of them women and little children. One lad about seven years old had got gunshot-wounds, and we extracted the bullet, which is now lying beside me. He will very likely recover. Women are also among the wounded ; but to find children with bayonet-wounds gives one a melancholy insight into the whole business." The wretched prisoners had been a whole day without

food. Moltke with difficulty managed to get them some raisins and some cheese, and the next day made them a huge "pillaw" of rice, which the women and children devoured voraciously. Capt. v. Mühlbach washed their wounds and bandaged them himself as well as he could. He spoke openly to the Sultan on the subject of the evils arising from the system in vogue of putting a price upon ears and heads. Yet Moltke thought that, for Bashi-Bazouks, the instances of barbarity were not very numerous. He notably praised the conscientiousness with which Mehemet Pacha respected the property of those villages which maintained their allegiance to the state, preventing the soldiery from entering the same, and taking care to protect their fields. Moltke, through the whole of this campaign, had been far from well. For the last few weeks he had not spared himself and had taken very little rest, and was now so exhausted that he had to journey by mule, and it was not until he was again in the pure mountain air that he by degrees recovered his strength.

On the 30th of June Hafiz Pacha broke up his camp at Karsan, where the heat was terrific, and moved from the Tigris back to the Euphrates. Moltke went with him as far as Sivan-Maaden, near the Murad; and here he received a fresh commission, for Hafiz was anxious to ascertain if the Euphrates could be made available for military and other transport. Its passage through the Eastern range of the Taurus mountains, and the many rapids which were found here, seemed to present insurmountable difficulties. Experiments had been twice previously made to descend the river on a raft constructed of leathern bladders; but without success and with some loss of life. The state of the river now seemed to favour a fresh attempt, and Hafiz requested Moltke to ascertain if this were practicable. Whereupon a large solid raft was built at Palu, made out of sixty hides,

well provisioned and manned by four sturdy oarsmen. "I went on board this raft on the 10th of July, accompanied by two of my men and an aga of the Pacha's, all well armed. I was provided with compass and instruments, and shipped at the various places we passed competent steersmen." They descended the Murad in a westerly direction to its junction with the Frat. From here the Euphrates winds through the mountains southwards, taking a westerly course after passing the town of Telek, and when the travellers reached the neighbourhood of Malatia their chief difficulties began. "At Kymyrhan rugged masses of rock overhang the water, and the stream flows on through gloomy defiles. Our craft glided along with extraordinary rapidity, and the river became reduced to half the width it had been higher up. We soon heard a distant roaring which was re-echoed by the steep rocky sides, and the increased velocity with which we were carried onward, showed that we were nearing the 'Snake's Mill.' We carefully moored alongside a jutting crag, and from thence took a survey of our position, before venturing into the whirlpool. Trusting to Providence, I gave the word to push off, and we were at once caught in the rush of whirling waters. Before we well knew where we were, we had got safely through; not, however, without being drenched from head to foot, which was pleasantly refreshing, for there were nearly forty degrees of heat. The difference in the level of the water above and below the fall in a distance of two hundred paces was about fifteen feet. There are more than three hundred of these rapids, each succeeding the other for over twenty miles; and these form the cataracts of the Euphrates. Before you are well past one of them you hear the roar of the next; and as the raft keeps continually turning round and round, one gets the opportunity of gazing upon the wild romantic scenery

without altering one's position. Several Kurdish villages are seen perched on the heights, among shady nut-trees, and waterfalls leap foaming down the mountain-sides. The most dangerous parts are near the little town of Schiro and at the village of Telek, for below this the stream, which above is two hundred to three hundred paces wide, has been narrowed by a landslip to some thirty-five paces ; a spot called the 'Stag's' Leap.'" From here Moltke went on as far as Samsat, where he landed and returned on horseback, his "rivergods" (steersmen) carrying their oars and other gear slung to both sides of their saddles. In scorching heat he crossed the mountains to Asbusu, in Malatia, and so on to Hafiz Pacha at Karbut, whom he found prostrated by the great heat, which had put a stop to all operations ; and Moltke himself was laid up for some weeks. The health of the troops was very bad, several thousands being on the sick list, without any doctors at hand. To Moltke this existence was monotonous in the extreme, sleeping on the flat roof of his house, where he had an exquisite view, and in the evening riding with the Pacha into the country, where, spreading out their mats, they smoked and drank the Euphrates water, and then rode home in the dusk. Moltke's activity revolted at such idleness. He writes, "I chafe at this life of inaction." That the Pacha had a deep esteem for Moltke's knowledge and energy may be gathered from a remark which he made on the occasion of a review, at which the artillery had anything but distinguished itself. "There was a time," he said, "when our artillery was considered the finest in the world ; and now we can scarcely execute the simplest movement. We have daily to thank the Padisha for having provided us with officers who have our interests more at heart than even we ourselves, and who work whilst we are sleeping." In the autumn he went with the Pacha to Asbusu, and

from there on the 3rd. October he began a tour of inspection, which took him as far west as Konijeh, which lies to the south of the Salt Sea. He had with him a dragoman, a non-commissioned officer, a Tartar servant and a groom. Crossing the vast plains of Malatia, he ascended the high table-lands of Asia Minor to Kaisarieh, near the river Kisil Irmak, or Halys, which Croesus had to cross in his march to conquest. Thence his route lay to Newschehr, where he made the acquaintance of a man whom the Turks all held in horror. His deeds of cruelty and daring at the massacre of the Janissaries had gained for him the sobriquet of "Black Hell." Moltke dismounted in the court-yard of the house, where he asked for fresh horses, and desired to see the master of the house. However, he was kept waiting by perpetual excuses until he lost all patience; and, as he knew that nothing can be gained from the Turks except by a firm attitude, without further ado he mounted the stairs, and entered a room just as his host was coming in—"a man of the most imposing presence that I have ever seen. We met as men each determined to maintain our dignity, and the Bey's handsome countenance clearly indicated that he had not quite settled if it was to be peace or war." Moltke affected not to notice this, but had his heavy boots taken off by his servant, and sat himself down in the best seat, before he even saluted his host with the friendly "Merhabah." The latter, in order to give the stranger a proof of his knowledge of European manners, replied gravely, "Adio." After these little preliminaries pipes were brought, and a few commonplaces exchanged. At last the inquisitive Moslem asked Moltke if he knew who he was, to which Moltke answered, "I have never seen you, though I have heard about you." "And what have you heard?" was the quick rejoinder. "Oh! that you are a capital artillerist, and go

by the name of 'Black Hell.' " "It was not every one who would have taken this Satanic nickname as a compliment, yet it had the effect of mollifying the Bey, who forthwith ordered up breakfast for us, and, to my Tartar's delight, provided us with excellent horses wherewith to continue our journey." At last Moltke reached Konijeh; and having business to transact with Hadj Ali, the governor, he remained here a day or two. On leaving, Hadj presented him, through an Armenian banker, with four purses of gold; but as Prussian officers were not in the habit of accepting gifts of this kind, Moltke asked the banker to be good enough to return the money to the Pacha. But this he was afraid to do, so Moltke was obliged to keep it and divide it among his attendants. "I believe they thought it rather foolish of me to be so generous; but then, you know, they always look upon all Franks as a little bit 'delih,' or 'cracked.'"

From Konijeh, going south towards the Euphrates, Moltke reached the Taurus by way of Eregli, at that part which is called Bulgar-Dagh, the mountains which separate Adana from Asia Minor, and are joined to Syria by a single narrow defile. "Ever since the days of Cyrus, Xenophon and Alexander, down to those of Ibrahim Pacha, these same mountains have played an important part in the march of armies, and even more so in the commercial intercourse of nations. These passes, through which European armies had often advanced against Persia, India and Egypt, had now to be closed against the latter nation, which threatened Europe with invasion, just as it had done five centuries ago." At Tschifte-Hann, where the valley becomes more like a ravine, he found his comrade Fischer, not, alas! among his men, busied with his work of fortification, but laid up with fever in a miserably damp room, comfortless and bare, with no one to look after him. At

meeting Moltke his strength revived, and that same day he was able to go for a ride with him, and on the following morning they together inspected and settled upon the most favourable points for closing the pass. They rode as far as the Egyptian outposts at Akköpü and Maaden, where they parted; and Moltke proceeded in a northerly direction to Develi, and from thence eastwards across Albistan, a country inhabited by Turkomans. He reached Malatia on the 29th October, having ridden 760 miles in twenty-six days. Of this journey he writes: "The peculiar circumstances under which I travel give me access to districts hitherto inaccessible to Europeans—districts quite unapproachable unless with a military escort, or following in the wake of an army. Such favourable conditions are seldom combined, and I avail myself of them conscientiously, and have now traversed upwards of 700 geographical miles, for all of which I have itinerary maps drawn out."

He remained in Malatia from November until the following January, partly occupied in completing his map of Asia Minor, which the Pacha was delighted to receive. Though it was December the weather was exquisite. There were some forty battalions stationed in the place, who went through their drill every day. Of the manœuvring of these troops, Moltke says: "It is difficult to make the people here understand that it is not a question of how many, but of how few, evolutions it is possible to perform. Each officer who comes from Europe shows them some new method, and the consequence is that they have now about eighty-six movements, and if I had offered to introduce another forty or so, more complicated even than these, they would willingly have adopted them. It was more difficult to make them unlearn all this. Tomorrow we are going to present to the commander-in-chief

a couple of brigades of militia, who can by this time go through the simple Prussian brigade-drill with considerable precision." Moltke felt certain that war would break out in the following spring. He seemed to think that the treaty of commerce which had been concluded between England and the Porte was impracticable, as far as Egypt was concerned. And though Mehemet might agree to these terms, he certainly would not take any steps to carry them out, and in the event of compulsion he would at once attack the army of the Taurus. Moltke writes on the 23rd December, "Ah, well, my dear Vinke, our Christmas out here will not be a very brilliant one. If it goes on snowing as it has done, it will put a stop to all military operations. You must not imagine that our occupation is at all like the pleasant active work to which we are accustomed at home, when assembling a large body of men. It is just as if the troops here had lost all the warlike spirit of their ancestors. We have had to shoot a non-commissioned officer for having induced six of the sentinels to desert with him. Our Pacha pays 250 piastres for a deserter who is caught, and he says he has had to pay since October 100,000 piastres. As I watch our battalions marching past to the sound of merry music, I sometimes indulge in strange reveries. In the background is one of the most hideous towns it is possible to imagine, no street-boys, no lamps, no cabs, a town without women, balls, or theatres, cafés, or clubs of any sort—nothing but just the sky and the soldiers. Of course above this towers the splendid snow-capped mountains, and at times, by way of encouragement, I say to myself, 'That's Armenia, and there rolls the Euphrates, whose sources I was never able to point out at school, for I used to think they must be beyond the end of the earth.' But you mustn't imagine from this dreary picture that I am in a very melancholy

state of mind; my domestic arrangements are all that I could wish them to be; my servants are contented and devoted to me; my gallant steeds bear me daily across the vast plains—so my life goes on! and the Pachas are not only very polite but really extremely friendly to me, just as they always are to a Giaour. How odd it will seem once more to come across a dish of potatoes, or a pair of polished boots with well cleaned spurs, or any of that kind of European luxuries! Well, if you should see a ghost on Christmas-eve, you'll know that it is yours truly."

Moltke left Malatia for Urfa and Biradschik on the 19th of January, 1839, and in the former town he met with Mehmet Pacha, with whom he had made a campaign against the Kurds the previous summer. From Biradschik he made an excursion to Nisib, a little town on the Turco-Egyptian frontier buried amid olive-trees, a town soon after destined to increase the renown of Turkey as well as that of Moltke. He returned to Malatia by way of the Taurus, where he remained until April, and then went on to Egin, which lies between the two arms of the Euphrates, in order to take an accurate survey of the district. Having completed this, he made a second voyage on board his sheepskin-raft down the rapids of the Euphrates, which was rendered additionally dangerous by the swollen state of the river. The oarsmen explained to the Pacha, who was anxious to know, that the river at present was utterly unnavigable, and that any such attempt would result in the loss of the entire crew. What, therefore, the natives did not dare to venture upon, that the Pacha now proposed to Moltke. A raft was quickly got ready, and the next morning Moltke was in the midst of the stream. More than once he was obliged to land and pack up his craft, and carry it past rapids which had become waterfalls. So they went on until they reached

Telek, where they put up for the night, and where the Colonel of Engineers and his companions, declaring that they had had quite enough of it, turned back. The aga also, and the four oarsmen, tried to shirk going any farther, but this was more than Moltke could brook, so, taking a pilot from Telek, he pushed off.

Swift as an arrow the raft sped on down the stream, which was so rapid that over two miles were covered in something like ten minutes. The waves constantly broke over the raft, and at times it was altogether under water. Rowing was entirely out of the question; two oarsmen fell overboard, but, as they had ropes around them attached to the raft, they were soon hauled in. "Thus things went on in the greatest confusion, until Allah guiding us into an eddy, we were able to collect our scattered senses as we whirled round and round; and plying our oars with great energy we pulled ashore. The aga sprang at the risk of his life, like William Tell, on to a rock, and, falling on his knees in prayer, he vowed to offer a lamb as *corban* for his safe deliverance." In spite of all these difficulties Moltke was anxious to complete his task, feeling that "things could not be much worse than they were." He, therefore, dismissed his aga, and offered to reward the two oarsmen with a purse of gold if they would continue the journey with him alone. But in vain; money would not induce them; and Moltke was obliged to turn back. On the 12th of April he was again in Malatia, and reported to the Pacha that the Euphrates in its present state was quite useless as a means of transport. Two days later the army of Hafiz Pacha began its advance upon Syria.

The time had now come when some decision must be arrived at, for matters could not remain much longer as they were. The Porte had 70,000 men under arms in Asia Minor, consisting of the three corps commanded by

Hadschi Ali, Isset Pacha and Hafiz Pacha, encamped respectively at Konieh, Kaisarieh and in Kurdistan. The greater portion of these were half-drilled militiamen, and the line-regiments were chiefly made up of recruits. During the past year the army had lost more than one third of its numbers through sickness, and Hafiz Pacha's division had been recruited for the most part from the Kurdistan district. This province was well-nigh ruined by the raising of levies, the quartering of troops and the enormous demands made on it by the commissariat. The mode of recruiting adopted differed only in name from the African mode of kidnapping slaves. They were brought in in gangs, rope-bound and handcuffed. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that they should desert whenever they could, deliberately running away under fire, and even shooting at their own officers. Hafiz Pacha seriously contemplated incorporating a certain number of the Armenians with the Turkish forces; but his difficulty lay in being able to justify to his Government a measure so directly opposed to Mahommedan pride. It was also a question as to how it should be carried out. By this means he thought that a friendly rivalry might be established between the Mahommedan and the Christian battalions; the army would be strengthened; the country would be the gainer; and in a manner, at once the easiest and most equitable, an emancipation of the Christians might possibly be brought about. The billeting of the troops was also a weighty grievance, meaning as it did the entire occupation of the houses by the soldiery, who turned the inmates thereof out into the street, to find what shelter and food they could. It was thus that the Pacha's army had occupied Malatia all through the past winter, not one single house being left in the possession of its rightful owner.

This continuous state of military preparation was draining the finances of the Porte, decimating the young troops, and could not fail to fill the inhabitants of the districts occupied with bitter feelings against the Government. Either Mehemet Ali must, under guarantee of the *status quo* by the Great Powers, be compelled to disarm, which would enable the Porte to demobilise, or else war was inevitable. At the moment the Powers did not do anything, and thus the Sultan Mahmoud was compelled to take the initiative. Mehemet Ali continued to hesitate with regard to the acceptance of the Anglo-Turkish treaty of commerce, and, utterly ignoring his position as a vassal, was proceeding to carry out a private commercial policy of his own. Whereupon Mahmoud denounced him as a traitor, deprived him of all his honours, and gave orders for the advance of the army of the Taurus. The Egyptian forces, which were similarly unfavourably situated, lay at that time in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, not far from Nisib and Biradschik. They had, however, the advantage of being concentrated and under the sole command of Ibrahim Pacha. It had to be considered whether Ibrahim would assume the offensive or the defensive; in the former case he would take the shortest road to Constantinople through Konieh and the Taurus passes; or go on to Malatia in quest of Hafiz Pacha. As Moltke believed that Ibrahim would probably choose the former course, he thought that the best means of arresting his march on Constantinople would be for Hafiz Pacha to advance upon his right flank. Of course, it was more than likely that Ibrahim would not allow himself to be thus attacked, but that, before he pushed on to Constantinople, he would engage with Hafiz's army and endeavour to destroy it, for only then he would be able to commence his march unmolested through Asia Minor. For every reason it was

imperative that all the troops of the army, of the Taurus should be moved forward and concentrated at Biradschik, on the left bank of the Euphrates. They were to pitch their camp upon the right bank, in a place where the winding river would entirely protect their flank and rear, and which could only be approached from the west. Earth-works were here thrown up by Capt. v. Mühlbach, who had been sent on in advance. On the 14th of April all the troops left their cantonments and marched to Biradschik. Moltke and Capt. v. Laue, who had meanwhile joined him, had hard work to get the artillery thither, partly by land and partly by rafts. Ibrahim's cavalry was posted close to Biradschik and had seen this crossing of the Euphrates, and as the Turkish army had at first got only nine guns, if he had attacked it then, he could have utterly annihilated it. But he let this opportunity go by of surprising his almost defenceless foe: Moltke himself thought that his own position would have proved a critical one. The position taken up at Biradschik was certainly hardly in accordance with the rules of the Prussian staff; but the state of things in the East, and notably those of the army of the Taurus, were of an exceptional nature. To place one's self with a river at one's back, thus cutting off all retreat, would be regarded by an European army as a gross mistake; yet Moltke looked upon this fact in the light of an advantage, which shews that he was not very sanguine of success in the coming battle. "A bridge across the Euphrates immediately behind the battle-field could only be of use to deserters, but as matters are at present, every man knows that he must make a stand or perish." The army was at a further disadvantage in that, notwithstanding the advice of all the Prussian officers, the Seraskier at Constantinople had neglected to place his forces in Asia Minor under one commander, but had allowed each general to occupy a separate

position, so that neither could give the other any support, but, fighting independently, were always outnumbered.

Moltke estimated the force of the Turkish army in May at 28,000 infantry, with 5,000 cavalry and 100 guns. He doubted whether 30,000 men could be brought into action, for the daily loss by desertion was very great. Much was yet needed to a thorough state of readiness. He says: "It will take at least a fortnight or three weeks from to-day (May 20th), before we shall be even in marching order." And yet Hafiz Pacha considered that the next good shot which came from the Egyptian ground ought to be looked upon as a *casus belli*; and the Mollahs, or priests, of whom a great many were in camp, encouraged him in his intention of instantly beginning the campaign. It was hardly consoling to Moltke to find both his own plans and those of the other officers met by this kind of ignorant opposition; and he explained to the Pacha as follows: "The Mollahs may be able to tell you if the war be just, but you are the best judge if it be a wise one. The whole position of affairs, the intentions of the Grand Signior, as well as those of the courts of Europe, the strength and position of our own troops as well as that of our adversaries—in short, all that must be taken into consideration in giving advice upon this all-important question, is known neither to the Mollahs, nor to me, nor to anybody else, but only to you. All honour and all responsibility falls upon you; and your only counsellor is yourself." Hafiz did not at all relish this speech. Much also was done contrary to Moltke's advice which led finally to "the melancholy catastrophe." What was the good of enlisting the services of the ablest Prussian officers if the general in command did not follow their advice? Moltke, who at that time had been indisposed for some weeks, had also had the disagreeable task on the one hand of endeavouring to dissuade Hafiz Pacha, who was eager

for the fray, from engaging in any decisive battle, pointing out to him that he could only be sure of its results on having the entire troops in Asia Minor assembled in his camp. Again, on the other hand, were Hafiz to act in direct opposition to this advice, Moltke had to make up his mind to fall in with any imprudent undertaking, simply in order to save his military reputation and to stand by Hafiz in his hour of self-incurred need.

All through May the army remained in camp outside Biradschik. On the 29th as a result of the carelessness of the Turks, their powder-magazine blew up with some 50 tons of ammunition, causing great loss of life. A few days after this, the army (manifestly against Moltke's advice) moved to Nisib, some distance from Biradschik, where they encamped and threw up fortifications. They were now close to the border, and a collision might be looked for within the next few days. Yet Ibrahim was in no hurry to take the initiative, for he had a higher game to play than Hafiz. If he were to lose a battle, all Syria would be up in arms to shake off the Egyptian yoke. Like the Turkish one, his army consisted for the most part of raw recruits; it was badly provided for, and no pay had been issued for eighteen months. From forty to fifty deserters came daily into the Turkish lines. On the other hand, he had an advantage in having all the Syrian forces together, and as Hadschy-Ali remained in a state of stubborn inactivity, Ibrahim was even able to draw in his forces from Adana, which made his army the stronger of the two by some 10,000 men. Besides this, it was better drilled, its artillery was more numerous and better served, and it had the chief advantage of being under the sole command of one man, who well knew that it was not merely a question of the honour of victory, but of the existence of the Egyptian kingdom, which it had been the labour of years

to establish. So Ibrahim was cautious and let matters rest for a while, in the hope that his adversary would come to grief. The Turks had daily made incursions across the frontier, and finally had seized the town of Aintab, enrolling the garrison troops of the place among their regular army. At this Ibrahim lost all patience. On June 20th he left his cantonments and routed the Turkish cavalry at Misar, and pitched his camp about an hour and a half's march from the enemy's position. The Turks quickly formed in line and awaited an attack. No attack was, however, made. The Turks remained under arms all night. Moltke the next morning watched the movements of the enemy from a high crag, "strongly protected by our right wing, whence with our glasses we could see everything." In order to reconnoitre the Turkish positions, Ibrahim sent forward a few divisions to Hafiz' front and left flank, but these, after opening fire at some distance, retired. The enemy's position seemed to him to be too formidable, and no attack was made. Whereupon Moltke advised the Pacha to let his troops return to their tents and rest themselves; but Hafiz grew suddenly suspicious, and kept the whole of his troops that night under arms, which, of course, told upon their energies for the coming battle. Early on the morning of the 22nd of June the enemy retired, and Hafiz thought that this was their actual retreat. Moltke, however, found out that it was no retreat at all which Ibrahim had in view, but that he was attempting to turn the Turkish left flank; and with the two other Prussian officers he at once went to Hafiz and showed him how matters stood. He pointed out that, as the enemy's advanced guard was now at the most but two hours' march distant, it was advisable at once to make a general attack, and by a bold stroke to surprise and defeat Ibrahim's army while still in its divided condition. Moltke's brother-

officers shared this opinion. But Hafiz was not equal to a task of such daring : he contented himself with a useless exhibition on the part of his "miserable cavalry."

Meanwhile the enemy continued their march. In the afternoon Hafiz himself came up to the rock where Moltke was, and from there he could see Ibrahim's troops making for a bridge over the Nisib, not far distant. If this march were effected, the Turks would be completely surrounded, and would have to evacuate their present advantageous position for one equally unfavourable. Moltke saw all this and told the Pacha, who seemed anxious now for his opinion, that, as the opportunity had been neglected of attacking the enemy while on the march, the only thing to be done was to withdraw to the fortified camp at Biradschik, for there it was impossible that they should be surrounded, and the ground, as the troops all knew, was one which gave them the sole choice between death or glory; and it was there that they must await Ibrahim's attack. Hafiz retorted that it would be a disgrace to go back, and seemed to fear that Ibrahim, who would find the Biradschik position far too strong to attack, would retire towards Aleppo, and the looked-for battle would thus take place a long way from where they then were. To this Moltke replied that he would wager his right hand that Ibrahim would not go back to Aleppo without giving battle. It was just a struggle between Prussian strategy and Oriental obstinacy and ignorance. But the Grand Signiors were playing a very high game. Even Moltke did not exactly relish the idea of all the fruit of his energies during the past eighteen months being thrown to the winds through the shortsightedness of the Pacha. And, therefore, in the presence of several of the senior Turkish officers, he openly expressed his disagreement with Hafiz' plans. "I pointed out to the Pacha the strength of the enemy's army, and the insta-

bility of his own ; I showed him, too, the utter insufficiency of our fortifications, and that it was simply a question of a voluntary retreat, which the enemy could in no wise disturb ; and, finally, that when so much was at stake, all minor considerations, even the temporary loss of Aintab, must be merged. Lastly, I told him plainly that, from the position in which the Sultan Mahmoud had placed me, it was necessary for me to say what I thought, and that I declined to hold myself responsible for anything which might result from staying any longer at Nisib.

Hafiz could hardly dispute the justness of these remarks ; the retreat to Biradschik was all but decided upon ; and it was only a question as to how soon it could be done. An hour after this Moltke rides into the Pacha's tent with the news that the enemy's advance-guard was about to cross the bridge. Hafiz had again relapsed into his former state, and, surrounded by his Mollahs, who seemed to be fairly sanguine about matters, he assured Moltke that "the news could scarcely be correct, for the enemy was only going to withdraw to Aleppo. The cause of the Sultan was a just one, and Allah would stand by him ; all retreat was disgraceful, and Moltke had better choose a position on the left wing, fronting the bridge."

Moltke declined to do this, and rode back to his tent to rest himself, for he had been ill for some days past, and was scarcely able to sit his horse. On the way he met two Englishmen who had joined the head-quarters, and he advised them to get their baggage in readiness for the impending catastrophe. Meanwhile the Pacha heard from the outposts that the enemy had actually got to the bridge. Neither the Mollahs, nor Allah, nor the Just Cause would help him now : here he was, surrounded beyond doubt. Hafiz became greatly terrified. The three Prussian officers told him that, so far, nothing had yet been lost ;

only that the retreat to Biradschik must instantly be made. The Turkish officers were also of this opinion, though they had not ventured to express it. Yet Hafiz did not yield to their advice, partly, perhaps, because he was afraid that a retreat of this sort would serve to utterly demoralize his miserable troops. Moltke vehemently urged the Pacha to consent, warning him against the gratuitous advice which had been lavished upon him by those who understood nothing whatever of military matters, adding finally: "By to-morrow at sundown you will know what it is to be a commander without an army." Yet this, too, made no impression. In the twilight Hafiz went to reconnoitre the ground occupied by the left wing, which Moltke did not think was altogether unfavourable in itself. Yet, with such troops as Hafiz had, he saw plainly that there could be but one result. What was the good of his being there as Hafiz' military adviser, and in effect at the head of the Turkish Staff, if no one took his advice? And so he once more begged the Pacha to give the orders for a retreat, and, as he again met with refusal, he tendered his resignation. "Of course," said he, "I shall go through the battle just as any ordinary soldier would; but from this time forward I relinquish my position as 'Müsteschar,' or counsellor." At first the Pacha angrily acceded to his request, but subsequently he altered his mind on reflecting that if any one could get him out of this difficulty it would be Moltke. So after a little while he sent for him and said, "'that he quite hoped that I should not desert him at this climax; though, as to going back to Biradschik, he would first let himself be cut to pieces—no, I must just take up the best position which I could.' What was I to do? I saw that it was now impossible to get back to Biradschik, and my duty now would be to make the best of a bad job." So Moltke at once began the task of placing the troops in the most judicious manner

possible. "They took up their fresh position by the light of the full moon. The forts which had hitherto protected our left wing now formed our right, while on the left we were covered by a strong battery of artillery; and in our front was a narrow pass. Capt. Laue undertook the placing of the batteries, and we had them in readiness about three o'clock the next morning. Every one was at his post, this making the third night which our troops had passed under arms." Before sunrise the Pacha inspected the lines of the new position, with which he seemed greatly pleased. With a view to encourage the men, Moltke, on the night of the 23rd, opened fire upon Ibrahim, who was now only an hour's march from the Turkish lines; the Pacha looking on through his glasses from a neighbouring eminence. Moltke had some difficulty in getting the infantry near enough to the enemy's camp. "The people here have their own peculiar views as to distance." The shells created great consternation among the enemy, who returned the fire, and soon the retreat commenced. The troops were delighted at this brush with the foe.

Moltke had slept only about three hours on the march, when he received the news that Ibrahim's army was rapidly advancing, and soon the battle began in real earnest. Ibrahim advanced in three columns on Biradschik, and became placed between the Turkish camp at Nisib and their magazine at Biradschik, which was a highly dangerous position, for if he were driven back he would have no line of retreat. But it was his last card, and upon it he staked his whole existence. Moltke quickly formed a fresh front and threw up several fortifications to guard against a flank attack. Ibrahim now opened fire at a distance, which created a panic among the Turkish soldiery, many of whom had never heard the whizz of a shell before. As a bomb

burst here and there among the ranks, whole companies broke up in wild confusion. Moltke at first remained with the right wing, which managed to make a stand for nearly an hour; but the left wing, which was more exposed, had speedily retired, and could on no account be induced to advance. The reserve divisions made several attempts to get out of the line of fire, and whole battalions stood with hands uplifted, crying aloud to Allah to give them the victory. Moltke told the Pacha to give his left wing orders to advance; but, before this could be done, the cavalry, which was quite the feeblest portion of his army, left their position among the reserves and advanced to the attack. These had just got as far as the infantry-lines when several shells burst amid their ranks, and they fled in wild dismay, throwing the infantry into terrible confusion. Only one regiment of infantry came to close quarters with the enemy, and all the rest kept at a distance and fired vaguely in the air. Hafiz thus lost the battle in this disgraceful manner, in spite of the great disorder which prevailed in Ibrahim's army—a disorder which prevented any attempt at pursuit. The latter might be glad that he had won the day, and had succeeded in routing the enemy and capturing all their guns. The defeated army, which left some thousands of dead and wounded in its rear, retreated in the direction of the mountains, and Hafiz himself fled through Rumkaleh and Behasne to Malatia. The Kurds, overjoyed to think that the much-hated war was now at an end, hastened home to their villages, shooting down their own officers *en route*, and blocking up the mountain-passes, making attacks upon Hafiz, and marching through the villages singing and shouting as they went. Such a disbandment absolutely defies description. Moltke at the close of the engagement met the two other Prussian officers, and they kept together and resolved to get the start of the fugitives. That night they

reached Aintab, whence they pushed on to Marasch, arriving there on the morning of the 28th of June. Moltke was thoroughly exhausted, and was obliged to rest here for a couple of days. His attendants had all left Nisib with their eight horses; and his luggage, with many of his maps, was also lost. The Turkish irregular cavalry had even plundered the tents of their own officers. Leaving Marasch, Moltke and his companions rode on to Malatia, in the hope that the enemy had moved thither; but they were nowhere to be seen, and he was informed that at the news of the defeat at Nisib a division of three thousand men at Kaisarieh, and one of twelve thousand more at Derindeh, had both flung down their arms and fled in all directions. Thus the whole of Asia Minor lay at the mercy of Ibrahim, who had used but little skill to reach success. Hafiz Pacha was at once deposed from command and temporarily exiled to Siwas, whither Moltke accompanied him; and, after having taken his leave, he went on with Capt. Laue over Tokat and Amasia to the seaport town of Samsun, where he caught the steamer sailing on August 3rd for Constantinople. We may see how anxious Moltke was to quit this uncivilized atmosphere from the letter in which he wrote of his arrival in Samsun, and of his going on board the Austrian steamer. "From the woody mountain-ridge we now caught sight of the glittering sea, and, like Xenophon's Greeks, we cried aloud for joy and galloped forward down the steep decline and in another two hours reached the quarantine at Samsun. But a Turkish quarantine means only just reading over a letter of introduction from the Pacha and paying down fifty piastres on some sofa-cushion. With our foot once on the Austrian steamer we exchanged Asiatic barbarism for European civilization. The first thing we asked for was potatoes, which we had not tasted for eighteen months, and then for some champagne, wherewith to drink our King's health, here on

the waters of the Black Sea. In our tattered Turkish dress, and with haggard faces and long beards, and our Turkish servants, they scarcely allowed us to go into the cabin until we had spoken to the captain in French. You can't think how comfortable everything seemed there, with chairs and tables and a looking-glass, books, and knives and forks—all luxuries of which we had almost forgotten the use."

On the 3rd of August Moltke crossed the Bosphorus and revisited Buyâkdere and Therapia, and ere long the steamer lay at anchor in the Golden Horn. Much had taken place in Moltke's absence. The Sultan Mahmoud had expired on the 30th of June. "His life-sorrow, which had brought him to his grave, was the failure of the great aim of his existence—the regeneration of his people." He was succeeded by his son Abdul Meschid, a delicate stripling of sixteen, who seemed to take a serious view of life. "He has good cause to look grave," writes Moltke. It really seemed then as if the kingdom of Turkey would collapse, or at any rate that the throne of Osman would be usurped by Mehemet Ali, the *ci-devant* gunner. Five days after Mahmoud's death the Capudan Pacha left the Dardanelles with the Turkish squadron, under orders to attack the Egyptian fleet; but instead of doing this, with his whole contingent he went over to the enemy; and Mehemet was now master of the sea as he had been of the land. He hoped to secure everything, and, deaf to all offers of mediation, he began by demanding that all his possessions in Egypt should become his by hereditary right. It was to be feared that at this critical juncture the Porte would again throw itself into the arms of Russia, and, in order to guard against this, the representatives of England, Austria, France, and Prussia intimated, in a joint memorandum to the Porte, their willingness to undertake the solution of

this Eastern problem, an arrangement in which Russia, not wishing to appear isolated, acquiesced. Thus the danger as far as regarded the new Sultan was averted, and Mehemet, in spite of his victory at Nisib, and the treachery of the Capudan Pacha, was, if anything, farther from the goal of his ambition than before. France was the only one of all the five Great Powers who at all encouraged the Viceroy of Egypt. The others all wished to preserve the strict integrity of the Turkish empire; and, in case this arrogant vassal refused to submit to their decision, they were determined to thoroughly humiliate him.

It was during this phase of Eastern politics that Moltke arrived at Constantinople. He met with a welcome everywhere, and found his old patron, Chosref, still at his post in the Ministry. Moltke could now speak Turkish fluently, and was no longer in need of an interpreter; and, when he went to see Chosref, he had to recount all his adventures to him at length, besides being asked to furnish a written account of all that had occurred during the late war. In Constantinople people spoke of Hafiz in terms of reprobation, and threw the entire blame upon him, so Moltke was not sorry to have this chance of explaining to Chosref the entire truth as regarded this fatal campaign, and tried all he could to mitigate the heavy punishment which Hafiz had incurred by his defeat; and, while forbearing to gloss over his errors, he took care to point out those of others. "It was hardly his fault," says Moltke, "if instead of giving him eighty thousand men he was allowed only half that number, nor yet that the corps were not all placed under one general, as had been repeatedly advised by us in all our despatches to head-quarters. Nor could the faulty arrangement of the army, formed as it was of two-thirds of Kurdish troops, be set down to him—troops which were loth to remain in the service, and which,

when it came to the point, with one accord turned tail and fled."

Moltke begged several diplomatists also to interest themselves on Hafiz Pacha's behalf, and shortly afterwards had the satisfaction of hearing that he had been pardoned, and that the Pachalik of Erzeroum had been awarded to him. Moltke was anxious that it should be publicly announced that neither he nor the other Prussian officers had in any way contributed to the cause which led to the Nisib catastrophe, and so he deemed it advisable to obtain an audience of the Sultan. As the ambassadors had not yet received their credentials, a document from the Grand Vizier gained for the officers the desired audience. Abdul Medschid received them very graciously, ordered presents to be given to them, and granted them leave to quit his service. "The Seraskier let us know that he would be highly pleased if we were to return to Constantinople as soon as the present complications were at an end, more especially as we were acquainted with their language and customs; and he hoped that we should be as satisfied with them as they had been with us."

On the 1st of September Moltke visited Mahmoud's tomb, and, while lost in admiration of the masterly career of this man, he asked himself how it came that, while Peter the Great and his successors had succeeded with their reforms in Russia, those of Mahmoud in Turkey had failed. "In neither country could the reforms be brought about by the people themselves, but must have their origin in the government; in both cases the people were the conservative and the government the revolutionary element; and only those men who were at the helm of the state were alive to the imperative change which perforce would have to be made. Materially different, however, was the task of the Czar, who had to guide aright the growing energies of

a young empire, as compared with that of the Sultan, who had to revive the drooping powers of the state. And equally different were the points from which the two monarchs started to accomplish their great work." This was undoubtedly true. The young Czar had travelled in foreign countries, mixing at will in every class of society, while Prince Mahmoud, on the contrary, was a prisoner at Serail, learning nothing beyond the Coran and perhaps a little Arabic and Persian, surrounded only by his women and his Mollahs. During the first year of his reign the Christian communities sought to free themselves from the Turkish yoke. The cause of this lay, as he thought, in the defective administration of the Turkish state, and he therefore determined to effect an utter metamorphosis of his suzerainty through the medium of reforms, which were not without precedent in the Levant. His first step in this direction would be summarily to crush the Janissaries, those sworn enemies of all innovations, who aimed at sharing with him the supreme authority, presuming even to dictate their own laws. The whole internal arrangements would now be altered, and a new structure raised upon the ruins of the old. Individually, this could not be carried out by Mahmoud; he would need the help of others. But "among his own people the Sultan Mahmoud found no enlightened man to second his efforts by assisting him to carry out his reforms." In a land where high state officials could not even read, and where many a Lieutenant-general could not write his own name, it was impossible to find a minister capable of making reforms, whose attainments could vie with those of a well-educated European. Mahmoud was obliged either to rely upon foreigners, or else to compel the natives to study in Europe. And though he did this, it was to small purpose; while in the case of foreigners, the Coran proved the stumbling-block.

In Russia, too, the foreign officers and engineers whom Peter had brought with him from Europe were not exactly received with open arms. But whereas in Russia aliens were hated, in Turkey they were despised. Moltke praised the great deference shown him by the high state officials, but found that the respect for Giaours considerably lessened as you descended the social scale. "The colonels gave us precedence; the inferior officers were tolerably civil; the lower orders simply ignored us; and the women and children occasionally got so far as abusing us." And to the scarcely edifying doctrines of the Coran was yet added that ludicrous pride, presumably based on the raids of the Arabs, and the Turkish expeditions to Vienna, which found its expression in the remark of an imperturbable Mollah: "Why should we not even now raise 10,000 'Osmanli, and with a firm faith in Allah and our sharp sabres ride to Moscow?" To which an heretical Turkish officer, who had been educated in Europe, sarcastically replied (in French, however), "Oh certainly, why not, provided they get their passports viséed at the Russian embassy?" Thus the Coran and the impossibility of getting the Turks' support, stood hopelessly in the way of Mahmoud's reforms. And again, when he applied for advice to those of the great Powers then interested in the Bosphorus, he was advised according to their own interests and not those of Turkey. The reforms actually in force existed mostly in name and appearance only—a mere skin-deep gloss, which left the heart and life of the people untouched. The latter, moreover, were well content with their ostentatious and narrow Islamism, and to make any alterations therein was manifestly a perilous course even for a Mahmoud. Moltke completes this interesting parallel with these words: "The unbiassed judgment will assign to Peter the Great a much higher place in history than to Mahmoud the Second ;

it will, however, be obliged to admit that the task of the Sultan, taken as a whole, was an infinitely more difficult one than that of the Czar."

At last the day of leave-taking and departure came. On the 9th of September, 1839, Moltke embarked with his friends on board the steamer at Buyukdere. They passed quickly along the west coast of the Black Sea and up the Danube to New Orsowa, where in October, 1835, Moltke had first set foot on Turkish soil. At Old Orsowa he entered Austrian territory, and was obliged to submit to a ten days' quarantine. After this delay Moltke soon reached home, and once more resumed his old position, remaining at Berlin as a captain on the General Staff. Even up to this time his career had been an eventful one, fraught with many important reminiscences. He was now a man of mature experience, with an intellect sharpened by foreign associations, and whose strategic knowledge had been increased by his operations on the Euphrates. In his after-life these four years spent in the East, were indisputably of great value to him. Independence of action, quickness of perception, promptness and precision in forming a correct estimate of the strategic advantages of a position—all these he learnt even better than when on those expeditions through European and Asiatic Turkey, during which, as he himself tells us, he traversed upwards of 1,000 miles on horseback; and more particularly when, as the Pacha's military adviser, he was called upon at a moment's notice to avert a disaster which the sheer indolence and neglect of the other had brought about. Moltke delighted to recal his Eastern experiences, and for many years after still said with satisfaction that he was the first European who had penetrated to those parts of the Mesopotamian desert, his immediate predecessor in observing the Euphrates where it forces its way through the Kurdish

mountains being Xenophon. The exertions and privations which he underwent in Asia Minor, had, as he himself says, given a shock to his nervous system, and in the summer of 1841 he went to a watering-place in Heligoland, to restore his health. A German author who met him there, gives us the following sketch. "In figure he was tall and spare, his face gaunt and weather-beaten, with clear-cut features, the taciturn earnestness of his thin-lipped, compressed mouth in no wise corresponding with the vivacity and occasional sly humour which we meet with in the clear and fluent pages of his book. But it was easy to see that he must really have undergone all those incredible hardships of which he speaks in his letters, hardships which only an iron will and a naturally good and well-preserved constitution could have enabled him to bear. At that time he was only forty years old, though from his appearance one would have taken him for close upon fifty. What was specially noticeable about him was, the simplicity and naturalness of his whole person, his reserved demeanour appearing only to spring from a kind of innate reticence."

During the years of rest which followed, Moltke employed his time in collating his letters from the East, which were published in January 1841, and which form, as we have seen, so excellent a means of judging of the public and private life of our strategist. Maps also appeared of Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and Asia Minor, of all of which Moltke was the topographer. In the spring of 1840 he was transferred to the General Staff, and was gazetted major on April 12th, 1842. "I now determined to make a home for myself, so I married a Fräulein von Burt, of Holstein." Moltke's sister had married an Englishman, John Heytinger Burt, a widower with three children, who had settled in Holstein. Of these three, the son died early; the

elder daughter was married to a Baron von Brockdorff, in Holstein; and Mary, the younger, was at home when Moltke came back from the East. By the birth of his sister's only child, the family circle was increased, and here the much-travelled Captain Moltke remained on his return, finding in his niece a most beautiful and accomplished girl; while she, on her part, cherished sentiments of esteem and respect for her uncle, which ere long gave place to a deeper feeling. They were married in 1842, and three years later he was appointed adjutant to Prince Henry of Prussia, an uncle of King Frederick William IV. This Prince had become a Roman Catholic, and had been living in Rome for some years, suffering from an incurable malady. He was a man of high education, who, although confined to his bed, was well posted in all European affairs, and was in constant correspondence with his royal nephew. He was much respected in Rome, and was on friendly terms with all the celebrities. Moltke went thither accompanied by his wife, and entered the Prince's service, where his leisure was spent in the study of old Roman antiquities, and in riding through the Campagna with his wife by his side. And, as on the shores of the Bosphorus, so now on those of the Tiber, he continued his topographical studies, which resulted in the publication of his "*Contorni di Roma*," which brought him so much fame. His sojourn in Rome was during a remarkable period. On June 1st, 1846, Pope Gregory XVI. died, and was succeeded by Count Mastai-Ferretti, under the title of Pius the Ninth. "No one," says Moltke, "had an inkling of the Pope's decease; only Prince Henry and one or two others knew of the fact. One evening I was standing near his bed, and I heard him exclaim, 'So Gregory XVI. is dead! God rest his soul!' I thought that he must be talking in his sleep, but after his death was officially announced some days later, those words came back to my

mind, as well as the circumstance of a strange priest, who on that memorable afternoon rushed breathlessly into the palace and had a private audience of the Prince. I also saw how the conclave bore witness to the indescribable enthusiasm which prevailed on Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti's assumption of the papal chair—heard, too, the exultant populace, who filled the air for hours with the cry ‘Evviva Pio Nono!’” In that same year Prince Henry died. Moltke went to Berlin to inform the King of the fact, and was instructed to return to Rome to superintend the removal of the body to the Prussian capital. On this journey “I again saw how rapidly the enthusiasm had subsided as soon as the new pope had convinced himself that he would have to halt upon the liberal path which he had chosen.”

On his return from Rome Moltke was appointed to the staff of the 8th Army Corps in Coblenz, and in 1848 he became Chief of the Staff of the 4th Army Corps in Magdeburg, which post he held for seven years; advancing by degrees, he became a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1850, and a full Colonel in the year following. The year 1855 brought a change in his official duties, when he was appointed equerry to the Crown Prince, who in the autumn of 1856 was in command of the 11th Infantry regiment, then quartered in Breslau. On all the journeys which the Crown Prince had to make at that time, to London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, Moltke was always in attendance, and if they were somewhat different from his adventures *en zig-zag* through Asia Minor, still they were not without interest to our hero, who thus was enabled to make the acquaintance of the chief dignitaries of Europe, and to gain a knowledge of the principal European capitals. In August and September 1856, they had to go to St. Petersburg and Moscow to the coronation of the Emperor, the Crown

Prince representing the King of Prussia on the occasion. Moltke recounts his experiences while there in a series of letters to a lady in Copenhagen, a near relative of his. These letters were published in a separate form in 1877. And although this journey was less of an Odyssey than a princely tour, chiefly made up of a round of visits and gaieties, Moltke yet found time to pursue his studies of fortifications, and to make himself acquainted with the national character of the Russians, drawing therefrom historic parallels, which have a special charm for us at a time when Russia's attitude in the Eastern crisis brings her once more to the front of the stage of Europe. With reference to the Emperor Alexander's personal appearance, Moltke says, "He made a most agreeable impression upon me. He has not the statuesque beauty nor the marble severity of his father; but he is a man of singular attainments and majestic bearing. He seemed to have a somewhat worn look, and one might believe that events had stamped a gravity upon his features, contrasting with the benevolent expression of his eyes. With no nation has the personality of the sovereign greater weight than in Russia, from the fact that in no country does he wield such unlimited power. On coming to the throne (March 2nd, 1855), Alexander found Europe in arms against him, and in the interior of his empire improvements had to be made calling for a firm hand. What wonder, then, that he should face so grave a task with sadness!"

Very instructive, too, are the details of Moltke's visit to Cronstadt. The Emperor's brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, played the cicerone, and let the strangers into all the secrets of this powerful fortress. Having inspected the batteries and the forts with all their means of defence, Moltke felt sure that "it would be utterly impossible to sail right through here to St. Petersburg." Moscow appears deeply

to have impressed him, the old Muscovite capital, where he arrived on August 25th, 1856. "I still go about in quiet amazement, trying to collect my thoughts and to overcome my sense of strangeness at my surroundings, by comparing them with what I have seen elsewhere. Everything is different here; and the Kremlin, the centre, as it were, of this whole world, can be compared to nothing of a like nature. Moscow, with its ancient relics and historical associations, is for every Russian an object of veneration and of love." If Petersburg is his pride, Moscow is nearest to his heart. The national peculiarities have survived here unaltered in language, manners and customs, among a most extraordinary community, the freest and most independent that exists anywhere. If I had my choice, I would rather live in Moscow than in St. Petersburg." From what he saw of country and people, Moltke came to the conclusion that it was absolutely necessary for the Russian to have a master; that if he had none he would find himself one; that the ordinary Russian is naturally good-tempered and peaceable; and under good officers, turns out the most obedient and devoted of soldiers. He quotes instances of Russian soldiers who at inundations and fires, preferred to perish miserably rather than desert their posts, unless expressly ordered to do so. Moltke speaks appreciatively of the beauty of the Russian church music, and notices how well the Empress's mother (the daughter of Queen Louisa of Prussia) kept up throughout the whole ceremony, and remarks upon the tenderness shown to her by the Emperor, paying her every attention, supporting her, and wrapping the ermine round her to prevent her taking cold. Moltke, writing then, was convinced that in a country where civilization made yearly such vast strides, serfdom could not last much longer, although he was not blind to the existing obstacles. He sums up the utter untrustworthiness and

corruptibility of Russian officials generally in the following pithy sentence : " To be caught in a theft is, in Russia, a misfortune—not, as with us, a disgrace." Of the two chief reformers of old Russia, he says : " Peter grafted German and Dutch, and Catherine the Second French slips upon the old crab-tree of the Russian dynasty ; and this, with new life infused into its hardy roots and wide-spreading branches, now bears richer and more southern fruits." He finds that the civilization of Western Europe has not penetrated anywhere into the lower strata of society, for from the polished aristocrat you descend at once to the bearded, ignorant plebeian, who forms by far the larger class of the two. He thinks, too, that the antagonism to all things foreign exists in Moscow as much now as formerly, yet he is convinced that it will be long before the Russians can dispense with the aid of foreigners, and " notably with the skill and persevering devotion to duty of the Germans ; for honesty among Russian officials can only be brought about by many years of iron severity." On the 12th of September the Crown Prince and suite were present at a review of the troops, paid a farewell visit to the Imperial family at Moscow, and after going to the theatre, they left at twelve o'clock in a carriage and four, with their luggage in a fourgon, a military attendant acting as courier. " Throughout the journey relays of horses were in readiness, which were quickly harnessed, and we drove off generally at a gallop. In getting to Warsaw we employed altogether two thousand horses, and, taking the train, we covered another four hundred and eighty miles in four-and-twenty hours. On the whole, with the exception of two hours' sleep at Warsaw, we did not change our clothes for five days and six nights."

Moltke had long been known by name to the upper portion of Russian society, and especially in military circles,

partly through his "Letters from the East," and his excellent book on the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1828-9, which his thorough knowledge of Turkey and his keen powers of observation made of special value to military men. The first edition appeared in 1845, and the second in 1877. Speaking of the existing political situation, Moltke says: "On the Emperor Nicholas ascending the throne, a material change took place in the policy of the St. Petersburg cabinet. Since the terrible ebullition of discontent when the Emperor Alexander died, which was only suppressed by the personal firmness and decision of the new monarch, people looked upon a war with their hereditary enemies as a vent for the malcontents among the military aristocracy. This certainly caused the new Russian policy to clash with that of old Austria, but by treaty right it was Russia's place to protect all the Greeks living under the rule of the Porte, inasmuch as they were her co-religionists." After an accurate description of the theatre of war, Wallachia and the Dobrudscha, Bulgaria, and the line of the Danube, which the war of 1877 makes specially interesting (particularly the detailed account given of the Balkan passes, notably the Shipka Pass), Moltke goes on to the plan of operations; he admits, however, that the verdict of historians will have to be regulated by the later course of events, as "in every campaign, the original plans of operations are seldom known otherwise than in the crudest outline, for events of necessity widen or narrow the horizon, as time goes on." The results of the first year were unimportant as far as Russia was concerned. She had only conquered the small Danubian fortresses of Isaktsche, Matschin, Hirsowa, Basardschik, Taldscha, and Kustendsche, and after compelling Varna, through Jussuf Pacha's treachery, to capitulate, and abandoning the siege of Silistria and

Shumla, she withdrew the greater portion of her army across the Danube, and took up her winter quarters in the Danubian Principalities. The reasons which Moltke gives for all this are very conclusive. "War had been declared when too late, which was an advantage to the Turks, although totally unprepared. The Russian army whose active corps consisted of at most 30,000 men (the Imperial head-quarters and suite alone monopolizing 10,000 horses), was quite unequal to the task which had been assigned to it. The march on Shumla, where a defending body of 40,000 men was placed in an almost unassailable position, was so great a strategic blunder, that it naturally led the way to the unsatisfactory issue of the campaign. The entire strategy of the Turks lay in their inactivity, and this and their advantages of locality were what brought their opponents to the brink of the precipice. However, as it was remarked in 1877, they did not know how to follow up their successes, nor how thoroughly to crush their adversary; while, on the other hand, the combinations of Russian strategy were not such as to conduce to a final and successful issue of the struggle. Moltke concludes this paragraph with these words:—"If one considers the immense sacrifice that the war of 1828 entailed upon the Russians, it is indeed difficult to say whether they or the Turks were victorious or not, and thus it became necessary that the value of this campaign should be tested by a second one."

It is well known that in 1829 matters shaped themselves differently owing to the energy of the new commander-in-chief, General Diebitsch, who succeeded Count Wittgenstein in the command of the Russian Army. He was victorious at Kulewtscha, forced Silistria to capitulate, and, crossing the Balkans, entered Adrianople and compelled the Turks to sign a treaty of peace. These simple facts, as also the

brilliant trophies of a four months' campaign, Moltke describes to us in a most lucid manner, both as regards the military as well as the political part of this Oriental crisis. Nicholas, "who," as Moltke says, "had openly declared that he would not sheath the sword until the honour and the claims of his country had been satisfied," did not wish either for a war-indemnity or an extension of territory; but to secure for Russia a preponderating influence on the Bosphorus, and at the same time to vindicate her honour.

That the war remained localized, and that the other Powers in spite of their jealousy did not interfere, were circumstances chiefly due to the Berlin Cabinet which, dreading the consequences of a general European war, and at the same time anxious to secure for Russia an honourable peace, sought to bring the conflict to a speedy conclusion. Diebitsch's army was certainly not stronger than that of Count Wittgenstein; in fact, it had been reduced, notwithstanding the experiences of the last campaign; yet his position was a more favourable one than that of his predecessor. "Both he and his subordinates could profit by the lessons of the previous war, and he was in no way hampered by any diplomatic accessories, which might hinder his freedom of action. Neither could home-policy have much influence upon what he undertook, and, being at so great a distance from St. Petersburg (where the Emperor Nicholas had remained), he was empowered and authorized to act in accordance with purely military views as well as his own private judgment." Leaving behind him a corps of observation at Shumla, Diebitsch advanced on the 15th July over the Balkans, and entered Adrianople on the twentieth of the following month. He had at the most not more than 20,000 men with him, and dysentery was making havoc among their ranks. "This force was totally inadequate to the task it had before it, if that meant

defining peace with the point of the sword. General Diebitsch's path to victory lay on the brink of a precipice, where to pause or to turn back was simply out of the question—a path which led either to success or to utter ruin. He felt convinced that his position was one where the utmost audacity took the place of the keenest foresight, and he acted at once boldly and prudently, when, in the few weeks left to him and with the remnants of his forces, he undertook, or seemed to undertake, operations which would ordinarily require another army and a fresh campaign." During the next fortnight Diebitsch made a further move on Constantinople, so that the left wing of his advance-guard lay at Midia on the Black Sea, his right wing at Enos, on the *Ægean*, and his out-posts at Tschorlu and Rodosto. This, however, was not enough for his impetuous followers, who demanded that he should at once push on to Constantinople, notwithstanding that 40,000 Albanians under Mustapha Pacha were at Sofia in his rear, 30,000 Turks at Constantinople, and that the 80,000 inhabitants of Adrianople were for the most part ill-disposed towards him. Under such conditions, with what force could Diebitsch possibly reach the walls of the Turkish capital? "To surround Constantinople it requires two armies in Europe, one in Asia, and a fleet in the Sea of Marmora. To secure the latter, it is absolutely necessary in the first place to destroy the Turkish fleet, and then to force either the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus. Generally speaking, towns with half a million of inhabitants are not taken by force of arms, but bring about their own fall."

The Russians were in a much more critical position than the Turks, and Diebitsch only attained his object by not showing a trace of embarrassment, but by appearing confident of success, and by taking up such a commanding position, as would leave it to be inferred that he had at

least 60,000 men, and not 20,000 only at his disposal. It was just this over-estimation of the Russian strength, which induced the Porte at the request of the Prussian General Muffling, who arrived just in time, to act as deliverer and negotiator, to send plenipotentiaries to Adrianople. Here, however, they were able to see a little more closely behind the scenes, and, difficulties being raised, negotiations came to a standstill. They gave out that they had not received sufficient instructions. This was on the 8th of September. If the Turks were allowed to prolong the matter in their usual way, Diebitsch's game was up. Every day's delay would be a gain to the former, and a loss to the Russians. In order, therefore, to lead the plenipotentiaries to believe that they had been deceived in what they had seen, and to make them think that he was really in command of a large force, Diebitsch gave them five days in which to obtain their instructions, at the end of which time, failing any reply, he would come himself to Constantinople and fetch it. At the same time he advanced from all sides on Constantinople, and the Fleet was instructed to take several forts on the Black Sea. This had the desired effect. The Turks allowed themselves to be taken in, and, believing the impossible, signed on September 14th the peace of Adrianople. The whole thing was a *chef-d'œuvre*. "In this strait General Diebitsch indubitably showed himself a clever diplomatist, besides being a fortunate commander." What principally forced the Sultan into signing the treaty was the dread of an insurrection in Constantinople, where, ever since the massacre of the Janissaries, so many hostile elements had accumulated. This second campaign was no better planned than the first had been, nor was there any difference in the material employed; but the bold as well as circumspect action of General Diebitsch enabled him to compensate for all defects, and to profit by

his advantages. Moltke could not too highly praise "the self-sacrificing obedience of the officers, and the cheerful endurance of the men, and their indomitable courage in the hour of danger." In conclusion, he remarks: "Taught by the experiences of these latter campaigns, the Russians will probably, in any future war, advance into Bulgaria with much larger forces." The fact that they did not act upon this suggestion in June 1877, doing so only after further bitter experience, lost them the chance of a summer campaign, and made a winter one necessary. In the Russo-Turkish campaigns of 1877-8, much has repeated itself which Moltke in his history of the war of 1828-9 described and cited as instances either of errors of strategy, or the reverse. It is this which makes his book of such value at the present time, and one which will amply justify an attentive perusal.

In the autumn of 1856, a few weeks after his journey to St. Petersburg, Moltke accompanied the Crown Prince to London. Later on they again visited England on the occasion of the marriage of the Princess Royal and the interment of the Prince Consort. Everything in England, both as regards government and people, was in marked contrast to all that he had seen in Russia. He returned by way of Paris, and, with the Crown Prince, visited the court of the Emperor Napoleon III., who was fresh from the triumphs of Sevastopol. In the minds of the susceptible French the Paris Congress had well-nigh effaced the recollection of that of Vienna; Russia had been humbled and Austria isolated; England's military power had proved sadly deficient; Italy—then Sardinia—in the hope of protection, clung to the skirts of France with all the fire and eloquence which a Cavour could command; even Prussia, at that time occupied with the Neuenburg conflict, was not wholly impervious to French influence. The Second Empire was indisputably

then at the topmost pinnacle of its glory, and Napoleon ranked as the first monarch in Europe. Of course, France was flattered thereby, however much it might cost her later on; Parliament was all but an echo of the Crown; opposition was nowhere. To add to all this outward brilliancy, on March 16th, 1856, "the child of France" was born. "Although since Louis XIV. the son had never succeeded the father on the throne of France, yet at the Tuileries people consoled themselves with the thought that the existing order of things might be reversed, and that glorious battles and brilliant annexations with the Prince of Prussia as their ally, maybe, would more and more serve to popularize the Empire. Anyway, the Court managed to enjoy itself with every sort of fête and gala, the Empress Eugénie playing much the same rôle as did Marie Antoinette in the early years of the reign of Louis XVI."

It was in such an atmosphere that the Crown Prince and his suite now found themselves. Moltke, writing on December 13th, 1856, thus describes his reception at the Tuileries. Prince Napoleon had been deputed to receive the Crown Prince at the station. His likeness to his illustrious uncle was at once remarked—"the same black hair, pale complexion and imperial profile." From the station they drove straight to the Tuileries, where they were presented, and at seven o'clock dined in the Diana gallery. Moltke took in Madame de Marnezia, who, like all the Court ladies, was most amiable and entertaining. Immediately opposite to him sat the Crown Prince between the Emperor and Empress, so that he had a capital opportunity of observing their Imperial Majesties. "I quite thought that Louis Napoleon was taller—he looks better on horseback than on foot. I was struck by his peculiar immobility of countenance, and, I had almost said, the lack-lustre look in his eyes. He has a good-natured, kindly smile,

which is anything but Napoleonic. He sits generally in a position of quiet repose, with his head slightly on one side ; and it is perhaps just this repose, which, never forsaking him in a serious emergency, so impresses his excitable subjects. Events have shown that this is no apathy, but the outcome of a thoughtful mind and a firm will. In society he is not imposing, and in conversation he seems even slightly embarrassed. He is all an emperor, but not a king." The Empress Eugénie, then about thirty years old, made a very agreeable impression upon him. He writes of her—"She is both beautiful and elegant, and uncommonly like Madame de B., only she is a brunette. Her neck and arms are of matchless beauty, her figure slim, her toilette *recherchée* in the extreme—no over-dressing. She had on a white satin dress, with such a train that in future ladies will require yards more stuff than at present. Her headdress was scarlet, and round her neck she wore a double row of magnificent pearls. She talks much and animatedly—more than one would expect of such an exalted personage." The description which Moltke gives of one of the Empress's *réunions* is charming. "The conversation turned upon mesmerism, and one of the gentlemen-in-waiting allowed himself to be mesmerized by a doctor who was there. He seemed to be asleep, weeping all the time, and on being asked by the doctor if he were in pain, replied, 'Yes.' 'Whereabouts?' 'At the heart.' 'Aren't you sleeping comfortably where you are?' 'No.' 'Where would you like to be, then?' The Empress did not quite like this last question, and, fearing lest the mesmerized courtier might perhaps reveal some delicate secret or other to the ears of his select and eagerly attentive audience, she interposed with the words, '*Ah ! ne posez pas cette question-là, il dit quelques fois des bêtises !*'"

There was a grand hunt in the woods of Fontainebleau, in which the Empress took part. Moltke drove with her to the station, whence they were conveyed by special train to Fontainebleau, and after luncheon, they rode to the meet. "Every sportsman being in the saddle, we rode for about a mile to where the stag was uncartered. The hounds were put on the track, the horns blew and away we went for a long straight run. It was a splendid sight! The Empress, Madame de Contades, and Madame de St. Pierre, dressed in green riding costumes, with three-cornered hats and feathers, were the only ladies present. The Empress led the whole way at a rattling pace, looking charming on horseback with her easy, graceful seat. Madame de Contades rides almost too well, coquetting with her spirited brown hunter; indeed, anybody else would have found it hard work to sit the animal." Among other sights Moltke went to see the prison of Marie Antoinette, below the Palais de Justice, on the Seine Island, "a narrow, horrible dungeon." On the Sunday evening the Emperor gave a dinner to eighty guests, to which all the marshals and several statesmen were invited. "We occupied the seats of honour. I was most pleasantly placed between Madame Bruat, widow of Admiral Bruat, and gouvernante to the Prince Imperial, and Madame Walewsky." At a parade held in the courtyard of the palace, Moltke was struck with the slovenly way in which the troops handled their arms. "They don't think anything of it here: with us they would all have got extra drill." In spite of the rain, the Empress looked on the whole time from a balcony. Just as it was over, Lulu came back from a drive. "We rode up to him with the Emperor, whose face was beaming with delight, and really he is a fine little fellow." At the military school of St. Cyr, where the Marquise de Maintenon had established a ladies' institute,

Moltke saw a grand collection of models and other things, but "it did not seem a very clean sort of place." The pupils, about seven hundred, wash in a common lavatory just as in barracks. "The stables were the cleanest." At a battalion drill, he noticed that the troops brought the butt-ends of their muskets violently to the ground, and altogether handled them carelessly. "It would not do to let the French infantry have so delicate a weapon as our percussion-gun, for it would require all the endless care and supervision that we devote to our troops and their arms."

In Moltke's last letter from the Tuileries, dated the 21st December, he indulges in a few political observations on Imperial France, and we have again a careful study of Napoleon's physiognomy. "Things at present are not in their normal state, but seeing they are once established, it would be difficult to say how they might be improved. Nobody can be his own ancestor; the founder of a dynasty is very differently placed to the heir of a long line of legitimate successors. The latter runs in the old groove, the former has to open up new roads, and numberless personal claims are made on him. Napoleon III. has none of the dark earnestness of his great uncle, neither his Imperial presence nor his studied deportment. He is quite a simple, rather small man, whose placid countenance has a decided expression of amiability and benevolence. '*Il ne se fâche jamais, il est toujours poli et bon envers nous, ce n'est que la bonté de son cœur et sa confiance qui pourront lui devenir dangereux.*' This is what is said of him by his *entourage*. The fact that at the present time there should be but one ruling party, and that of this party the Emperor should not always be able to surround himself with the most influential men, is the outcome of necessity. Louis Napoleon cannot employ men of inde-

pendent character, as the reins of government must virtually remain in his own hands. If things were better regulated, a greater amount of freedom might be allowed; but in France's present state, a strong personal government is alone possible, which, by the way, is the most suited to the French character. To allow freedom of the press would be as impossible as to allow an army in the field to discuss the orders and dispositions of the general in command. Louis Napoleon has displayed both wisdom and consideration, firmness and self-reliance, as well as clemency and moderation, qualities all veiled beneath an external repose. He only looks really like an Emperor when on horseback. Simple in his own person, he does not forget that his subjects require that the court of their sovereign should be a brilliant one. That is why the young Prince, when out for a drive, is escorted by a *piqueur* and three *guides-à-cheval* as well as an officer with a detachment of dragoons, one-half in front and one behind his carriage-and-four, all the guards turning out as it passes and presenting arms to this eight months old *enfant impérial*." On the 22nd of December the Crown Prince and his suite, after once more dining with the Emperor, left Paris by the night train, and the discomfort of the journey was made more bearable, owing to the luxurious arrangements of the Imperial saloon carriages. "I woke at Saverne, whence the road through the Vosges is very lovely." Full one hundred and seventy-five years before, Louis XIV. travelled along this self-same road, after the German town of Strassburg, on the 30th September, 1681, had been surprised and betrayed into surrender by Louvois, his Minister of War, and thus became a French provincial town. Three weeks later, Louis wished to see his latest conquest, and to present to the Strassburgers their new sovereign. On reaching Saverne, from which his new possession opened

out in all its wealth and beauty, he exclaimed, "*Ah ! quel beau jardin !*" On October 23rd he made his entry into Strassburg. Moltke was thus thinking of these evil days when writing from Carlsruhe on the same day of October he says, "It was very sad to hear all the people talking German, being thorough Frenchmen all the while. Ah ! how we left them in the lurch then !" Well, circumstances have brought about a reparation. Time can never justify such an act of violent injustice ; it is one which no great nation can ever forgive. Who knows whether Moltke even then, on that journey from Saverne to Strassburg, was not thinking whether, what through the weakness of the House of Hapsburg had been lost, might not by the strength of that of Hohenzollern be regained ?



CHIEF OF THE PRUSSIAN STAFF.

1857.

WITH the year 1857 a decisive change took place in Prussian affairs. In consequence of the serious illness of King Frederick William the Fourth, the Prince of Prussia became his brother's representative in October 1857, and, a year later, assumed the Regency. This change meant a strict concentration of Prussian strength, and notably of her military strength. Moltke, who was made Major-General in 1856, on the 29th October 1857, at General von Manteuffel's suggestion, was entrusted with the provisional direction of the affairs of the general staff of the army, to which post he was definitely appointed on the 18th September 1868, when his duties with the Crown Prince ceased. In the following year he became a Lieutenant-General. It was in 1859 that the Italian war broke out, and an episode in the same was the mobilisation of the Prussian army, the consequences of which Austria in her ambition sought to avert by rapidly concluding the treaty of Villa Franca. The combats of the Austrian army with the combined forces of France and Sardinia were attentively observed by the Prussian staff, who carefully noted the several defects and merits in their strategy. The result of these studies was the publication, in 1862, by the historical division of the Prussian General Staff, of the work entitled "The Italian Campaign of the Year 1859." The *raison d'être* of the volume is explained in the preface

as follows:—"Partly the intimate interest in the fate of a confederate state, to aid which the policy of the Government was only awaiting the most effective moment, partly, too, the justifiable endeavour to observe the mode of warfare and conduct of an army, to oppose which was deemed advisable by our forefathers no less than by ourselves, and finally to secure for those more recent technical discoveries, as applied to the art of warfare, the only valuable recognition which their extended use in war-time can afford." The work points out that, as a consequence of the newly begun system of re-organization, there was a disproportionate number of recruits in the Austrian army; and the soldiers of her different nationalities, if they fought bravely, yet did not manifest that enthusiasm which prompts an attempt at the impossible in the attainment of the highest. Austria is severely censured for having so hastily declared war without any correspondingly rapid preparation for an offensive attack, which would have its commencement in the defeat of the Sardinians, to be followed by a prevention of the advance of the French troops. As a consequence of this erroneous strategy, the Austrians, to begin with, were at once doomed to act on the defensive, and to regulate their *modus operandi* by the steps of their opponents. It comments upon Napoleon's conduct, who took advantage of Austria's belief that her left flank was in danger to make a rapid advance upon her right, on the Ticino, hoping thus either to crush severally the Austrian corps which were hastening to the rescue of Milan, or, when united, to take them in flank. "No doubt the Emperor Napoleon fully appreciated the gravity of such a step; but he could rely upon his army and on his superior numbers. He acted quickly, unhesitatingly, and in force; and he reaped the advantages which fall to the lot of those who act on this wise—advantages which are lost to those

who hesitate." That Napoleon should have concluded peace after Magenta and Solferino before reaching the Adriatic, is due to the existing state of the political horizon, which augured an early commencement of a Rhine campaign, as already, on July 15th, the transport of Prussian troops by rail to the Rhine was to begin, to join which the other German contingents were fully prepared.

About this time Moltke was commissioned to draw up plans for a general system of defence of the German coast-provinces, and was to submit the same to the German Diet without delay. He set to work with his wonted energy, travelling along the entire North-German coast; and causing elaborate plans to be drawn up by officers of Marine and Engineers. On presenting them to the Diet, a commission was at once organized to take the plans under review, and, on account of their importance, this commission was specially charged to lose no time in coming to a decision. Three years, however, elapsed before anything was done in the matter, and then the commissioners met in Hamburg and once more went round the coast with Moltke, making a thorough investigation of everything, finally rejecting the proposed measure, objecting principally to the formation of a German Fleet under Prussian rule. "Thus the old pernicious state of things prevailed, and we may judge how useless were the fortresses on the coast, on calling to mind the immediate results of Prussia's capture of Stade and Geestemünde in 1866." Austria and Hanover were the two Powers who helped most to thwart Moltke's scheme of reformation. Prussia had no alternative but to take the plan in hand herself, and do all that was possible in the way of fortification. This experience which Moltke had made of the readiness and alacrity of this same German Diet was well fitted to make him the sworn ally of those two men who were called to their high posts shortly after

he was—General von Roon, who in 1859 became Minister of War, and Count Bismarck, who, four years later, was appointed Minister of the Exterior and President of the Ministry. These men together formed a trio which all the world might envy. On January 2nd, 1861, Frederick William the Fourth died, and was succeeded by his brother, who was resolved to gain for Prussia her proper place of honour; and it was very evident that the Diet would help little towards this end. Prussia would either have to rely upon her own resources or else she must continue to submit to the existing yoke. In order to meet every emergency, she must place as thoroughly efficient an army as possible in the field. This was the firm conviction of both the King and his three statesmen, Bismarck, Moltke and Roon, who each brought their best energies to the task. To begin with, the army would have to be re-organized, and for this the King was specially fitted, supported by his Minister of War, Von Roon. On this same subject of re-organization, which of course entailed an increase in the military budget of expenditure, the conflict was specially protracted between the Prussian Government and the Chamber of Deputies. Bismarck and Roon had principally to fight the matter out, as the King wished that they should. In his capacity as head of the staff, Moltke had personally nothing whatever to do with the Chamber: he could sift and weigh the plan with the King, though he was not actually called upon openly to defend it. We may thus perhaps be slow to notice his activity in the matter. He was mainly bent on bringing about, not merely improvements affecting the troops, but also as regarded the staff, for he was anxious that it should reach that pitch of excellence which has earned for it the reputation of a really model institution.

In 1860 the re-organization of the army was already completed, and the conflict which occurred later between

Germany and Denmark served to show the need of it. Moltke had to draw up the plan of operations and to issue the general marching orders. The Prusso-Austrian forces were commanded by Field-Marshal Wrangel, the Prussians were under Prince Frederick Charles, the Austrians under Field-Marshal Gablentz. Düppel was stormed on August 21st, 1864, when the King went in person to Schleswig to greet his victorious troops, Moltke being among his suite. Lieutenant-General Vogel von Falckenstein was appointed general in command of the Third Army Corps, which was to occupy Jütland, while Moltke at the same time was made chief of the staff of the active army. He at once saw that, in order to go on with the war, it would be necessary to take possession of Fünen and Alsen, the two islands lying opposite to North Schleswig. This would serve to convince the enemy of their insecurity even upon their own islands; and Prussia in capturing them, would the more effectually protect Schleswig. Moltke, therefore, with Field-Marshal Wrangel, completed the plans for landing on Fünen. Just at that time this could very easily have been done, only, however, with Austria's aid, as the Prussian forces lay at Sündewitt and in Jütland, the Austrians being at Kolding. "Field-Marshal Gablentz had been offered the supreme command of a corps consisting of Prussians and Austrians, and however much this and the hazardous nature of the enterprise might fall in with the views of this first-rate commander, the Vienna cabinet had yet not enough special interest in the scheme to admit of its being carried out. Our only remaining means of compulsion to be used against the inaccessible Danish Government was to attack Alsen and completely to occupy Jütland." Perhaps the Austrian Government had already begun to feel that any conquests which she as Prussia's ally might make in Denmark would eventually only benefit the latter;

perhaps, too, Moltke's present scheme brought back to her mind that one which he had seconded some years ago, respecting the formation of a fleet under Prussian guidance; and, seeing that such manifest efforts had been made by Prussia to assume the lead in the north of Germany, and to establish her dominion in those waters, Austria felt hardly disposed to think that the issue of the war would be an insignificant one. If Hapsburg declined to attack Fünen, Hohenzollern was all the more resolved to land upon Alsen. Meanwhile, on May 18th, a decree had been issued, appointing Prince Frederick Charles in place of Field-Marshal Wrangel, while the command of the First Army Corps was entrusted to General Herwarth von Bittenfeld. The collapse on June 25th of the London Conference, whereby England had endeavoured to secure all that was possible for Denmark, was the signal for a resumption of hostilities. Moltke had already drawn up the plans for the landing upon Alsen, to be effected by General Herwarth's corps on June 29th. On that date the battalions crossed the Alsen Sound in boats, and landed under the fire of the Danish batteries, and quickly seized the whole island as far as the peninsula of Kekenis, which the Danes voluntarily forsook on the next day, taking refuge in their fleet. A few days later, Falckenstein crossed the Lymfjord, and planted the Prussian standard on Cape Skagen, to the north of Jütland. The Austrians seized the Frisian islands Sylt and Föhr, and preparations were at once instituted at head-quarters for landing on Fünen, where the Danes had a force of some 15,000 men, the points of debarkation being chosen and batteries thrown up. But the Danish Government was not anxious to wait for the result of this, and therefore begged for an armistice, signing the preliminaries on August 1st, and on October 30th the treaty of Vienna.

The German duchies of Lauenburg, Holstein and Schleswig were once more to be united to the German kingdom, and for the present were to be ceded to the two conquerors, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia. It was a strange coincidence certainly that Moltke, the quondam Copenhagen cadet, should have rendered his first services to the Prussian staff in a campaign against Denmark.

Moltke found a wider field for the exercise of his strategical genius in the year 1866, when the allied Powers were unable to come to a satisfactory arrangement regarding the conquered provinces; when the Schleswig-Holstein question became a national one, and Austria demanded the Diet's military action against Prussia. Before war was declared, on June 8th, 1866, Moltke was gazetted General of the Infantry. We have already seen, in the first part of this volume, with what brilliant success Moltke was attended in this campaign, a success achieved by a genius all his own. He says himself after the return from Nicolsburg: "How beautiful it is that God should have thus lit up the evening of a man's life as He has done that of our sovereign and many of his generals. I, too, am now sixty-six years old, and for my duties in this state of life I have had such splendid reward as can fall to the lot of few. We have conducted a war of immeasurable importance to Prussia, to Germany, to the world. God's mercy has crowned our honest endeavours with the glories of victory. And we elders in this campaign, in spite of the rough battles of our earlier years, may yet boast ourselves to be seemingly still the darlings of fortune." But misfortune was at hand as well. Among the many ladies of rank who thronged the platform of the Berlin terminus to meet the victors of Königgrätz was Madame von Moltke, ready proudly to welcome her beloved husband, whose name was

now in every one's mouth. Their marriage was an exceedingly happy one. But in the December of 1868 Madame von Moltke fell ill; and the Christmas-eve of that year, which brought to many so much joy, brought to her husband that great sorrow which follows on the loss of those we cherish most in life. There had been no issue from the marriage; and Moltke was again alone in the world. The King did not wish that his great general should be left alone in his grief, and he immediately appointed Moltke's nephew, Lieutenant von Burt, to be his second adjutant. Moltke's widowed sister, Madame von Burt, came to live with him and keep house for him, and their presence formed afresh the family circle. Moltke erected a mausoleum to the memory of his wife in the form of an exquisitely carved image of Christ, with hands outspread above a bier which rests on a marble pedestal beneath.

It was in the midst of this time of bereavement, in the December of 1868, that fresh work fell to Moltke's share. He had done much already, but there was yet more to do; his energies were again in request on behalf of his sovereign and his Fatherland; and this helped him to forget his own personal sorrow in the impending crisis, which could ill dispense with his strategical guidance. A war with France which in 1867 had only just been avoided, seemed now inevitable; it was only a question of time as to when it would break out. "Vengeance for Sadowa!" was the cry which since the 3rd of July 1866, had found its echo in the French Chamber and the organs of the press. In 1867 the Minister for War, Marshal Niel, introduced new army regulations, modelled for the most part on the Prussian system, which would ensure for the Government the possession of a powerful army in the field, to be armed with the new *chassepot* gun, which carried extremely far. Arrangements were also made for improvements with regard to the

artillery ; but Napoleon was hardly so fortunate in this respect, for the newly-invented mitrailleuse did not exactly answer expectation. All these hastily-devised and much-vaunted warlike preparations could only have one end in view, namely, an invasion of Belgium or of the Rhine provinces. However, all these equipments had as yet only reached their preliminary stage. If the French Government wished in some measure to ensure success, they would have to wait until this re-organization was concluded, which was not until 1873, when the contingent forces were called out, and then there were only 800,000 men for active service, with 500,000 of the garde mobile. It was also impossible that the necessary supplies of the new weapon could be furnished in three years. All the same, it was hard to believe that the patience of the French would last until the completion of the re-organization scheme. The Bonapartists dreamt of warlike triumphs ; the Ultramontanes dreaded the establishment of a Protestant empire in Germany. The Emperor himself did not wish for war, but he was powerless to check the universal cry for it, and continued to cherish the idea that to annex large territories was the only way to secure the throne for his son. For safety's sake he wished that such annexations should be made in conjunction with Prussia, and finally, in 1867, offered to consent to the incorporation of Southern Germany in the Germanic Confederation, on the cession of Luxemburg and Belgium, an offer which Bismarck neither accepted nor rejected, but treated in a "dilatatory" manner. Under these circumstances the idea gradually obtained in the French cabinet, that as Prussia seemed so reluctant to avail herself of the offers made by France, it became necessary for her to endeavour to gain single-handed those territorial advantages which she had hoped to secure in conjunction with Prussia, and that as the

line of separation between North and South Germany was still a hard and fast one there could be no better time than the present for declaring war. Unfortunately for France's warlike proclivities, the prime mover in this re-organization scheme, Marshal Niel, died in the August of 1869, and his successor, General Lebœuf, had neither energy nor foresight sufficient to carry out the matter himself, nor to avert a premature declaration of war.

Already, in 1867, the authorities at Berlin being convinced that war with Prussia had been irrevocably decided upon in France, and that its declaration alone depended upon some unforeseen event, the Prussian Government deemed it safe as soon as possible to occupy itself in arranging the outlines for the anticipated campaign, by placing its battalions, if not exactly in the field, yet, in accordance with Moltke's system, theoretically in opposition to the enemy. In the winters of 1868-9, Moltke laid before the King a memorandum drawn up by the Prussian head-quarters staff, containing very detailed proposals for the assembling of German forces, as well as for the placing and apportioning of each separate army, which proposals were to serve as a basis for future operations. The introduction to this memorandum was as follows:—
 "Among the duties of the general staff in time of peace is to arrange for the grouping and transport of masses of troops, for all probable warlike eventualities down to the minutest detail, and to prepare plans for the same. Political and geographical motives have to be taken into consideration as well as military, at the first movements of an army. It is almost impossible during a campaign to remedy an error in the primary concentration of the troops. All such arrangements call for a previous careful consideration: the state of readiness of the troops, as well as the organization of the transport service, must have this one general

object in view. As regards strategy, the task is again a different one, as here our will soon clashes with the independent one of our opponent, upon which limits can be put by a well-timed and determined initiative, but is only to be overcome by actual combat. The material and moral consequences of every great battle become then so extensive, that an entirely new situation is created, and a new basis formed for fresh operations. No plan of operations can with any certainty reach beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy." Moltke goes on to say:—"The next object in view is to discover and attack the main body of the enemy," the underlying idea being "to force them in a northerly direction, thus severing their connection with Paris." The memorandum then goes on to treat of the relative strength of both armies, assuming that North Germany could at first only bring ten army corps, or say, 330,000 men, into the field, and France only 250,000, and, by calling out her reserves, 343,000. "It is at once apparent how important it is that we should make the most of those forces which we already possess in North Germany. The value of such superiority at deciding points will become materially increased when the French undertake expeditions against the coast of the North Sea or South Germany. Sufficient forces are in readiness at home to repulse the former." The relative strength, at the commencement, of the North German army, would, however, prove greatly to the disadvantage of France, if (as was not the case when the memorandum was drawn up) either the South German states at the beginning of the war at once took part in the same, or if three reserve corps and several divisions of North German militia were placed in the field. Conferences were held at Berlin with the representatives of the South German contingent prior to the outbreak of the war, when the Prussian General Staff stated that North Germany, on

account of distance alone, would not be in a position at first to give immediate and effective resistance in the defence of the Upper Rhine and the Black Forest ; but that a far surer protection of Southern Germany would be ensured by uniting their entire forces on the Middle Rhine, from whence they could attack the invader in the flank upon either side of the river, thus quickly arresting his progress or compelling him to retire.

The South German Princes were sufficiently "devoted to the common cause and confident in the powers of the commanders-in-chief," to concur in the views expressed by the Prussian Staff, and accordingly were willing "to add the entire military portion of their population to the forces of the North German army." They were all the more disposed to do this as Bismarck had already informed them that Napoleon, in the course of his multifarious offers of alliance and demands of compensation, had also cast greedy eyes upon Rhenish Bavaria. Thus, when the war broke out, the position of affairs was far more favourable than could have been expected in the winter of 1868.

In the completion of his memorandum, Moltke had to count upon various possibilities. If France were to respect the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, the theatre of war would be confined to the space between Luxemburg and Basel. If, however, a French army were to force an entrance into Belgium, and from thence to press forward across the Meuse to Cologne, Moltke sought to hinder such advance by placing a body of German troops on the Moselle, forcing the enemy to show front towards the south, and compelling them to give battle while all their communications were in danger. If France thought of advancing her troops through Switzerland, Moltke believed that she would find the powerful and well-organized body of Swiss militia a very formidable bar to progress ; and as their

capital would be immediately threatened by any considerable assembly of troops on the Moselle, Moltke thought that the French would not be likely to adopt so extended a line of action. "We may reasonably assume that the French will effect the first concentration of their troops upon the Metz-Strassburg lines, in order, by surrounding our powerful Rhine army, to push forward to the Maine, and separate North and South Germany, when, coming to an agreement with the latter, they would advance upon the Elbe. And here, again, an assembly of troops to the south of the Moselle, and, indeed, of all available forces in the Bavarian Pfalz, would appear to be the most expedient manner by which such plans could be opposed." In case the enemy should make an attempt from Strassburg to move into South Germany, with a portion of their forces, Moltke's idea was to march along the Rhine, and take them in flank, compelling them to desist from their advance on the Black Forest, and to form their front facing the north. In case the Würtemberg and Baden troops were to join the North German left wing, Rastadt was indicated as being the point in the neighbourhood of which a decisive battle might be looked for. Should the enemy abandon the idea of pushing forward in the direction of South Germany, the most suitable place for the formation of the troops seemed to Moltke to be the Bavarian Pfalz, which allowed of their being moved either to the right, on Metz, or to the left, on Strassburg, or, "always assuming that we are in sufficient force" (meaning to say, if the South German contingents join with Prussia), they could also simultaneously show front to the enemy on either side. The occupation of the Pfalz would serve to protect both the Upper and Lower Rhine, and would easiest admit of an offensive attack upon the enemy's country; and this, if accomplished at the right moment, would probably anticipate any similar attempt on

the part of the French. Moltke continues :—" It is now only a question as to whether we can run the risk of an attack while moving our first assembly of troops across the Rhine and through the Pfalz, close up to the French frontier ; as far as I can see, I am able to answer that question in the affirmative." And in the minute instructions in his memorandum, with regard to the German mobilization, we may find a confirmation of this belief. Six direct lines of rail were to be in readiness for the transport of the troops to the Moselle and Rhine districts ; the *Fahrlisten* were already complete, from which each division of troops could know the precise moment of the break up of every camp, and the date of their arrival at each place. Within ten days from the date of mobilization, the first divisions were to be stationed on the French frontier, to be followed in a week by a force of 300,000 men, two days later the entire corps were to be provided with all their baggage and accessories ; so that there should not be the slightest reason to suppose that the French would have completed the disposition of their army in a shorter space of time than had the Germans.

The disposition of the forces was, according to the memorandum, to be similar to that of 1866, and in these calculations and apportioning of the troops the South German contingent was now included. Moltke was again for operating with three temporarily separate armies. The First Army consisting of two corps, in all a body of some 60,000 men, was to form the right wing, and would take up a position near Wittlich, to the north of Treves. The Second Army comprising four corps, together 131,000 strong, was to form the centre between Neuenkirchen and Homburg ; and the Third Army comprising five corps, including the Bavarian, Württemberg and Baden troops, would occupy the right wing, and, being some 130,000 strong, was to be

assembled at Landau and Rastadt. Two corps of 63,000 men stationed near Mainz would form the reserve of the Second Army, which would bring the force of the latter up to 384,000 men. The remaining three *corps d'armée* of 100,000 men, if their march were not hindered in any unforeseen way, were not intended to reach the theatre of war, until the transport arrangements of the other corps were complete. For the present the fortresses were to be garrisoned by nine infantry regiments, and the coast would be guarded by the 17th Infantry division, supported by the newly-formed militia. Moltke at the close of his memorandum was able to inform the King that three weeks after the sanction of the order for mobilization, a force of 484,000 men could be placed in the field. The arrangements for transport and the march of these men were all carefully and minutely specified, so that when the war broke out, and the King gave the orders for the mobilization of the entire German army, he had only got to fill in the date to the *Fahrlisten*, which were already complete. The plans of the campaign had been completed during the early part of 1869. Napoleon and his ministers might put the war question when they liked; Moltke was ready, on the same day that war was declared, to issue orders for the advance of his troops; and, in little over a fortnight, could place 384,000 men on the enemy's frontier, who, four days later, were to be re-inforced by an extra 100,000 to meet the foe upon their own ground. This thorough state of readiness, which Moltke by his memorandum had brought about, gave to Prussian policy that marked tone of assurance and superiority which so favourably contrasted with the vacillation and profuse phraseology which characterized that of France.

But the French had also for long past busied themselves with drawing up a plan of campaign. They were aware

of Prussia's readiness for action through their military attaché at Berlin, Baron Stoffel, but they did not put much faith in these reports, which in nowise abated their senseless zeal for bloodshed. Both Napoleon, Leboeuf, and Marshal MacMahon knew perfectly well that, as far as numbers went, Germany was very much stronger than they were, and they computed her active army at 550,000 men, while their own was only 300,000. But this difficulty Napoleon hoped to overcome by a sudden and overwhelming initiative. He intended to place 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strassburg, and 50,000 in the camp at Châlons, and having effected a junction of the two first armies at Strassburg, he would cross the Rhine with a force of 250,000 men at Maxau, and compel Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria to preserve their neutrality, whereupon he could advance against the Prussian army, the strength of which he estimated at only 350,000 men. As soon as the first battle had been fought, he thought he might rely upon the alliance of both Austria and Italy. The presence of the French fleet in the waters of the North Sea and the Baltic would serve to keep back a portion of the Prussian forces, while the rear of the French army and the north-east frontier of France would be protected by the reserve army which had been pushed forward from Châlons to Metz. This plan, said to have been devised by Napoleon himself, was a quite correctly-conceived one, but it was not without errors, and was based for the main part upon mere possibilities and probabilities. The whole organization of the French army precluded any attempt at rapid concentration; the South German states already looked favourably upon Moltke's scheme of action, and even without this contingent, Prussia, who in 1866 was able to put 350,000 men in the field, now commanded a much larger army, as the entire forces of the North German Confederation were at her dis-

posal. And, although negotiations were entered into with Austria and Italy with regard to the conclusion of an alliance, Italy's help was only to be ensured at the cost of the cession of Rome, a cost which Napoleon, in the face of the powerful Church party at home, could on no account incur ; while Austria, threatened by Russia in her rear, dared not make any attack upon Prussia until the latter had experienced the reverses of a second Jena. As for the fleet, there was little to fear on that head, for no sooner had the German army reached the soil of France, than all operations in that quarter ceased. Napoleon's plan, plausible enough to a Frenchman, was wholly wanting in the solidity of that of Moltke, and France at the beginning of the war was isolated to begin with. If Germany, too, was without an ally, she neither needed nor looked for one. And in Berlin, on comparing the achievements of the French army during the year 1859 with those of the Prussian forces in 1866, and bearing in mind their respective leaders on these occasions, one could look forward calmly to a rupture with France, an opponent which was neither to be undervalued nor to be feared.



THE FRANCO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN.

1870 AND 1871.

DURING the sultry days of the July of 1870, while King William was at Ems, Moltke was staying at Creisau, his estate in Silesia. The pretensions of the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne formed the nucleus of that thunder-cloud which the French war party kept in readiness to discharge, a cloud which hourly grew more threatening. With the Prince's withdrawal from the candidature on July 12th, the atmosphere grew somewhat lighter. But the Duke of Grammont, the French Minister of the Exterior, was by no means disposed to let the storm blow over. War he would have, cost what it may; and with his consummate knowledge of stage effect, he could well counterfeit the lightning flash and the thunder roll. The bolt fell; it was only a question whom it would hit. From the attitude of mingled obtrusiveness and want of tact maintained by the French cabinet towards King William and his government, there could be no doubt whatever that it was a "revenge for Sadowa" which was meditated. But Moltke had a voice in the matter, who, leaving Creisau, had joined Bismarck in Berlin on July 12th, where a cabinet council was held. On the 15th the King returned from Ems to Berlin, amid the acclamations of his subjects at his having thus baffled the presumption of the French government. The Crown Prince, with Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, travelled to meet their sovereign as far as Bran-

denburg, "in order to carry out the commands of his majesty without an hour's delay." Amid the vociferous cheering from the vast populace, the royal train reached the Potsdam station shortly before nine o'clock, where it was learnt that on that same day proposals had been made to the Chambers by the French ministry which were, in fact, tantamount to a declaration of war. The King and the Crown Prince drove together to the castle, while Moltke went on to the War Office, and at eleven o'clock, as he passed through the streets on his way to the palace, he met with a stormy welcome from the crowds which thronged the streets, an expression of their confidence in the Prussian strategist of 1866, who was now to lead their country's arms. On the 19th of July war was formally declared, though the transport of the German troops had commenced some days before. On the 15th the King had already decided upon mobilization, which came into effect on the day following. According to Moltke's calculations, it would take three weeks for the first operating army to reach the French frontier. But by the 26th, just eleven days later, the mobilization was completed, while the placing of the German troops between the Rhine and the Saar had been accomplished in a week. By the energy of the Government and the zeal of the railway authorities, the seemingly impossible had actually become possible. But no amount of zeal or energy could have brought this about, had not Moltke long before the general mobilization, so to speak, mobilized himself. His scheme of 1869 was now about to be put into execution. To the returns, already completed for each several body of troops, it was now only necessary to add the date of July 16th, and the journey to the Rhine and the Moselle could go on without interruption. As we have seen, the North German contingents had been subsequently included in the plans of the campaign,

and knew equally, with the South German troops, what purpose they would serve. The orders for a formation of the army in accordance with Moltke's proposals, were issued by the King on the 18th of July, General Steinmetz being appointed to command the First Army, which formed the right wing; Prince Frederick Charles with the Second Army, the centre; the Crown Prince with the Third Army, the left wing. On the 31st of that month, Moltke left Berlin with the King's suite, reaching Mainz early on the morning of August 2nd, where, for the present, the head-quarters had been established.

Moltke thought that it was quite likely, from the remarkable suddenness with which war had been declared, that the French commanders would have their troops in sufficient readiness to admit of their being pushed across the frontier of the Rhine provinces and the Pfalz, to prevent the formation of the German troops on the left bank of the Rhine. Such a proceeding would mainly affect the Second Army, which had been drawn up in the Hessian and Bavarian Rheinpfalz. And when, after the combat at Saarbrücken on August 2nd, the French soldiers occupied that town, and the false rumour spread that the frontier at Saargemünd had been crossed, Moltke had fresh grounds for believing that he must guard against an offensive movement on the part of the French. And, therefore, Prince Frederick Charles was resolved to abandon his march through the Hartz mountains, and to take up a position to the rear of these, near Kirchheimbolanden in the northern Rheinpfalz. The Third Army near Landau, which had the twofold task of covering the Second Army's left flank and South Germany, was, from his position, most fitted to prevent the enemy's encroachment in the Pfalz. Moltke consequently sent a telegram on July 30th to the Crown Prince, which gave directions that, as soon as the

divisions from Baden and Württemberg had been moved up, he was at once to advance in a southerly direction on the left bank of the river, and immediately engage with the enemy. But, as there was much wanting to a thorough equipment of his troops, the Crown Prince did not feel himself strong enough to assume the offensive, although he might be able to protect the left flank of the Second Army. But as the rumour just mentioned became known in Mainz, it seemed that an advance of the Third Army would be absolutely necessary, and on August 2nd Moltke despatched Lieutenant-Colonel von Verdy to the headquarters at Speier with the report that in consideration of a later co-operation of the entire German forces against the Saar lines, from which the Third Army was the furthest off, the left wing would have to move forward without delay. On the 4th the Crown Prince decided to cross the frontier just as he was, a decision which led to the victories of Weissenburg and Wörth, by which MacMahon's army became split up, a part being driven back into Strassburg and a part across the Vosges, Lower Elsass remaining in the hands of the victor.

The French Government was by no means equal to its task. By postponing the conflict and the actual declaration of war it could have gained the time necessary to a thorough state of readiness; but the arrogance of French diplomacy drove the nation into open rupture, while its warlike preparations were very far from complete. When war had already been declared there were only four French corps between Metz and the Prussian frontier, with a couple more between Saargemünd and Strassburg, while another corps was in course of formation at Belfort, the reserves remaining at Châlons. Hence all attempt at an offensive movement was utterly impossible. The engagement at Saarbrücken on August 2nd, by which

the French had commenced hostilities, was not a serious one; Count Gneisenau, the general in command, having been previously instructed to withdraw his men if opposed by superior numbers. General Frossard, who was on the Spicheren heights with the Second Corps, soon began to feel rather uncomfortable, and on August 5th he had already expressed his opinion as to the insecurity of his position, desiring to move off in the direction of Saargemünd or St. Avold, which was acquiesced in at head-quarters. One may safely conclude that General Frossard, if not at the news of the advance of the First and Second Army, yet at any rate on hearing of the defeat at Wörth, would have voluntarily quitted his position for one on the Moselle, as he had no intention of fighting where he then was. Neither had Moltke nor General Steinmetz, although his instructions were what led to this bloody encounter. Originally he was meditating an advance of the Saarlouis-Hellenshausen lines, which would help him in bringing up the Second Army on the Saar. But on the 4th inst. he received a telegram from Moltke ordering him to concentrate the First Army at Tholey, which looked as though a general offensive were to be assumed, the First and the Second Army acting in concert. A further telegram requested him to maintain his position until further orders. The First and Second Armies were stationed on the borders of Rhenish Bavaria and Rhenish Prussia at the towns of Neunkirchen, Ottweiler and St. Wendel, to the north of Saarbrücken; and were now so close to each other that disputes arose as to where they were to be quartered. Moltke, telegraphing on August 5th, decided that the Second Army was to quit the St. Wendel and Neunkirchen road on the following day, which General Steinmetz was rather afraid of doing, thinking that if he stopped on at Tholey he would be completely forced into the second

lines, and Prince Frederick Charles might get on in front of him and reach the French frontier before he did. He therefore gave orders on August 6th, for an advance on the Saar, the advanced guard being pushed forward as far as Völklingen, and he notified this action on his part to head-quarters and to the other two generals. General Steinmetz was somewhat mistaken with regard to the intentions at head-quarters. He believed that Prince Frederick Charles' plan of operations would be directed towards Nancy, while he would be called upon to operate independently to the south of the Moselle fortresses, which led him to persist in his wish to push forward in the direction of the Saar and of the Nied. But Moltke's plan was quite a different one, namely, that on the 7th inst. the whole of the Second Army was to be drawn up on the Neunkirchen-Zweibrücken lines, and after a day's rest the First and Second Armies were to cross the frontier simultaneously. As long as they were still isolated any collision with the French forces was to be avoided ; and this was especially to be observed in the case of the First Army, which consisted of only three corps. It was utterly impossible for the Second Army to march on Nancy, the Crown Prince's troops after routing MacMahon were more in a position to do this. The general point of juncture for the First and Second Armies was Metz, where the French army of the Rhine was drawn up ; Moltke thought that the whole of it, including Frossard's troops, would either be in readiness to engage in a decisive battle upon the right bank of the Moselle, or else that it would certainly be found in position upon the other side of the river. "In which case the First Army will engage the enemy's front while the Second Army will at once make an attack immediately south of this."

The moving forward of the advance guards of both armies upon Saarbrücken, and General Frossard's action in the

matter on August 6th, led to the celebrated but bloody engagement of Spicheren, which was begun by the 14th division under Kamecke, and only resulted in a thorough victory for the Prussians by the arrival of other divisions of the two armies. People in Metz were paralyzed at the news of these successive defeats. A retreat with the whole army to Châlons had already been agreed upon, and was now in process of being carried out. At that rate Metz was lost, for Coffinières, the general in command, had declared his inability to hold the town by himself for more than a fortnight. On weighing the matter, the question at once presented itself as to what Paris and France generally would say on hearing that, eight days after the commencement of the campaign, the entire territory between the capital and the Rhine provinces had been abandoned to the enemy. So Napoleon, who, chiefly for political reasons, had assumed the supreme command, determined to take up a position between the Moselle and the Nied, which was done on August 10th; but, as this proved extremely unfavourable, it was agreed, two days later, to move up the whole of the army of the Rhine under cover of the fort batteries. At the same time Napoleon, who perhaps foresaw that his sun was setting, withdrew from the command, appointing Marshal Bazaine to the chief command of the army of the Rhine. This general, it would seem at the Emperor's request, adopted the first plan, and on the 13th issued orders for the army of the Rhine (consisting of five corps and two divisions of cavalry reserve) to march in the direction of Verdun on the following day. This retreat, if not checked by the enemy, would have to be made as quickly as possible, for it was Châlons that must be reached and not Verdun. Napoleon, likewise, in order to give his general entire liberty of action, besides saddling him with all responsibility, resolved to leave Metz with his son, and travel through

Verdun to Châlons, where MacMahon was collecting the shattered remnants of his army and getting fresh troops together.

But these plans on the part of the French were not to be suffered to reach completion by the German Staff. For the present Moltke endeavoured to feel the enemy, and by reconnoitring to gain cognisance of its intentions, keeping his three armies as much as possible in line. For this purpose, the Third Army, which had finished its advance on the Saar, received orders on August 12th to move forward on the Nancy-Lüneville lines, and there to wait until the other two armies had reached the Moselle. If the operations of the latter were to be carried on with uniformity and despatch, it would be necessary to establish the head-quarters at a place as near to the scene of action as possible; and, after being moved from Homburg to Saarbrücken, they were ultimately transferred on August 11th to St. Avold, a French village. Moltke adhered to his original plan of moving the First Army gradually in the direction of the Nied, and of pushing forward the left wing of the Second Army a considerable distance southwards, in order to take the enemy in flank. The uncertain tactics of the French commanders were narrowly followed by the Prussian staff, who made their arrangements accordingly. The news that on August 10th the French were in position behind the Nied was supplemented by the report of the reconnoitring parties that the enemy had abandoned their fortified positions to the west of the Nied, and lay yet in considerable force to the east of Metz. More important still was the news that the country above Metz as far as the Moselle was wholly unoccupied, and the principal fords of the river undefended. The Prussians were not slow to profit by this fatal omission on the part of their opponents.

On the evening of the 12th, Moltke issued orders to the three armies in which it was stated that, in accordance with intelligence received, the main force of the enemy was about to retreat over Metz across the Moselle, and the First Army was to move up in the direction of the Nied, and seize the station at Courcelles, and to push forward the cavalry for reconnoitring purposes to Metz, and below that town as far as the left bank of the Moselle, thus covering the right flank of the Second Army. The latter was to march on Chateau Salins and seize the passages of the river at Pont-à-Mousson, Dieulouard, Marbach, and elsewhere, and reconnoitre the ground on the left bank; while the Third Army was to continue its march on Nancy-Lüneville. The directions are conspicuous alike for their boldness and foresight. The First Army, which was only about two miles from the enemy, ran the risk of being attacked by superior numbers, but, if this should happen, the Second Army would come to its aid, and if attacked by the French, it could, if necessary, make room for the Third Army, the First Army attacking in the rear. To carry out these plans correctly, it would be necessary to keep a very strict watch upon all the enemy's movements.

Nor was this wanting. The cavalry, the very eyes of the German army, made incursions in all directions, getting near enough to the French to observe all their actions; and in due course the passages of the Moselle at Dieulouard, and Pont-à-Mousson, as well as the Courcelles railway station, were all taken possession of. Still it was not yet quite clear what the French were going to do, for, although apparently a retreat was meditated, they still remained in Metz: and, even after two of the Prussian corps had reached the Moselle and their cavalry had reconnoitred as far as the Verdun road, it was found that a considerable force was stationed on the east of the fortress. Moltke, therefore, on August 13th,

gave orders that on the following day the First Army was to remain in its present position, being covered by the right wing of the Second Army. He likewise arranged for an advance of the remaining corps in the direction of the Moselle, and for the cavalry to be pushed forward if possible. That the enemy, if inclined to attack the First Army, should not find it in an isolated position had of course to be guarded against: the position was manifestly a critical one. Moltke's daring idea was to throw as many troops as possible in the path of the retiring enemy, to cut off their line of retreat while he held the army of the Rhine at Metz, but his soberer judgment on the other hand forbade him to separate the two armies any more than was actually necessary, and not to endanger the one at the expense of the other. He sought to combine the advantages of each of these modes of action; and with success. On the morning of the 14th of August intelligence was received from various quarters, which left no doubt that the retreat of the French on the left bank of the Moselle had already begun. Major-General von der Goltz, commanding the 26th infantry brigade, no sooner remarked this than he at once felt the importance of impeding this retreat, which would give it more time to surround the enemy's left flank. He therefore determined to attack, with the advance guard of the 7th corps, the two *corps d'armée* of the enemy which confronted him, and gave notice to that effect to the generals in command of the 7th and 1st corps. This took place at half-past three in the afternoon, and resulted in the improvised battle of Colombey-Nouilly, which lasted until nine o'clock P.M. The French were repulsed at all points, and were compelled to retire under cover of the earthworks. Moltke dwells upon the importance of this encounter in his orders of August 15th, in which he says, "The circumstances under which the 1st and 7th corps, with a detach

ment of the 18th infantry, were victorious in the engagement of yesterday evening were such as to prevent any attempt at pursuit. The advantages of victory can only be obtained by a forcible offensive movement against the roads leading from Metz to Verdun." The result of the victory won on the right bank was only to be reaped on the left. "As a matter of fact, the battle of Colombey-Nouilly served to delay the retreat of the foe to such an extent that it was possible by the battle of Thionville to check that movement altogether, and then afterwards in the battle of Gravelotte to follow it up by a comprehensive and decisive attack from the west. Thus the events of August 14th form the commencement of the series of heavy battles around Metz, which finally resulted in the surrender of the French main army."

In the meanwhile the Prussian head-quarters had been transferred to Herny, and on August 16th they were to be removed to Pont-à-Mousson. Moltke, writing from Herny, gave orders that the First Army was to maintain the position which it had gained during the battle, if it was not within the range of the fortress batteries. At the same time he informed Prince Frederick Charles how matters stood, and laid stress upon the importance of a pursuit along the Metz-Verdun road. A few hours later, as the results of the battle became more apparent, Moltke sent a second telegram to the Prince, informing him that the French were completely driven back into Metz, and were probably now about to retreat upon Verdun; that at present three corps were at his disposal, a fourth being already on the march to Nomery, on the Seille. And now the troops of the Second Army had a heavy task before them, which to be successful must be accomplished before the walls of Metz. On the 15th of August Bazaine proceeded to continue the retreat, but at no rapid rate. The two corps which had

been beaten at Colombey, were unable to reach the rallying point specified for the 15th, the day on which Bazaine shifted his head-quarters to Gravelotte. The Emperor Napoleon was still with him and did not leave until early on the morning of the 16th. But as the Rhine army continued to move so slowly, Prince Frederick Charles was all the more anxious to get one corps after another over the Moselle as fast as possible, in order by a flank march to reach the road from Metz to Verdun, across Gravelotte, Rezonville, Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, where he would oppose the enemy's progress. The directions of the 16th which Moltke gave to the two armies were as follows:—

“As long as the strength of the remaining forces of the enemy in Metz is uncertain, the First Army will have to place a corps in the neighbourhood of Courcelles, which will, however, be very shortly relieved by the troops from Saarlouis under General Kummer. The two other corps of this army are to come into position between Seille and Moselle, and at once effect a passage across the river, and it is left to the discretion of the generals in command of the Second Army to assume a vigorous offensive with all the resources at command.” Thus on August 16th the battle of Vionville was succeeded by that of Colombey. The orders for an offensive movement were carried out with unexampled bravery and endurance. The Brandenburg corps had to make the hardest stand, fighting by itself for six whole hours, against the greater part of the Rhine army. It was not until the afternoon that the entire Hanoverian Corps came upon the scene, followed, later on, by troops from other corps. By four o'clock, Prince Frederick Charles and his Staff reached the battle-field and assumed the command. All branches of the service distinguished themselves, notably Bredow's cavalry brigade; and the dragoons under Count Brandenburg. The battle lasted from nine in the

morning until ten o'clock at night, and the losses on either side were estimated at 16,000 men. Neither side had vanquished the other; the Germans had not succeeded in forcing the French to quit their position, the French, again, were unable to regain the ground which they had lost, and had failed to repossess themselves of the road from Mars-la-Tour to Verdun. The Germans could not be said to have lost anything, and for that reason they may claim to have won; the French, however, had gained nothing; and so may be said to have lost. It did not much matter to the German army if, on August 16th, it advanced a little more or less on Metz in the direction of Mars-la-Tour: to maintain its position was not so difficult, now that its principal object had been gained. But Bazaine could not afford to remain where he was; he must move on with all speed; and if no way was to be forced in the direction of Verdun by the 16th, the game would be as good as lost. These fears were amply realized, owing to the measures which he subsequently took on the day following.

Prince Frederick Charles on August 17th was prepared for a vehement attack on the part of the French, and, if an attempt to break their lines were made by the five corps of the enemy, it was very doubtful if the Brandenburg—the Hanoverian—corps could offer any serious assistance. Fresh troops must, therefore, be brought into the field without delay. As soon as Lieutenant-Colonel von Bronsart had brought the reports of Prince Frederick Charles to headquarters, measures were immediately adopted for providing sufficient forces to oppose a fresh attack. The Saxons were already under orders on the evening of the 16th to cross the Moselle; the ninth corps was in the act of crossing; immediately in their rear General Steinmetz was to cross the stream with two corps, leaving the one under General Manteuffel on the right bank to divert the

enemy's attention by a heavy cannonade from the development of events on the opposite side of the river. Early on the morning of the 17th, the King, accompanied by his entire staff, started for the scene of action, where he arrived at 6 A.M., taking up his position on a height to the south of Flavigny already occupied by the Prince and his Staff. Moltke here conferred with General Stiehle, the chief of the Staff of the Second Army, and with Colonel von Wartensleben, quarter-master-general of the First Army, and made further arrangements for the following day. The reconnaissances which had been made plainly showed that no attack on the part of the enemy was to be expected on the 17th of August, but, on the contrary, that Bazaine had the day before quitted his positions, and had withdrawn towards Metz. The only point of uncertainty was whether the whole or only a portion of his army had withdrawn, and whether the greater or the lesser portion had resumed the march northwards to Verdun. The powerful resistance by which Bazaine had been met on the 16th led him to believe that the opposing army was equal to his own in numbers; on the 17th he feared having to engage with a superior force, in which case his present positions were not strong enough; nor would a northerly march be safe. On the night of the 17th, therefore, he issued the orders for a retreat, in which he says: "The great consumption of ammunition which has taken place, as well as the fact that we are short of provisions, prevents our commencing the march which had been previously agreed upon. We shall, therefore, at once withdraw to the heights of Plappeville." By occupying the positions of St. Privat, Amanvillers and Roserieuilles, and having the fortress immediately behind him, he believed that his position would be an impregnable one, from whence he could quietly await the attack of the enemy. "Here the

Marshal hoped that the German forces, already weakened by their previous battles, would be disabled to such an extent, as to enable him to continue his march unopposed to the Méuse by the 19th or 20th."

Although Bazaine considered his position an impregnable one, Moltke yet thought that he might risk an attack upon it on the 18th. By midday on the 17th seven *corps d'armée* and three divisions of cavalry were on or near the field of battle, and the Pomeranian corps which was rapidly advancing by forced marches might be counted as an eighth. It was thus agreed at head-quarters, that the united forces should commence the battle upon the following day; and whether the enemy were to retreat northwards, or to remain in Metz and wait to be attacked, Moltke's orders to the generals in command of the First and Second Armies were calculated to meet either contingency. In the former case, the left wing of the German front was to be the first to compel the French to come to a stand, and then to accept battle under very severe disadvantages; in the latter case everything had been arranged for the first *corps d'armée* which should form its front towards the north, to right wheel in an easterly direction. The two armies could now be conducted in unison, and their orders reached them direct from head-quarters through the medium of staff officers, who brought back with them reports to Flavigny. The enemy's position in itself was a strong one, which was rendered more secure by their fortifications, many of the surrounding farms having been converted into small forts. Their left wing from Moscou to Roserieulles was specially strong: their right, again, at St. Privat, was not so favourably placed owing to the conformation of the ground; and it was without any reserves. From all the intelligence received that morning at Flavigny, it seemed clear that no retreat of the enemy had taken place; but that their main

force lay at Metz, and that their right wing extended as far as St. Privat, and not only to Amanvillers, as had at first been supposed. Moltke's orders were for the Second Army simultaneously to attack the enemy's front and right wing, while the First Army would at first engage their left in a desultory manner, until the left wing of the Second Army, marching from the north, should have taken the French in the right flank. Towards twelve o'clock the first shots were fired from Verneville, behind which lay the enemy's centre.

On the German right the battle raged hotly from one o'clock, where Steinmetz's two corps opposed the enemy's strongest positions. In order to follow the issue of events more closely, the head-quarters were transferred from Flavigny to the heights of Rezonville, from thence eastwards, towards Gravelotte, and at 5 P.M. they were in the neighbourhood of Gravelotte and Malmaison. It was just at this time, when at Amanvillers and St. Privat the fighting had been decided, and the corps under Ladmirault and Canrobert were forced to make a hasty retreat, that matters on the German right wing had reached a crisis, where between Gravelotte, St. Hubert, and Point-du-Jour, the two French corps under Frossard and Lebœuf were stationed. At seven o'clock they brought up their entire reserves, and these drove back some of the troops into the valley, and, towards Gravelotte, the French artillery played mercilessly into the surrounding woods and on to the Gravelotte heights; nor was the point where the head-quarters were untouched. Yet the Prussian troops held their ground and managed to hold St. Hubert, which they had captured. Just at the right moment the Pomeranian army corps under Fransecky came up to relieve Steinmetz, who had made an advance with all his available troops on the Point-du-Jour heights, and victory was thus ensured in this quarter. Moltke, with other officers of the Staff, had repaired to the

road leading from Gravelotte to Point-du-Jour to witness the effect of this new movement. The fight lasted here until nearly ten o'clock. The Pomeranians received instructions to maintain during the night the position in front of Moscou and Point-du-Jour which had already been forced, and to hold themselves in readiness to follow up the assault in the morning; for, owing to the favourable nature of the ground, the enemy's left wing was still in possession of its principal positions. It was not impossible that the enemy, growing desperate, might attempt to break their lines during the night, or, resume the battle on the next day. But in reality this was not so. From the reconnaissances of the 19th inst., it transpired that Bazaine had evacuated all the positions which he had held on the evening of the 18th, and had retired with his entire army into the fortress itself, and the outlying forts. Thus the fighting round Metz came to an end as far as an offensive movement on the part of Germany was concerned. The task which Moltke had set himself was to prevent the march of the army of the Rhine to Châlons and Verdun, to force the same back into Metz, and to isolate it in such a manner as to make it practically useless for defence of the country. On the morning of the 19th he learnt that it had been carried out. At that very hour preparations were being made for a new undertaking, and the orders for the same were instantly completed. The enemy's forces in front of Metz would have to be separated, and a strong blockading army left there; while an advance must be made upon MacMahon's army, now under process of reformation at Châlons. Paris was the goal which the Prussian Staff had in view; and the road thereto lay through Châlons.

On the night of the 18th the head-quarters were at Rezonville, whence Moltke issued the following decisive order to the commanders of the First and Second Armies.

"The successes of the last few days render it both possible and expedient that the troops should have sufficient rest to recoup themselves after their recent losses. It is furthermore necessary that the armies should advance with such speed upon Paris, as to be in sufficient strength to oppose the French troops now in course of re-formation at Châlons. And in case of the army, which has been driven back on Metz, attempting to force a passage on the west, it will be advisable to place six *corps d'armée* on the left bank of the Moselle, which will oppose such a proceeding from the newly captured heights. Another corps and the reserves will remain on the right bank, which was, if necessary, to repel an attack in superior numbers. The fortifications necessary for protection were to be thrown up." At the same time it was stated that his Majesty had entrusted Prince Frederick Charles with the entire command of this army, and that a separate force, consisting of the 4th and 12th corps, and the guards with two divisions of cavalry had been formed, which would constitute the army of the Meuse, under the command of Prince Albert of Saxony. This latter, in conjunction with the Crown Prince's army, was to annihilate MacMahon's forces, while Prince Frederick Charles's troops were directed against Bazaine, who must be driven back into Metz and forced to capitulate. But MacMahon's army had yet to be found, for on the day that Moltke gave the orders for an advance on Châlons, the French were already retreating from that town. On the 21st of August, Moltke issued orders from Pont-à-Mousson to the Crown Prince and the army of the Meuse, for a combined march of both armies on Châlons. The Crown Prince's army would form the left wing, and generally speaking, was to keep one day's march in advance, which, if the enemy were to hold their ground, would allow of a simultaneous attack being

made on their front and right flank, thus forcing them back northwards of Paris. This advance was to commence on the 23rd, and by the 26th it was expected that the advance-guard of the left wing would reach the environs of Vitry, while that of the right would be at Menehould. On this date, also, the head-quarters were to be transferred to Commercy. On the 15th the Crown Prince's head-quarters were still at Luneville, and on the next day were moved to Nancy. On the 20th he was at Vaucouleurs where Moltke's staff orders of the 19th reached him. His troops consisted of five and a half corps and a couple of divisions of cavalry. These latter were sent forward on the following day to reconnoitre the ground westward, and to re-establish their connection with the enemy.

The news had by this time reached head-quarters that MacMahon's army had evacuated Châlons, whereupon Moltke authorized General Blumenthal to discover by means of reconnaissances the direction which the enemy had taken. On the 23rd inst., it was reported that the Emperor Napoleon with a large portion of the French army, was at Rheims. At the same time a letter of a superior officer in the Metz army had been intercepted and forwarded to head-quarters, in which the hope was confidentially expressed that the army of Châlons would come to their relief. Both the reports were communicated by Moltke to the commanders of the Third Army and the army of the Meuse, recommending them to obtain further information by means of their cavalry, to narrowly watch the neighbourhood of Rheims, and to destroy the railway at several points between that place, Longuyon and Diedenhofen. During the transfer of head-quarters from Commercy to Bar-le-duc, they fell in with the Crown Prince, who, during the early part of the day, had received various reports from the reconnoitring parties of MacMahon's having left Châlons,

and that he was most probably marching on Rheims. The general Staff arrived at Ligny from Commercy at one o'clock. A conference was at once held with the Commanders of the Third Army, at which Quarter-Master-General Podbielski was the first to express the opinion, "that an advance of the French from Rheims to relieve Marshal Bazaine was, irrespective of military considerations, not improbable from a political point of view, and it might be desirable that the German forces should be advanced in the direction of the right wing." This view did not agree with the reports hitherto received, which all seemed to point to the fact that it was not MacMahon's intention to march in a northerly or north-easterly direction, but rather that he was going to take a westerly course straight upon Paris, or a north-westerly one to Laon, in order to cover the capital by this flank position. It was therefore decided to continue the advance in the direction adopted, and to hasten the same as much as possible. Before long, other reports were received, in part confirming the departure for Rheims, and partly bearing out Podbielski's views. An intercepted Paris newspaper stated that Marshal MacMahon with 150,000 men had taken up a position at Rheims. A Paris telegram which had been received, *via* London, ran as follows: "MacMahon's army concentrated at Rheims—Emperor Napoleon and Prince Imperial with the army—MacMahon is trying to effect a junction with Bazaine." These reports did not seem to Moltke sufficiently reliable to admit of a complete wheel to the left, with the front to the north. The march on Paris would certainly for the present have to be postponed. Moltke's orders of the 25th took it for granted that the French had evacuated Châlons, and were marching to Rheims, and advised the two armies to turn somewhat more to the north-west of Rheims, and to keep a special look-out upon all the move-

ments of the right flank. The cavalry of the army of the Meuse, which, as forming the right wing, would be nearest to the enemy, was to be pushed forward considerably, and must anyway get as far as Bouziers and Nancy. Moreover, Moltke had already devised a scheme for a partial right movement of the German forces towards the north, which, if MacMahon actually marched on Metz, would serve as a basis for the marches of the next day. On the evening of the 25th various French papers and telegrams were brought to head-quarters. One newspaper declared that for a French General thus to desert his comrade-in-arms would surely merit his country's curse. Other journals quoted the speeches made in the French Chambers, which pointed out what a national disgrace it would be if the Rhine army were to be left without support. A London telegram stated that MacMahon had suddenly decided to hasten to Bazaine's assistance, although by abandoning the road to Paris France's safety was at stake; also that the whole of the Châlons army had quitted the neighbourhood of Rheims, though the reports received from Montmédy as yet made no mention of the arrival there of French troops.

However singular it might have appeared to Moltke, from a military point of view, that MacMahon, instead of retreating on Paris, should have taken the direction of Metz, it yet seemed to him fairly probable that it might have been done principally on political grounds. On the evening of the 25th, he went with Podbielski to the King to discuss the military position of affairs, and it was decided that, if the reports of the cavalry outposts of the army of the Meuse should confirm the news of the enemy's march on Metz, the army of the Meuse, and the two Bavarian corps should march northwards on the 26th. In due course these reports were received, confirming the intelligence respecting the French troops, which had moved from

Grand-Pré northwards, and stating that the enemy was encamped in force at Bouziers. There could now hardly be any doubt that MacMahon intended marching on Metz. The Crown Prince of Saxony, to whom Moltke had sent Lieutenant-Colonel von Verdy to give him accurate information of the intentions at head-quarters, decided to advance his whole army on the 26th towards the north. On that day the Crown Prince of Prussia and General Blumenthal (from Ligny) met at Bar-le-duc. They were both of decided opinion that not only the Bavarian corps, but also the left wing of the Third Army which was advancing on Rheims, should follow the army of the Meuse in the direction of the north. The King agreed with them in thinking that the trifling delay in the advance on Paris would be less damaging to the Prussian plan of operations than if in an important battle in the north these necessary forces were not forthcoming. Whereupon the Crown Prince gave orders to his remaining troops to begin the march northwards, and at 11 P.M. General Schlotheim, the chief of the staff of the army of the Meuse, who just happened to be at head-quarters, was commissioned to inform the Commanders-in-Chief of the army of the Meuse that they were to seize the passages of the Meuse at Dun and Stenay on the 27th inst., and with their cavalry were to harass the right flank of the enemy.

MacMahon also tried to reach Dun and Stenay, and, crossing there, to advance along the bank of the Meuse to Bazaine's rescue. It was just a question as to who would reach the river first. After his defeat at Wörth, MacMahon had collected at Châlons a fresh army of some 150,000 men, with four *corps d'armée* and two cavalry divisions. His task on the one hand was to protect Paris, and on the other hand, in conjunction with the army of the Rhine, to offer a general resistance to the Germans, and seek to force

them back across the Rhine. To accomplish both was a difficult matter; for in essaying to cover Paris, he would have to leave the army of the Rhine in an isolated position, and by marching on Metz his right wing as also the capital would be threatened by the army of the Crown Prince. Without information respecting the fighting before Metz, but fearing the worst, he moved on the 21st of August from Châlons to Rheims, where, in accordance with further intelligence, he intended to come to a definite decision. Napoleon had been with him since the 17th, and on the 21st Rouher joined them, who had been commissioned by the Empress and the Ministry to request that Marshal MacMahon should instantly hasten to Bazaine's assistance. But as to his present position, people knew less in Paris than they did in Rheims. MacMahon, who was not without good information, knew at least that the army of the Rhine was blockaded in Metz by 200,000 of the German troops; that the Crown Prince of Saxony with a force of 150,000 men had reached the neighbourhood of Vitry, but this piece of news was a trifle premature. He, therefore, explained that, if he were to move his army eastwards, it would only be to expose it to overwhelming numbers, and work its certain ruin, and so on the 23rd he decided to commence his march on Paris. Rouher then drew up a proclamation to the French people to pacify them respecting this retreat, and forthwith returned to Paris. Arrangements were completed for the march of MacMahon's troops, when towards the afternoon a despatch from Bazaine arrived, dated the 19th inst., with the news that the Rhine army had in the engagement of the 18th been able to maintain its positions, but would have to rest for a couple of days or so; he was expecting a fresh attack on the part of the Prussians, but was still in hopes of being able to march northwards to Châlons, whether over Montmédy and Mene-

hould, or by way of Sedan and Mézières. In Rheims people were sanguine enough to hope from this despatch that the army of the Rhine had already begun the march on Montmédy, and thus considered it absolutely necessary to abandon the plan of retreat and to advance at once on to Stenay, where it was hoped a connection with Bazaine might be established. A telegram from Rouher in Paris confirmed this resolution, and on the 23rd inst. the army left Rheims. In spite of all MacMahon's orders, the commissariat arrangements were in such a deplorable condition that a large part of the army had to make a very considerable detour through Rethel, where large quantities of provisions were obtainable. The troops reached there on the 24th.

On the 26th, while the German army was moving northwards to the right, the French had moved from Rethel, in an easterly direction, to effect an advance on the Meuse through Le Chesne and Vouziers. On the evening of the 27th MacMahon heard at the head-quarters at Le Chesne that the Crown Prince's troops were close at his heels; that the army of the Meuse was marching from Verdun to Busanzy; and that on the 25th Bazaine was still in Metz. His hopes of thus joining his colleagues were ruthlessly shattered, while in marching eastwards the danger of being taken in front and rear by the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles grew hourly more threatening. MacMahon thus reverted to his original plan, and gave orders to march to Mézières on the 28th, informing the ministry of his resolution. That same night the answer was telegraphed back: "If you desert Bazaine now, there will be a revolution in Paris, and you yourself will be attacked by the whole force of the enemy. Paris will be able to defend itself from without, for all the forts are in perfect readiness. It seems to me absolutely necessary that you should join

Bazaine with all haste. The feeling is very strong here on this subject, and your movements are being watched with the keenest interest." At the same time MacMahon received a similar telegram from the Cabinet, and likewise the information that General Vinoy had been commissioned to come to his aid with a body of troops from the capital. These despatches again upset matters, and instead of marching to Mezières he was now to advance on Stenay and Montmédy. So, in thus wavering from east to west, much precious time was lost. On the evening of the 28th MacMahon had only got to Stonne when the disagreeable news was brought that Stenay was already occupied by the Prussians, and that the bridge over the Meuse had been destroyed. Whereupon he decided to turn aside, more to the north, and, crossing the Meuse at Mouzon and Remilly, to march further eastwards to Carignan on the Chiers, whence he would wheel round on Metz. By the 29th his army would reach the neighbourhood of Beaumont and Mouzon, and the entire troops were to cross the river on the following day.

At the same time that Moltke (on the 26th) gave the orders for the advance of the army of the Meuse, he had instructed Prince Frederick Charles to send on two corps of the blockading army in the direction of Stenay about as far as Damvillers, where, if the French were to succeed in crossing the Meuse unhindered, they would find the road to Metz blocked, while they would be threatened in flank and rear by the other two armies. After the bridges at Dun and Stenay had been seized by the Germans (on the 27th) Moltke confidently relied upon being able to attack the foe while yet on the left bank of the Meuse, and with such numbers as to allow him to dispense with the support of the blockading army. The army of the Meuse therefore received instructions to advance on Busanzy and

Beaumont, while to the left the Crown Prince's troops moved forward by forced marches towards Grand-Pré and Vouziers. "The decisive turn" had been given to matters by the orders of the 25th for the army of the Meuse and the Bavarians to march towards the right, inasmuch as what time and ground the French had gained they had lost again, so that by the 27th their march on Metz became an impossibility, and it was only by a rapid retreat towards the west that MacMahon was able to save his army from being hopelessly surrounded; and by sheer force they were driven into that very danger by the orders received from Paris. Moltke's immediate intention was to commence serious hostilities when the two wings of the armies should be near enough to admit of their acting in concert. The army of the Meuse was thus instructed, on the 29th, to take up a defensive position, the Crown Prince making all haste to overtake it. On the 30th, after some slight skirmishes, the two armies were able to advance together to the attack. The marches, as arranged by Moltke on the evening of the 29th, resulted in the battle of Beaumont on the 30th, at which those French corps, who had not yet reached Mouzon, were driven back to the Meuse with great loss. Some crossed the river at Mouzon, others lower down, but on reaching the other side, were in such a disordered and crestfallen state, that any faint glimmer of hope which they might have had of reaching Metz was, by that time, completely extinguished. On the afternoon of that day MacMahon settled to withdraw with all his troops from Mouzon to Sedan, where he would get a fresh supply of food and ammunition, and from thence he could march on Mézières, where the advance-guard of Vinoy's corps from Paris had arrived on the evening of the 30th. The retreat to Sedan then began and was continued throughout the night, and those divisions which had already reached Carignan were

also ordered to turn back and march to Sedan. On arriving there early the next morning, MacMahon did not hurry himself to reach Mézières. He was mainly anxious to rest his exhausted troops, and did not believe that the Germans would be strong enough to place a considerable force at Donchery and on the left bank of the Meuse, to oppose his progress. His orders to destroy all the bridges leading from Sedan across the Meuse, were only in part carried out, for many important ones, including those at Donchery and Bazeilles, remained untouched, and were seized by the Germans. In this position the French army on the 31st remained in and around Sedan, waiting to see what the morrow would bring forth.

Moltke, with the King's suite, watched the battle of the 30th from the heights of Sommauthe, and late that night was hardly able to find shelter in the crowded town of Busanzy, where he could issue his instructions for the next day, which were for the troops to resume their march the first thing in the morning, that two corps of the army of the Meuse were to be sent across the river to prevent the French left wing from making a detour towards the east; that the Crown Prince was to advance upon the enemy's front and right flank and force them back into Belgium. On the 31st the head-quarters were transferred from Busanzy to Vendresse, *via* Beaumont, Raucourt and Chémery, which latter town formed the head-quarters of the Crown Prince. On passing through there, Moltke took the opportunity of holding a brief conference with Podbielski and Blumenthal as to the military position of affairs, making the final arrangements for the following day. It was settled that the Crown Prince's left wing was to cross the Meuse the next morning below Sedan and oppose the enemy's retreat, two of the corps crossing at Donchery, and the Würtemberg division lower down. As the enemy had entirely

quitted the left bank of the river, and now occupied a narrow triangle between the Meuse, the Givonne and the Floing, it was not likely that under such unfavourable conditions they would engage in a decisive battle with superior numbers. It was much more probable that, before becoming entirely surrounded, they would avail themselves of one of the three possible outlets, either westwards towards Mezières, or eastwards towards Carignan, or, to the north, over the Belgian frontier. The move on Carignan was the least probable, because the most difficult; it was a western exit, rather, that would need prevention, and consequently at eight o'clock that evening Moltke instructed Blumenthal to send forward a few divisions across the Meuse during the night, to oppose the enemy in case they should move on Mezières. But the French could not so soon be brought to quit their positions, and watched themselves being surrounded by the enemy with a kind of fatality. They were not alive to the full danger of their position until the evening of the 1st of September, when Bazeilles and Balan on the east were captured, the Givonne heights carried, their cavalry routed and their environment by the German infantry and artillery became more and more complete, so that their entire forces found themselves centred, in Sedan and the forest of Garenne, that is to say, within a diameter of some two miles. Any movement, offensive or defensive, was now out of the question. The army of Châlons, together with the Emperor Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon, were compelled either to allow themselves to be shot down to the last man by the German artillery, or to accept such terms of capitulation as might be imposed.

The German head-quarters during the battle had been established throughout the day upon the heights to the south of Frénois, which the staff officers had chosen as a particularly suitable point of survey. The battle was won,

but as the enemy seemed disinclined to accept their defeat, the whole of the artillery on the left bank of the Meuse was ordered about half-past four to concentrate their fire upon the town of Sedan. Flames were soon seen to shoot up from different parts of the town. Napoleon gave orders to hoist the flag of truce, whereupon the firing ceased. The King then sent two staff officers, Lieutenant-Colonel von Bronsart and Captain von Winterfeld, to Sedan to demand the surrender of the troops and of the fortress. On their entrance they were received by an official, and Bronsart was conducted to the house of the Sous-préfet before the Emperor Napoleon, of whose presence here the German head-quarters knew nothing. Bronsart discharged his commission, and requested the Emperor to send back with him an officer fully empowered to treat for terms. The Emperor, who was already engaged in sending a dispatch to the King of Prussia, replied that General Wimpffen now filled the place of Marshal MacMahon, who had been wounded, and that he would immediately send on an adjutant with his dispatch. Bronsart returned with this message to the heights of Frénois, whither the King had, in the meantime, summoned the Crown Prince. The greatest excitement prevailed when it became known that Napoleon himself was in Sedan, and that an ambassador would shortly arrive from him. The King, deeply moved, shook hands severally with the members of his Staff. Towards seven o'clock in the evening, General Reille brought the Emperor's letter, in which he laid his sword at the feet of the King. The latter, having perused the despatch, withdrew for a brief consultation with the Crown Prince, Moltke, and Bismarck. He then wrote a few lines to Napoleon, desiring him to send a fully-authorized officer to negotiate as to the capitulation of the army, and at the same time informed him that General von Moltke would act in this capacity on his

behalf. While the King was thus occupied, Moltke, in a short speech, thanked his brother-officers for their services and shook each warmly by the hand. It was an eventful moment. All that lay beyond the Meuse beneath the conqueror's view, France's last army, together with her Emperor, was in the grasp of Germany. General Rcille returned to Sedan with the despatch of the King. At a quarter past seven Moltke issued the following order to the German army: "Negotiations are pending. During the night, therefore, no attack is to be made by us. However, any attempt on the part of the enemy to force our lines is to be resisted by arms. Should the negotiations fall through, hostilities will be recommenced, only, however, after due notification; and a renewal of the fire of the artillery on the heights to the east of Frénois is to be looked upon as such." As there was a political side to the question of capitulation, the King commissioned Count Bismarck to take part in the proceedings, and went back himself to Vendresse.

The negotiations took place at the Château Donchery, commencing at ten o'clock that night. "In consequence of a repeated request" the French were represented by General Wimpffen and several other officers, among whom were General Faure, chief of the Staff, and General Castelnau, an adjutant of Napoleon's, who was specially commissioned to represent the Imperial interests. When Moltke and Bismarck, with Podbielski and the other plenipotentiaries arrived, they found the French generals were already at the Château. One of the adjutants, Rittmeister Count Nostitz, was instructed to make a report of the conference. Wimpffen handed his credentials to Moltke, and after mutual introductions they sat down, Moltke being Wimpffen's *vis-à-vis*. For some minutes there was profound silence in the room. Wimpffen would have been

glad if Moltke had taken the initiative, but he remained characteristically silent. Moltke had discussed the whole position with Bismarck on the way, and could form a fair idea of what propositions the French commanders would make. Three possibilities presented themselves. Firstly, if they wished to make allowance for the bravery of the French troops and to accord them every consideration possible, they might allow them to return home, on their promising not to resume arms against Germany during this war. But who would, or who could, guarantee the fulfilment of this promise? And was it likely that a revolutionary government, which, after Sedan, might follow upon the monarchy, would respect this treaty? Would it not rather call out the whole fighting population, and first and foremost the veterans? To prevent any such disregard of the treaty, it could be stipulated that the army was to retire to some remote part of France, or, if need be, to Algeria, and remain there until the conclusion of the war; but then, again, the question arose as to who would offer a safe guarantee for this being faithfully performed? Thirdly, the troops could be suffered to move into Belgium, the government there undertaking to provide for their distribution throughout the country, and to prevent their escape. Yet to any one knowing aught of Belgium and her national sympathy for France, it was plain that she lacked both means and inclination for such a task. Moltke therefore agreed with Bismarck that there was only one way in which the army of Sedan could be rendered harmless for further warfare, namely, to lead it prisoner into Germany. It was absolutely necessary to insist upon its utter paralyzation, for only then could they hope to dictate such terms of peace to the enemy as would make it impossible for them to renew the war for many years to come. Both statesmen felt that in such a case magnanimity would be sadly out of

place, for if the French could hardly forgive the victory of Königgrätz, which did not immediately affect them, how much less likely would they be to stomach this, their own defeat, even though it were accompanied by an act of generosity! To owe its deliverance, or even a mitigation of its punishment, to the clemency of the conqueror was, doubtless, for so hyper-sensitive a nation, a far greater indignity than the harshest penalties which it could incur.

Thus conferring together, Moltke and Bismarck reached the Château Donchery. Their minds were made up. Wimpffen may have had his misgivings on noticing the eloquent silence of Moltke, but, recovering himself, he begged to be informed as to the nature of the conditions upon which the King of Prussia was willing to grant a capitulation. Like some death-knell came Moltke's reply: "The entire French army to surrender arms and be made prisoner including the officers." Wimpffen thought these conditions too severe when taking the bravery displayed by his countrymen into consideration, and proposed to give up Sedan, with the surrounding batteries, if the army were allowed to leave the fortress, with their guns, standards and baggage, on their promising not to resume arms against Prussia, retiring to Algeria or to some part of France which the conqueror should choose, until peace was concluded. Moltke, however, remained inexorable, and briefly explained that he could make no alteration in the conditions which he had laid down. Whereupon Wimpffen sought to enlist sympathy for his own personal misfortunes. He had only returned from Africa two days ago, bringing back with him a spotless military reputation. He had been suddenly called upon, in the middle of the battle, to assume the chief command, without any thorough knowledge, either of the entire military position, or the placing of his troops. And now his name was to be connected with this ignominious

surrender, of which he would have to bear the entire responsibility, without having prepared the battle of which it was the result. He did not exactly wish to say that if he had assumed the chief command on August 31st he would have done better than Marshal MacMahon and won the battle; but, at any rate, he would have provided for a retreat, or, at least, by a better knowledge of the powers of his troops he would have combined them in one final effort, *en masse*, to break the enemy's line. Turning personally to Moltke, he went on to say that Moltke was likewise a general, and could thus best comprehend the bitterness of his position, a bitterness which it was in his power to lessen by according to him the most honourable terms possible.

Moltke felt but little edified by this elegiac monologue, which had no connection whatever with the great question at issue, so Wimpffen returned to the charge with another side-stroke. He represented to his opponents that it would be in their own political interest to grant the army honourable terms of peace. They were anxious for peace, and doubtless wished that it might be brought about as quickly as possible. Well, if favourable conditions were offered to her army, France, of all nations the most valiant and magnanimous, keenly sensible of all acts shewn towards it of generosity and consideration, would not take the bitter disgrace of her defeat so much to heart, and ere long the former friendly relations which had existed between the two neighbouring powers would be re-established, and a lasting peace might thus be counted upon. But if, on the contrary, these hard conditions were adhered to, it would serve to fill the army with rage and hatred, and damaging the nation's *amour propre*, would rouse up in her the very worst instincts, so that a condition of affairs would be reached which might leave a perpetual feud between the two countries as its result.

This last speech was, likewise, not happily chosen. It called forth an answer from Bismarck, who at some length sought to explain to Wimpffen that the surest guarantee for a speedy as well as a lasting peace would be for France to be deprived of her most powerful army, and that such a frontier line must be established between herself and Germany as would protect the latter from any fresh attack. For no reason whatever beyond those of ambition and self-aggrandisement, France had declared war, just as she had done centuries ago. To look for gratitude from her people was altogether out of the question. If they had not been able to forgive Sadowa, was it likely that they would not bear a grudge for Sedan? And in France, too, neither crown nor government were enduring institutions. The Emperor could be dethroned in a night, to be succeeded by a government which would hold itself bound neither by treaty nor word of honour. So that, while duly sympathizing with the position of General Wimpffen himself, and fully recognizing the bravery of his troops, it became impossible for them to accede to his wishes as regarded an amelioration of the conditions. At this Wimpffen declared that they were such as he could not accept; and, if no more favourable ones were offered, he would once more appeal to the fortune of arms, and that he and his troops would either cut their way through, or else defend themselves in Sedan. Moltke rejoined that both courses were alike impossible, and, entering into details, pointed out the relative positions of the two armies. The French army, said he, had not more than 80,000 serviceable troops, with provisions only for one more day, and hardly any ammunition left; moreover, there was sad evidence of their demoralization in the fact that in the present battle over 20,000 unwounded French soldiers had been taken prisoners. They were surrounded by a force of

240,000 German troops, with a more numerous and better-served artillery, which, placed on the commanding heights round the town, was in a position to utterly annihilate any troops directly they showed themselves outside the gates, and in less than a couple of hours could reduce the town of Sedan itself to a mere wreck. Moltke also expressed himself willing to allow one of the French officers to inspect the German positions, in order to convince Wimpffen of the accuracy of his statements, and of the futility of any further resistance. But Wimpffen persisted that he was unable to put his signature to such conditions: he would rather renew the combat. Nevertheless, it looked very much as though he well saw how impossible it would be to hold Sedan, and was only debating in his own mind as to how he could withdraw from the obstinately negative position which he had at first maintained with a fair show of military dignity. Moltke told him that the armistice would expire at four o'clock the next morning, and that, if by then the terms offered had not been accepted, he would open fire at that hour. Wimpffen stated finally, that he could not himself undertake the responsibility of signing such conditions, he must confer with his colleagues upon the subject, and for this purpose he asked that the armistice might be further prolonged for another twenty-four hours. This Moltke was at first unwilling to allow; however, at Bismarck's persuasion, it would seem, he consented to a prolongation of the armistice until nine o'clock the next morning.

It was one o'clock at night when the negotiations came to an end, without having resulted in anything definite. Moltke returned with Bismarck to Donchery, and Wimpffen and the other French generals went back to Sedan. That night Moltke had the precise terms of the capitulation drawn up, feeling convinced that though Wimpffen had not accepted them at one o'clock, he would perforce have to do so nine

hours later. He then retired to rest. Early in the morning an officer arrived, summoning him to the Emperor Napoleon, who had already driven from Sedan at five A.M. in order to confer with Bismarck and the King of Prussia (who, as he thought, was also at Donchery), and endeavour to obtain from them more favourable conditions for his army. He had sent General Reille to fetch Bismarck, whom he had met half-way between Donchery and Sedan. As Napoleon at first expressed a wish to have a personal interview with the King, Bismarck informed him that His Majesty was at Vendresse, some twelve miles off. The two then entered a labourer's cottage on the main road, to discuss matters further. On Bismarck's asking if the Emperor was willing to agree to the terms of peace, the latter replied that it was the Paris government which would have to answer that question. Thus any attempt at political discussion became futile; the immediate situation was exclusively a military one, and would have to be treated accordingly. Bismarck, therefore, sent for Moltke, and, as soon as he arrived, Napoleon asked that the French army might be allowed to cross the Belgian frontier. Moltke promised to acquaint the King of Prussia, to whom he was now going, with the Emperor's wish, but at the same time he did not hesitate to let him know that it was one which he was not in a position to support.

Bismarck and the Emperor continued their conversation, and afterwards went together to the Château Bellevue, while Moltke took the road to Vendresse, in order to acquaint his sovereign with their negotiations with Wimpffen, and to submit to him the outline of the capitulation for his approval. At nine o'clock, while on the way, he met the King, who approved of the proposals and expressed his readiness to have an interview with Napoleon, but not until the treaty of capitulation had been concluded. Moltke then

proceeded to the Château Bellevue, where General Wimpffen and several German staff officers had assembled. At the council of war which Wimpffen held at seven o'clock that morning, comprised of the generals in command of infantry and artillery, he had given them the details of his negotiations with Moltke, and said: "Directly we entered into conversation, I saw that General Moltke was, unfortunately, thoroughly acquainted with our actual position, and had been accurately informed as to our army having neither provisions nor ammunition." He then told them of the strength of the German army, the number of guns which they had, and the positions which they held. Upon putting the question to the council, whether, under the circumstances, they considered it possible to continue the battle, the majority answered in the negative. Only two generals, Bellemare and Pellé, gave it as their opinion that the fortress should be defended, or else that the troops should attempt to cut their way out. Yet, on learning further particulars as to the miserable condition of the French army, and the strength of the enemy's positions, they, too, joined in the verdict of the rest. Whereupon the council of war informed General Wimpffen that, as it was practically impossible to carry on hostilities, they were under the necessity of acceding to the terms of surrender imposed, as all postponement might have yet further humiliation as its consequence.

Everything seemed now *en train* towards bringing about a rapid conclusion to the treaty of capitulation. Yet Wimpffen hesitated. On going to the Emperor on the previous night, and having informed him of Moltke's terms, Napoleon promised that he would go the first thing in the morning to the King of Prussia and ask for more favourable conditions. The Emperor had not yet returned, and Wimpffen thought there was yet room for hope. It was now nine o'clock,

which hour Moltke had fixed as the extreme limit of the armistice ; but no French plenipotentiary had arrived. The German troops were drawn up in readiness to begin the battle : the gunners were at their posts. Captain Ziegler, accompanied by General Reille, was then sent into Sedan to inform General Wimpffen that, if the treaty of capitulation were not signed by ten o'clock, hostilities would instantly be recommenced. Wimpffen showed no inclination to resume negotiations, and pleaded his inability to act in the matter, the Emperor having instructed him not to quit the fortress until his return from the conference with the King of Prussia. Ziegler then told him that in case of a refusal his instructions were on his way back to order the German troops outside the town to open fire. Wimpffen at this mounted his horse and rode to the Château Bellevue, where he saw Napoleon and his suite coming towards him. "Sire, what conditions have you obtained?" "None whatever—I have not seen the King yet," was the Emperor's reply. "Then nothing remains but to sign the capitulation," said Wimpffen, going with his Staff into the conference chamber, where the Prussian officers were waiting for him. General Podbielski and Lieutenant-Colonel Verdy were there, and they conferred with him until Moltke arrived. Bismarck joined them, and laid bare the actual state of the political question in accordance with the disclosures made by the Emperor himself. Rittmeister Count Nostitz now arrived with a message from Moltke, to say, that the King could not have an interview with the Emperor until the treaty of capitulation had been concluded. Bismarck informed General Wimpffen of this, who thereupon relinquished all hope, and was prepared to accept the inevitable. Bismarck then rode to Chehery to acquaint the King with the interesting events of the forenoon, and he met General Moltke on the way. The two went back together to the Château

Bellevue, bringing with them the outline of capitulation as sanctioned by the King. General Wimpffen, indeed, bewailed his hard fate, as the blame in this matter was surely none of his. He had been called upon to assume the chief command in the middle of the battle, and was now obliged to put his name to this humiliating capitulation, though, on the other hand, he was bound to confess that, as matters stood, his army was incapable of further resistance, and that a resumption of hostilities would only lead to needless massacre. Both he and the other French generals were very grateful to Moltke for having complied with their request to allow all officers on parole, who had surrendered after the capitulation, and had not been taken prisoners in battle. Wimpffen has elsewhere expressed his special thanks to General Moltke for the considerate manner in which all the formalities of the capitulation were conducted.

It was eleven o'clock A.M., when the capitulation treaty was signed. The two last lines ran thus :—

Given under our hand at Frénois, September 2nd, 1870.

VON MOLTKE.
DE WIMPFEN.

The spoils of victory were enormous, greater than any which German forces had ever won. Marshal MacMahon had led 124,000 men into Sedan, of which 3,000 fell; 14,000 being wounded, and 21,000 taken prisoners, while 3,000 in Belgium were deprived of their arms. The remaining trophies were, an eagle and two standards, four hundred and nineteen field guns and mitrailleuses, one hundred and thirty-nine batteries of artillery, over a thousand waggons, sixty-six thousand muskets, and six thousand horses. Of the entire French army, General Vinoy's corps was now the only one in the field, for the rest of the troops

had either perished at Gravelotte and Sedan, or were shut up in Metz, or already taken prisoners. The eyes of Europe were turned in amazement towards the man whose cautious and daring strategy had enabled him after a four weeks' campaign, to point to such results. And, after Sedan, the German people put such implicit faith in him, that they felt no alarm as to the continuance of the campaign, for was not Moltke there to provide against any and every emergency?

The march on Paris could now be proceeded with unopposed. Marshal Bazaine's delay at Metz, and MacMahon's march from Châlons to Sedan, instead of to Paris, had brought terrible consequences to the country. While the action of these generals had been exactly calculated to bring about the ruin of their forces and themselves, Moltke's keen penetration, and the crushing force of his energy, had combined to thwart their schemes, and to visit their errors of strategy with the utmost punishment. As brilliant examples of his superiority as a commander, we have the advance across the Moselle to the Vionville road, and the circumstances attending it; as also the march towards the right from the Marne to the Meuse, and the events which followed thereupon.

The King was on the Frénois heights, and as soon as the treaty of capitulation was signed, he was informed of the fact. He then addressed the German princes, held a conference with Napoleon at the Château Bellevue, and rode round to all the bivouacs of the different corps. At the dinner at head-quarters, on the 3rd of September, the King expressed his recognition of the meritorious services of his three great statesmen, in the following words: "You, Von Roon, have sharpened our sword; you, Von Moltke, have guided it; while your years of statesmanship, Von Bismarck, are what have now brought the policy of Prussia to its present height." Yet, in spite of all victories, there was no

inclination shown at head-quarters to rest on their laurels. The Blücher "Vorwärts" system obtained as much as ever it did in the Prussian army. Moltke gave orders to continue the march, which he had already ordered, on Paris, which this interesting little digression at Sedan had interrupted, and at midday on the 3rd September he issued instructions from Vendresse for the Crown Prince's troops and the army of the Meuse to begin the march on the following day, the former taking a south-westerly direction, while the latter was at first to follow in their wake, and would again form the right wing. The corps which had been left behind at Avigny, had already received orders, on the 2nd, to advance from thence, over Rethel, to Rheims. Accordingly, on the 4th instant, the armies commenced the advance, the right wing, *via* Laon and Soissons, the left, over Rheims to the Marne, and were to reach Paris by the 19th inst. The head-quarters, on the 4th were transferred to Rethel, thence to Rheims, and on the 14th were established at Château-Thierry. Here, on the 15th, Moltke issued a fresh order to the two armies in connection with the march on Paris, which was, that every communication which the capital had from without was to be cut off, and all relief and supplies were to be prevented. The troops were ordered not to expose themselves to the fire from the forts, but to get as close to them as they could, in order to keep the line of blockade as narrow as possible. It was intended that the army of the Meuse should surround Paris from the north and the east, on the right banks of the Seine and the Marne, while the Crown Prince should occupy the ground to the south of the capital. The cavalry divisions were to effect a junction of the two armies to the east and west with all speed, and then to push forward to the Loire, behind which river it was believed that the enemy would attempt to concentrate a reserve army. "All lines of rail leading from

Paris are to be destroyed, but only by removing the metals and sleepers at the points of occupation. Similarly the telegraph wires are to be cut at certain points. In order to preserve the communication of the armies, the numerous passages across the Marne and the Seine above Paris are to be secured, and the lines of route leading to the same are to be ascertained. It is further the task of the blockading army to strengthen their outer lines by means of fortification, and make accurate reconnaissances of the enemy's resources of defence. Should relief be attempted from the Loire, the blockade of the city would have to be temporarily left in the hands of weaker divisions, the principal force of the Third Army marching in, at most, one or two marches to defeat the advancing army, and then resuming the blockade. The head-quarters will remain, until further notice, at Meaux, and are to be covered by the Third Army."

As Moltke had arranged, by the 19th September the two armies actually occupied the above positions before Paris, though certainly they were only six and a half corps strong. The other two corps, which had been left in charge of prisoners at Sedan, did not arrive until the 22nd. And in October these were re-inforced by a division of infantry, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and some battalions of militia, so that by the end of the month, nine and a half *corps d'armée* and four divisions of cavalry, together nearly 240,000 men with some 900 guns, were in position round Paris. On the same day on which the blockade began, Bismarck held a conference at Ferrières, with Jules Favre, who at the fall of the monarchy, had assumed the post of Minister of the Exterior in the so-called Government for the National Defence. He was anxious to bring about an armistice of from fourteen to twenty-one days, but Bismarck's answer was to the effect, that to grant one would be so detrimental to Germany's military interest, that it

could only be done if Bitsch, Toul and Strassburg were to capitulate, the beleaguered becoming prisoners of war, and hostilities being continued before Metz. We can easily infer that these conditions were not decided upon before General Moltke had^{*} been consulted. The conference came to nothing, and a few days afterwards, on the 23rd and 28th of September, the two fortresses of Toul and Strassburg capitulated. By this the existing position of the Germans became a much more favourable one. Now that they held Toul, the rail between Paris and Strassburg was in their hands, and a free line of intercourse established between the head-quarters and Germany. By the fall of Strassburg, they possessed an important *point d'appui* for maintaining their position in Lower Elsass, as also for the operations in Upper Elsass. It also enabled the Prussians, whose present forces were nearly all in the field at Metz and Paris, to send fresh troops to their relief. In his orders of September 30th, Moltke instructed General Werder, who had superintended the blockade of Strassburg, and was then in command of the newly-formed 14th corps, to send on a division of militia to Paris, and to advance himself with the remaining corps with all speed upon the Upper Seine, in the direction of Troyes and Chatillon, to prevent the formation of any French troops in that neighbourhood. He was also to disarm the inhabitants and to re-construct the lines of rail, and by a *coup de main* to carry Langres, a fortress situated near the Epinal-Chaumont railway, or else to bombard it with a force of artillery from Strassburg, if such a proceeding on his part would not greatly interfere with his march upon the Upper Seine. The 14th corps left Strassburg in the early days of October, and crossing the Vosges passed through Epinal to Vésoul, repulsed the advance of the enemy from Besançon and came into position at Gray, between Vésoul and Dijon. Here Werder received fresh

instructions from Moltke, based upon the imminent capitulation of Metz. They were to the effect that, with the aid of two reserve divisions under Generals Schmeling and Treschow, he was to protect Elsass and his own lines of communication, and to cover the left flank of the Second Army then advancing from Metz to the Loire, and to engage in a front attack with a force of the enemy of equal strength to his own. For this purpose, as long as the French remained in force at Besançon, he was to take up his position at Vésoul, and strongly garrison Dijon against an attack from Langres, Besançon, or Belfort. Until General Treschow came up the last-named fortress would have to be carefully observed, and any excursions from there to the Vosges and Upper Elsass must be prevented, if need be, with considerable force. Any weaker divisions of the enemy were to be attacked without restriction; and, if in no way prejudicial to the main object at issue, the line of advance could be extended over Besançon southwards. In the succeeding week the instructions were carried out; Upper Elsass was occupied; Garibaldi's francs-tireurs driven back; a division of the enemy routed at Nuits, and others forced back into Langres. By December the 14th corps lay at Dijon.

Meanwhile the head-quarters had been shifted from Ferrières, and on the 5th of October were at Versailles, the King occupying the house of the Préfet, while Moltke was at Rue neuve, No. 39. His two adjutants were close by, Major de Claer and Captain von Burt, his nephew. Every day Moltke might be seen going across to the Préfet's house between nine and ten o'clock, to hold a conference with the King, which the Crown Prince and Podbielski regularly attended. The question was not merely one of the blockading and bombardment of Paris; Versailles was where all the telegraph wires of the entire German

troops converged ; the theatre of war had become gradually extended ; France could not look quietly on and see her capital surrounded, with no alternative left to its inhabitants but death by starvation, or by the guns of the enemy. She gave her sons readily enough when, at Tours, Gambetta placed himself at the head of the Ministry of the Exterior, calling upon all capable of bearing arms to join in an attack upon the blockading army. In the north, south and west of Paris, relieving corps were somehow got together : all France seemed to be transformed into one vast camp. Nowhere was the danger greater than on the Loire. It was from Orleans that Paris was to be relieved, and with the partial aid of her troops the German forces were to be compelled to retreat. Thus, in time, the theatre of war extended over nearly a third of the whole of France, reaching from Metz to Rouen and Dieppe, and from Le Mans to Besançon and Pontarlier. All these attacks on the part of the French would have to be opposed by fresh troops, and every blow which they should strike must be returned with interest. Moltke, with maps before him, explained the whole situation to his auditors and his proposed plan of action in this emergency. Provided that accurate information as to the enemy's movements could be obtained Moltke was sure of success, but if, as was the case at the beginning of January, there was a total ignorance at our head-quarters as to the movements of an entire hostile army, and important decisions had to be arrived at, based for the most part upon contradictory and unreliable information, there was good need of Moltke's genius to guard against a surprise as well as to prevent a too hasty attack on our part. At each fresh movement of the enemy, Moltke had to furnish the different German commanders with an outline of a defensive, as well to appoint the line of march to be taken for an offensive movement, and to issue instructions in accordance with an accurate

survey of the peculiarities of the several fields of operation. These instructions, at once brief and to the point, were given to men who grasped their import and would carry them out with a rod of iron.

The first thing to be done would be to offer a fresh opposition to the forces of the enemy then forming in western France. This could not be effectually done as long as seven and a half corps were obliged to be stationed at Metz alone. It was, therefore, additionally welcome to hear that that fortress would shortly have to capitulate as provisions were at an end, and there was increasing dissatisfaction among both soldiers and inhabitants. On 24th of October negotiations were opened, when the French asked for an armistice to allow of their getting in fresh supplies, or that they should be permitted to retreat to Algeria unmolested. Prince Frederick Charles, however, demanded the capitulation of the fortress and the surrender of the entire army. Two days later, Bazaine declared himself ready to accept these conditions. The capitulation was signed on the evening of the 27th, and the next day the first infantry brigade entered the fortress. By this capitulation 173,000 men were made prisoners, among them 6,000 officers, 56 eagles were captured, 622 field guns, 876 batteries of standing artillery, 72 mitrailleuses, 137,000 chassepots, 123,000 other muskets, large quantities of ammunition, and other stores. With this brilliant victory, a worthy sequel to that of Sedan, Freiherr von Moltke, who two days before had reached his seventieth year, had the title of Count conferred upon him by order of the King. On the 23rd of October, as there seemed a prospect that the fortress would capitulate, Moltke sent a telegram to the generals commanding the blockading army, directing them to despatch one of their infantry divisions by the line of rail leading to Paris. His orders of the same date gave

them particulars of the conditions of the capitulation, and arranged for the transport of the troops which were taken prisoner, and notified to the commanders that the present blockading army would now be divided into two operating armies. The first of these would comprise three corps and a half, with a division of cavalry, which were to garrison Metz, to lay siege to Diedenhofen and Montmédy, at the same time guarding the captured army, which was to withdraw under escort of the militia. The remaining forces which would, perhaps, form a couple of corps, were immediately to march on the St. Quentin-Compiègne lines, under General von Manteuffel of the cavalry. The second of these armies, comprising four *corps d'armée* and a division of cavalry, was instructed to move with all speed in the direction of Troyes, advancing from there on the Mid-Loire. Moltke had strategically to direct these new fields of operation in Burgundy, on the Mid-Loire, in Picardy and Normandy, as well as those around Paris; the latter remaining still the most important. His main object was to keep back any army intended for the relief of Paris, in order to allow the siege of the capital to proceed undisturbed. It was not a question of occupying large districts, but of preventing the assembling of any large body of troops, and of neutralizing the influence of those already in existence. The newly formed armies of operation, under Prince Frederick Charles and General Manteuffel, acted, therefore, as covering forces to the army of Paris; and Werder's corps at Dijon had to keep open the communications with Germany and prevent any attack upon Elsass. All Moltke's orders to the commanders of the three armies were to this effect. General Manteuffel was further instructed on the 29th and 30th, in addition to the orders already given him, to clear the Argonne of francs-tireurs and to carry on the sieges of Verdun and Mézières.

On the 7th November he marched from Metz, arriving before Soissons and Compiègne on the 20th, on which day he received instructions from Moltke to continue his march towards Rouen. The question as to whether this route was to be through Amiens, depended on whether the French forces assembled there remained or retreated on his advancing. In any case Amiens was of sufficient importance to be occupied and held by a stronger detachment, and the delay in the movements of the French led to the battle of the 27th of November and the occupation of the town. *General Faidherbe, availing himself of the opportunity caused by Manteuffel's advance into Normandy and occupation of Rouen, as well as of his incursions towards Dieppe and Havre, made a vigorous advance on Paris. Moltke at once dispatched several battalions of the army of the Meuse to Soissons, and on the 13th December directed Manteuffel at once to cover the rear of the Army of the Meuse, to prevent any attempts of the enemy to relieve Paris or to disturb the German communications, to hold Rouen, and from thence to observe the left bank of the Seine. On the 17th December general orders were issued on the subject of the operations in France, which clearly show the views entertained at head-quarters. "The general position of affairs renders it necessary that, after a victory, the enemy should only be pursued so far as to disperse their main forces to such an extent prolonging their concentration as much as possible. We cannot follow them to their last supports, such as Lille, Havre, Bourges, nor occupy distant provinces such as Normandy, Bretagne or Vendée, for any lengthened time, but must determine to concentrate our main forces at a few points, relinquishing others, such as Dieppe, already won. These must, as far as possible, be occupied by whole brigades, divisions, or corps. From these points, the immediate neighbourhood must be

cleared of francs-tireurs by means of flying columns, and we must there await the forming and arming of the enemy in order to assume the offensive by advancing against them." In accordance with this order the First Army was directed to assemble its main body at Beauvais, to occupy Rouen, Amiens, and St. Quentin, and to retire from the left bank of the Seine, but to watch the same. The victories of Hallue, Bapaume, and St. Quentin, on the 23rd December, 3rd and 19th January, decided the campaign in favour of the German forces in this district. "

In accordance with the order of the 23rd October, Prince Frederick Charles broke up his army immediately after the capitulation of Metz. On the 3rd November he received, at Commercy, orders from Moltke to occupy Bourges, Nevers, and Châlons-sur-Saône. On the 10th November, his head-quarters being at Troyes, Moltke directed him, by telegram, to march with all possible speed in a westerly direction. A danger of no small magnitude threatened the army of Paris from the quarter of the Mid-Loire. The Bavarian General von der Tann had been ordered to advance on Orleans, information having been received that fresh troops were assembling there, and after several successful encounters he had occupied the town on the 11th October. A few weeks later, however, two army corps advanced against him, and endeavoured to cut off his line of retreat towards Versailles. On hearing of their advance he retreated from Orleans, and after encountering the enemy while retreating at Coulmiers, being joined by other troops, which had been operating to the west of Paris, or had been dispatched to his assistance from Versailles, he opposed the enemy at Toury. The French General Aurelle de Paladines, who had been reinforced by two more army corps, received orders from Gambetta to force his way through to Versailles. Considering the unfavourable com-

position of his forces, and hearing of the advance of Prince Frederick Charles, he did not think he could venture to give battle in the open field, but rather that he would be compelled to await the attack of the enemy in a concentrated and entrenched position. This state of affairs led to Moltke's telegram of the 10th November. Prince Frederick Charles, advancing on Orleans by forced marches, faced General Aurelle on the 20th, took command of the troops under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and prepared to carry out Moltke's instructions of the 15th November, which were "to attack Orleans as soon as circumstances would permit." Various encounters took place between the 24th November and the 4th December, on which night the Germans re-entered Orleans. Gambetta, removing General Aurelle, formed two armies, placing one under the command of General Bourbaki and the other under General Chanzy. The former occupied a position at Nevers, and the latter retreated down the Loire, pursued by the army of Prince Frederick Charles beyond Blois. Chanzy fell back on Vendôme, and later on withdrew to Le Mans. Gambetta transferred his seat of government from Tours to Bordeaux and Prince Frederick Charles assembled his troops around Orleans in accordance with Moltke's orders of 17th December.

Many conflicting reports were received as to the army under Bourbaki. First it was said he proposed a junction with the army of General Chanzy, then that he was advancing by way of Gien, Montargis, and Fontainebleau, against the blockading army; again, that he had arrived at Châlons-sur-Saône by railway, and that he would relieve Belfort and threaten the German rear. Moltke having heard that Chanzy had advanced from Le Mans on Vendôme, and believing that Bourbaki intended co-operating with him in attacking simultaneously the army under Prince Frederick

Charles, thought it best that the latter should fall on his nearest foe, Chanzy, in order "to dispose of his army before the other could come up." The Prince was therefore ordered by telegram on the 1st January to assume the offensive against Chanzy, to hold Orleans, and to watch in force the roads leading to Nevers on the right bank of the Loire. He was also informed that in order further to guard against Bourbaki, the Pomeranian Corps under General Fransecky, had been sent to take up position at Montargis, and that General Zastrow, who with a division of his corps had been stationed at Auxerre since the 20th December, and who, on the report of Bourbaki's advance on Belfort had been sent to Montbard, had now been ordered back to Auxerre and to show front to Bourbaki at Nevers. On the 6th January Prince Frederick Charles broke up his camp, and, leaving one division in and around Orleans, advanced with four army corps and four divisions of cavalry, together 58,097 infantry, 14,925 cavalry, and 318 guns, and defeating the army under General Chanzy in daily encounters, on the 12th January took Le Mans and forced his foe back into Bretagne. At the same time General Werder had given battle to the troops under Bourbaki, who, in order to mislead Prince Frederick Charles, had left an army corps between Nevers and Vierzon, and towards the end of December had led three army corps to Besançon, where he joined himself to a newly formed corps as well as to the division under Cremer. General Werder, who at the same time had heard of the assembling of large forces at Besançon, had, with Moltke's consent, moved from Dijon, and concentrated his army corps at Vésoul, in order from thence more effectually to cover the siege of Belfort. On the 5th January, General Werder was informed by French prisoners that two of Bourbaki's army corps were in front of him, and communi-

cated the same to Versailles by telegraph. Moltke ascertained at the same time from a reliable source the plan of operations about to be adopted by the French, and on seeing how matters stood in the east of France determined energetically to counteract the same. On the 7th January he gave orders for the Second Army Corps, then at Montargis, and the Seventh, a division of which was at Auxerre, to be within the lines of Nuits-Chatillon by the 12th January. These two army corps, in conjunction with the 14th, were to compose a new army to be designated the Army of the South. The command was entrusted to General Manteuffel, who hitherto had commanded the First Army. He was summoned to Amiens by telegraph on the 10th January, where he received his instructions personally from the King and Moltke, and on the 11th repaired to Chatillon to assume his command. Moltke stated in the presence of the King, that "the operations entrusted to General Manteuffel are extremely bold ones, but may lead to the greatest results; so that, even if he should receive a check he must not be blamed, for in order to arrive at great results something must be ventured."

On the 7th of January Moltke gave orders to General Werder, before all things to cover the siege of Belfort as well as the south of Elsass, not to directly resist an advance of the enemy to the west of the Vosges, but in conjunction with the troops in Lorraine to watch them, and assume the offensive and to destroy their line of communication as soon as the forces before him were less numerous than his own. He was, further, to act independently up to the 12th and report direct to Versailles. He, therefore, on the 11th, left Vésoul and occupied a defensive position before Belfort. On Bourbaki advancing against him with four army corps, and finding his position much weakened, owing to the frozen state of the waters, he telegraphed on

the evening of the 14th to Versailles, to know whether, under the existing circumstances, he was to accept battle before Belfort. Moltke answered to the following effect :—
 “Await enemy ; attack in a covering position before Belfort and accept battle. It is of the utmost importance, at the same time, to command the road from Lure to Belfort. Manteuffel’s advance will be felt in a few days.” General Werder accepted battle and defeated Bourbaki, who, after three days’ fighting, withdrew on the 18th of January, and endeavoured to escape towards Lyons, by way of Besançon. General Manteuffel, however, with the two other corps, placed himself across his path, compelling the demoralized French army either to give battle against a well thought-out military combination, to capitulate without fighting, or to escape surrender by crossing the Swiss frontier.

The armistice concluded at Versailles on the 28th of January apparently obviated the necessity for making a choice of the three fatal evils ; but Moltke, feeling certain of a favourable result, had distinctly demanded during the negotiation, that the three Eastern Departments, the Côte d’Or, Doubs and the Jura, as well as Belfort, were not to be included in the same, and that military operations there were not to be discontinued. General Manteuffel was informed of this by telegraph on the 29th of January, and the French army having thus no option, crossed over into Switzerland on the 1st of February.

The war was now drawing to a close. The several armies of relief had been beaten back, and either rendered harmless for a length of time, or as long as the war should last. The sorties of the army in Paris between the 19th of September and the 19th of January had all been repulsed ; the inhabitants of Paris were drawing their last rations. Moltke took an active part, as far as military matters were concerned, in the preliminary agreements at Versailles, as well

as in the negotiations for the capitulation of Paris and the armistice. The partial dislocation of the troops, as well as their homeward march, had yet to be regulated. On the 7th of March the head-quarters left Versailles, and Moltke, who on the 31st of July had accompanied his commander-in-chief as King to this war, now returned with him as Emperor to Berlin. With the greatest rejoicings the conquerors were received there on the 17th of March, and on the triumphal entry, on the 16th of June 1871, the Emperor William created the Chief of his Staff a General Field Marshal. Moltke's name was second on the list of subsidies which the Emperor distributed with the consent of the Reichstag. He met with a distinguished reception at St. Petersburg on the occasion of the Festival of St. George, on December 8th, 1871, to which he had been specially invited by the Emperor Alexander. In April 1873 Moltke with Prince Bismarck again visited St. Petersburg, in the suite of the Emperor William. So great was the esteem in which he was held by the Emperor Alexander, that during the Russo-Turkish war he, on the night of the 22nd of June 1877, telegraphed to Moltke from his head-quarters at Plojesti, informing him that the Rjasan regiment, of which he was honorary colonel, was the first to cross the Danube and place foot in the enemy's country. Many of the chief cities in Germany, amongst others Berlin, Hamburg, Magdeburg and Leipzig, elected him an honorary citizen, and he was chosen member of Parliament for the electoral district of Memel-Heydekrug. On the 2nd of October 1876 a colossal statue of General Field Marshal Count Moltke was unveiled at Parchim, his birth-place, in the presence of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and a number of military deputations. On the 28th of January 1872 the Emperor William named him a life-member of the Upper Chamber, and on the 2nd of September 1873 ordered that

one of the newly-erected forts at Strassburg should be named "Moltke." By his direction the head constructor of the navy, Captain Livonius, at the launching of a corvette at Danzig on the 13th of October 1877, christened the vessel the *Moltke*, making a most flattering speech on the occasion.

Wherever the victor of Königgrätz and Sedan appeared he was the object of universal attention, and called forth demonstrations of national enthusiasm, whether when in attendance on the Emperor at the annual manœuvres, or when accompanying some of the staff officers to different parts of Germany for purposes of observation, or when visiting Italy for his health in April 1876, where the representative of the first military power in Europe was received in Rome with all possible distinction.



IN THE GERMAN REICHSTAG.

1867-78.

MOLTKE seldom speaks in the Reichstag. A whole session may pass without his addressing the House, but when he does, there is a death-like silence amid the throng of eager listeners, anxious that not a word should escape them. Most of his speeches bear naturally upon military questions. He has always energetically upheld army organization and a thorough maintenance of the troops, devoting all the wealth of his extensive knowledge to the task. His speeches are eminently distinguished by a thorough knowledge of his subject, coupled with great clearness and elegance. On the occasion of a debate in the North-German Reichstag as to the two years' or three years' term of service, in his speech of the 3rd of April, he gave it as his opinion that the latter term was absolutely indispensable in order to maintain an efficient working army. After a vivid exposition of the financial and economical side of the question, he struck at the root of the matter, namely, as to whether the advantage of a more thorough drill were counterbalanced by that of having a larger number of men at command in time of war, which would be the case under the two years' system of service. Though he admitted this, he did not think it merited any serious attention, for the Government would probably never be really at a loss for men, while for these larger formations the requisite number of officers would not be forthcoming. "I have only to

quote statistics to show that officers are an important element in the conduct of a campaign. We have one to every fifty men, and in every twenty men we lose an officer. If you effect a formation without a sufficient number of really skilled officers, you will have a mass of brave men but not a troop. Last year we took something like 50,000 men prisoner, and the number of our missing was three thousand, of which perhaps the lesser half was taken prisoner; though, of course, this cannot be vouched for. Whence this enormous difference? I can only ascribe it to the duration of service. Financial pressure forced Austria to adopt a system of service by which the infantry soldier's period of service was on an average from fifteen to eighteen months. Her troops have certainly fought with great bravery, the officers setting a splendid example; and she, too, lost a great many of her officers. But with serious difficulties came a laxity of discipline; whole bodies of troops were taken prisoner in skirmishes round villages and in woods. With us the cry everywhere was, 'Where's the captain?—where did the captain say we were to go?' Gentlemen, this sentiment of unswerving loyalty at all times, and under all circumstances, is not a mere matter of drill—it can only be acquired by long usage, and is not to be gained in a couple of years."

Article VI. of the law on military service introduced by the Government, recited: "During the remainder of the seven years' service the soldiers to be allowed to enter the reserve so far as not to interfere with the annual drill, the necessary strengthening or mobilization of the forces, the fitting out of the fleet, or other military requirements." The progress party wished to limit these exceptions to the mobilization of the forces only, and others in the House to the event of preparation for war. Bismarck, Moltke and Roon opposed these amendments, on the ground that they

showed want of confidence, and they were consequently rejected. Moltke said in the sitting of the 18th of October 1867, "It has been proposed to word the clause 'in the case of preparation for war,' or 'if war should break out,' from political and police reasons. This last interpretation of the matter is nearest the point without, however, including every case which might make a strengthening of the forces necessary. Had we last spring, during the discussion of the Luxemburg question, been compelled to increase our forces in the Rhine provinces, and had we done so on the grounds of 'preparation for war,' the excitability of our neighbours would have rendered war inevitable. However, it is not war we want but peace—peace which shall enable us to develop our internal relations and to regulate our home affairs, and if we are prevented, then we must have war. I trust that we shall not carry out the theory of a weak attacking force and a strong defensive one. In such case we should have fared badly during the last war, and would have had to fight in Silesia and not in Bohemia and Moravia. An army cannot be divided in this manner. One that protects the nation best by attacking, is the one that will defend it best should it unluckily be forced to do so ; and in such case no one can doubt that it would find a necessary, powerful and excellent support in the militia."

At the sitting of the North-German parliament on June 15, 1868, in the course of a discussion on a loan for naval purposes, Moltke said : "What reasonable man would not wish that the enormous sums that are now spent in Europe for military purposes could be devoted to objects of peace ? War is but a continuance of politics, the methods employed being different. To reach this end I see only one means, namely, that a power should arise in the heart of Europe, which, without being an aggressive one, is yet strong

enough to be able to forbid war to its neighbours. And thus, I believe, that if ever this blissful work is brought about, that it will have its origin in Germany; only, however, when she shall be strong enough, in other words, when she is united. By this I do not mean to say that it wants an united Germany in order to have a large army and a large fleet, on the contrary, we need these latter in order to reach this unity, and we may then hope at some future time to be able to reduce our expenditure. Our neighbours all know quite well—though some of them may not acknowledge it—that we do not intend to attack; they must also be taught that we shall not allow ourselves to be attacked. For these reasons we require an army and a fleet.” Speaking in the German Reichstag on the 7th of June 1872, on the subject of military punishments, he says: “It is impossible to judge of military punishment from a jurist’s or a citizen’s point of view. Authority and obedience are the soul of an army. An army without discipline is worthless in war and dangerous in peace. It was discipline which carried us victoriously through three campaigns. It must be borne in mind that every healthy man of the legal age has to serve, and amongst these are many who would be candidates for a prison were it not for their corresponding military training. It is in the interests of the service that punishments should be short but severe. They are not for the well-behaved soldier but for defaulters.” At a consultation held at the Admiralty on the 23rd of June 1873, concerning a scheme for cutting a canal from the Baltic at the cost of from fifty to sixty million thalers, Moltke opposed the same, on the grounds that the pecuniary and military advantages to be gained were not in proportion to the large outlay; he thought that the money had better be spent in the formation of a second fleet.

In 1874 a measure was introduced into the Reichstag

fixing the permanent strength of the army in time of peace at 401,659 men, not including the volunteers of one year's service. The debate commenced on the 16th of February, and after a member of the progress party had opposed the measure on the grounds that the number of men should not be permanently fixed but be voted annually with the Budget, Moltke rose and said: "The first necessity for a state in order to exist is to secure itself externally. Minor ones can do this either by neutrality or by international guarantees: a great Power must rely upon itself and on its strength, being armed and determined to defend its liberty and its right. To leave a country defenceless would be the greatest crime a government could commit. It must not be forgotten that the results of many years of economy in peace may all be lost in one year of war. I bear in mind how much our country suffered during the unfortunate campaigns of 1808 to 1812. Napoleon might well boast of the milliard which he had extorted from the impoverished Prussia of that day. It has been said that it is the schoolmaster who has won our battles for us. Mere knowledge, however, does not raise a man to that point at which he is willing to stake his life for an idea—for duty, honour, or Fatherland. It needs an entire training for this. It is not the schoolmaster but the state which has won our battles,—the state, which for sixty years past has been physically and morally arming and training the nation to punctuality and order, to conscientious obedience, to love of country and manliness. The army in its full strength cannot be dispensed with as an internal means of education. And how as regards things external? Possibly some future more fortunate generation, whose burden we now bear, may hope to be able to escape from the state of armed peace which has oppressed Europe for so long time. For us, however, is no such prospect. An event of such historical moment

as the re-establishment of the German Empire can hardly be completed in a short space of time. What in one half-year we have won with the sword, we may have to guard for half a century with the sword, lest it be taken from us. We must not deceive ourselves. Our successes in the field may have brought us universal respect, but hardly universal love. On all sides the suspicion fronts us, that as Germany has grown a powerful neighbour, she may in the future prove an uncomfortable one as well. Belgium's sympathies are with France; Holland fears an invasion on our part; even England talks of the danger of a German army landing on her shores. Denmark increases her coasting fleet and strengthens the defences of Iceland. The Russian Baltic provinces and Austro-Germany are pointed at as the objects of Germany's policy of conquest. And France, our most interesting neighbour, let us see what she is doing! She has faithfully imitated our military system, and, first and foremost, has enacted a twenty-years' term of service instead of one of twelve. The government has already been empowered to raise the strength of the active army to 1,200,000 men, and that of the territorial army to over one million. In view of this object she has considerably increased her cadres, those of the infantry from 116 to 152, those of the artillery from 164 to 323, in addition to nine rifle battalions and fourteen regiments of cavalry. Her army on a peace footing has been increased by 40,000 men, and for 1874 consists of 471,000 men and 91,310 horses. In lieu of eight *corps d'armée*, she has now eighteen, exclusive of one in Algeria. The vote for military purposes has been augmented since 1871 by twenty-five million dollars. The Chamber, regardless of party factions, has willingly made every sacrifice in order to restore and enlarge its military power, and has even lately voted seventeen millions towards the calling out of the *seconde portion*. Nor have

the Communists been behindhand in their patriotism ; they have built barracks and granted drilling grounds. Gentlemen, all this clearly shows the feeling in France. I certainly believe that the great majority of Frenchmen are convinced of the absolute necessity for preserving peace at present. My opinion is confirmed by seeing a military man of such penetration and foresight at the head of the French Government. Yet we have all of us witnessed how French party spirit, having its expression in Paris, has been able to force both government and people alike to take the most extraordinary resolves. A wild cry surges across the Vosges mountains, one of vengeance for a self-courted defeat. We have not followed our neighbour's example of increasing the strength of our armies, believing that the present 'proposal will meet our needs. But we dare not diminish its internal efficiency either by shortening the term of service or by reducing its numbers in time of peace." The first proceeding, as he thinks, would lead to a system of militia, the uselessness of which was apparent during the American war of secession, and its political and social dangers demonstrated in the establishment of a Commune in Paris at the end of our last war. "As to the peace footing, I must impressively caution you against allowing it to become a question of finance. I know that many honourable members make a firm stand at this point, in order to protect the hitherto undisputed right of control over the national purse. I ask them to consider whether in so doing they are not impairing the rights of the country in a matter affecting the very existence of the state. It appears to me undesirable again to introduce a provisional state of things, but for once definitely to fix what forces are those which Germany can call into action. The normal strength of her troops in time of peace must for some years remain unaltered. Any shifting of figures introduces an element of uncertainty

which will hinder the vast and minute preparations which must long precede our attitude of quiet confidence in anticipating an attack. It must be borne in mind that any diminution in numbers re-acts for twelve years, and who can venture to predict that in twelve years' time we shall have peace or war? Yet I think we shall be able to prove to the world that we are become a powerful as well as a peace-loving people, a nation not needing war either for conquest or renown. I am really at a loss to know what we could do with any part of Russia or France which we might conquer. I trust that for years to come we shall not only be able to keep peace but to dictate it. The world will then perhaps be convinced that a powerful Germany in the centre of Europe is the best guarantee for the peace of Europe. But for this purpose we must be prepared for war, and it is my opinion that we must now decide either, in the present state of Europe, to deny the necessity of a powerful and well-appointed army, or else to vote the requisite means for the proper maintenance of the same."

This speech was the subject of much comment, more particularly in France. In consequence of it, the national party in the House proposed a compromise by which the number of men was to be fixed for seven years. This was accepted by the Emperor and sanctioned by the Chamber. In order to let it be known that the acceptance of this compromise had not altered his opinion, Moltke, speaking on April 13th, said: "As long as threats of revenge are uttered, we cannot forget that it is necessary to keep the sword in the scabbard and that a disarmament would conduce to war, however much we might wish to avoid it. If we had known earlier how peaceably to unite Germany, our struggle with France would perhaps never have taken place. But in 1869 and 1870 we were not united. However, we have not abused our strength, for we might have starved the two

and a half millions of the inhabitants in Paris. The government would have been obliged to comply with any demands which we might make. We contented ourselves with demanding the return of those provinces which a restless neighbour had torn from a weak one. As to the other war indemnity, no number of milliards can heal the wounds inflicted on our families by the war. We can give our new countrymen in Elsass a couple of centuries to become our friends, but we must likewise have the power to hold what we have won. We must not rely upon our superior numbers ; we must put our trust in the internal efficiency of our army."

In the year 1877 a vote of 465,000 marks was asked for by the Government to enable it to increase the number of officers in the army by one hundred and twenty-two. The reasons given for this necessary increase were the weakness of the cadres of the German regiments, the concentration of French troops on the frontier of Elsass and Lothringen and the smallness of the German forces in those provinces. Moltke, whose speech was considered by the French as addressed to them rather than to the German Government, said : " The vote in question has been opposed, not on the score of its inutility, but because it increases the military Budget. It has been remarked that it is a bad precedent to increase the number of officers in time of peace as they are only of service in time of war. The reply to this is simply that all grades of officers exist in time of peace as officers are needed in time of war. We have had our attention drawn to the very much weaker state of the French battalions, but at the same time it has not been pointed out how very much more numerous these are. The number of men composing these battalions, with their necessary contingents of other arms, is 487,000, whereas Germany, with a larger population by several millions, only maintains a little over 400,000 men. From a military point

of view, weak battalions are altogether undesirable. I believe it is a question among military men, and nowhere more so than in France, whether it is possible with companies of forty or fifty men to perfect the troops in all branches of the service, besides the inevitable garrison duties. Certainly, if it is intended to take the field with 1,092 battalions, of which 641 are maintained in time of peace, it is difficult to strengthen them very much without incurring an enormous expenditure. The French military budget with its weak battalions exceeds the German with its strong ones by one hundred and fifty millions annually, independently of extraordinary and supplementary votes. It remains to be seen whether even a rich country like France is willing to take upon itself a burden such as this for all time, or if it is doing so with a fixed and not altogether remote object in view. It has been remarked that probably under present circumstances an absolute government would be more likely to reduce than to increase the army. I have the hope and the wish of the speaker for a lasting peace, but not his confidence in the same. Happy the time when it will no longer be necessary for the states to devote the largest portion of their revenues to the protection of their very existence—when government and nation shall alike be convinced that even in a successful campaign the loss exceeds the gain, and that it is no advantage to purchase material wealth at the cost of human life. But mutual distrust stands in the way of such an advance of humanity, and in this want of confidence lies the greatest danger. Some of our border provinces, though belonging to the realm, are not of German nationality. These have fought with equal bravery at our side though their interests and ours are by no means identical. Would it not, therefore, be madness to weaken ourselves by extending our territory? Germany's desire for peace is so

clearly founded on necessity, that the whole world should be convinced of it. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the profound mistrust shewn towards us, notably by our western neighbours. The French journals, even the leading ones, all display their marked dislike of us, although it be but faintly expressed. Of their scorn, ridicule and contempt I will not speak : there is no reasonable ground for all that. The truth is, however, although the French press does not publish it, that there is a national anxiety lest, after France has so repeatedly attacked Germany when weak, she, in like manner now grown strong, should wantonly assail her former oppressor. This will account for many facts, among others for the gigantic work which the French have accomplished in having re-organized their army in so short a time, and for the disproportionately large number of men, chiefly cavalry and artillery, stationed since the conclusion of peace between Paris and our frontier. It is also a noteworthy circumstance, that in France all party factions are at one in this, namely, to acquiesce in every demand which shall be made on behalf of the army ; while with us it is difficult to obtain even a small sum to increase the efficiency of our own. In France the army is the darling of the nation, its pride, its hope, whose defeat has long since been forgiven. I will not say that our victories have been forgotten, but if, on the next occasion we are to expect the same services from our army, we should not be so niggardly in granting the means necessary for its further development. It seems that our neighbours intend in future to depend for results upon overwhelming numbers, and that is certainly a very important fact. We, again, rely more upon the careful improvement of our troops and upon their internal capabilities. The French have one very decided advantage over us in that they possess, in time of peace, the cadres necessary for all their numerous forma-

tions in time of war. It has rightly been said, that in passing this measure we shall not increase the strength of the army, but it will enable a number of officers to fit themselves better for the positions which they will be called upon to fill in time of war. It is quite natural that a person taken suddenly from any other vocation in life, and placed under the most trying circumstances at the head of a troop, should at first experience some embarrassment, which could not fail to make itself felt among the men. Indecision in commanding produces unreliability in obedience. You need not fear that the extra officers demanded will lead an idle life. There is abundance to be done. I think that notably those honourable members who have taken part in the councils of commission are convinced that our military administration is really an economical one, demanding only what is actually needful. Gentlemen, I recommend your acceptance of the measure." The vote was passed by the Reichstag and the notified "Ausgleichungsmassregel" effected by an imperial decree of the 26th of May, which resulted in a substantial reinforcement of the garrison at Metz.

Dark days were to come. The attempt upon the Emperor's life on May 11th, 1878, disclosed the dangerous abyss on the brink of which Germany stood. But the Government had not been blind to the fact. As far back as the year 1875, when the penal code was under consideration, it had demanded fuller powers of action for suppressing the democratic clubs and meetings, and for restricting the Socialist press. In the early part of 1876 Prince Bismarck and Count Eulenberg, the Minister of the Interior, distinctly drew the attention of Parliament to the organization, the resources and the aims of the social Democrats. The House, notwithstanding, declined to accept the "elastic clauses" (*Kautschukparagrafen*). After the attempt upon the Emperor's life, the guilt of which was plainly shared

in by this now permanent conspiracy, the Government plan for the suppression of socialism was submitted to the Reichstag, and formed the subject of debate on May the 23rd and 24th. After opposition speeches from several members, who were seen with regret upon the Socialist side, Count Moltke rose and said : " I sincerely trust that those honourable members who both yesterday and to-day have combated the proposed measures of the Government, may not soon be under the necessity of themselves demanding the enactment of this very law ; or, it may be, of a very much more stringent one. The measure may require amendment ; but it seems to me that there is a widespread desire for some better security than at present exists against the dangers which threaten the state through the increase of social democracy. I fear its leaders have well-nigh reached that point at which a fulfilment of their promises will be required of them. But these gentlemen well know the obstacles in their path. They cannot deny that the first partition of property involves the hundredth ; that an equality of wealth means an equality of poverty ; and that want and privation are a necessary condition of humanity which no form of Government, no code of laws, no human measures can ever set aside. And how could the human race have attained to its present development without the aid of these coercive elements in the divine economy ? No, there will always be care and labour in the Future. But a man starving with cold and hunger does not think of the Future, but grasps at such means of relief as the Present holds out to him, and is driven by unbridled passion and mortified hopes to acts of violence which his leaders are least of all capable of hindering, being themselves, as a rule, the first victims of a revolution. Now in what position does the Government find itself confronted by all this ? Is it always to be looked upon as an adverse

power requiring the utmost limitation and restriction? Is it not time to grant it ample means and scope to act in defence of our common interests? The history of the Commune in Paris may teach us the dire consequences of allowing the reins of government to slip from one's hands. *There* was an opportunity of showing what democracy could do towards an attempted realization of its ideals. Yet though it destroyed much, it constructed nothing. The authentic accounts of this terrible episode in French history open up to our view an appalling condition of corruption, and describe a state of things which might well be deemed impossible in the nineteenth century; but which, happening under the very eyes of our troops, were witnessed by them without the possibility of prevention. I am far from believing that even the most misguided of our working class desire anything of this sort; but on the path of overthrow the evil element soon absorbs the good; and a moderate Liberal always has a Radical at his back to goad him on. And this has been the chief error of so many in thinking it possible to level down to their own standard and then to call 'Halt!' as if an express train could be pulled up at a moment's notice without destruction to all who are in it! And then, side by side with the honest Liberal, we have the Professors of Barricades and the 'pétroleuses' of 1871. Gentlemen, you may reject the bill to day, in the belief that the Government is strong enough to prevent violent outbreaks, if not to put them down by sheer force. Alas! this is an expedient as sad as it is ineffectual—one which only arrests the danger for a time without healing the wound from whence it springs. Rather than resort to such deplorable means had we not better unite in giving force to a law which, by a temporary but wise restriction of that liberty which has been so abused will restore social order, and will, in a special manner, further the

real interests of our working brethren, who can never be efficiently helped but by the slow yet certain path of legislation, moral education and industry. I, for my part, shall vote for it." Although this speech was loudly applauded, the bill was thrown out by a majority of 251 to 57; and the fears which Moltke expressed at the commencement of his speech were speedily realized. The attempt of June 2nd was followed by a dissolution of Parliament, and fresh laws were framed of a "much more stringent" nature than the last.


Under all aspects Moltke remains the same. We have seen him as an officer of the line; as military adviser on the Bosphorus and the Euphrates; as chief of the Prussian staff; as victor of Königgrätz and Sedan; and, lastly, as an orator in Parliament. We are throughout constrained to admire the sterling qualities of his character—his pure and thorough devotion to the service which owned him—his self-sacrifice and unswerving faithfulness in the discharge of his duties, joined to a penetration and a foresight which are well nigh prophetic. After a life rich in events and in results, Field Marshal Count Moltke stands now, at the age of seventy-eight, in the broad sunlight of his high position. All the full vigour of his manhood, all the maturer wisdom of his riper years, all the best impulses of his whole life he has dedicated to his country; and to the full he earns that country's gratitude and lasting praise.


THE END.



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